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Introduction
Multinational firms account for more than a half of world trade, and the majority
of foreign direct investment (FDI) is horizontal. Since the horizontal FDI is mainly
driven by demand factors, this work focuses on the demand component determin-
ing choices of firms about entering into particular foreign markets and setting up
global sales networks. Importantly, the entry into a new market is subject to uncer-
tainty regarding the perception of firm’s product by foreign consumers, as well as the
realizations of aggregate demand fluctuations. On top of this, the returns to multina-
tional activity can vary across countries and industries, which generate differences
in the foreign-market entry patterns. In this dissertation, I introduce the structural
frameworks suitable for the analysis of industry-specific choices of firms about the
multinational sales structure under demand risk.
This thesis consists of two self-contained chapters. Both chapters are a joint work
with Francesco Paolo Conteduca. Chapter 1 titled Serving Abroad: Export, M&A,
and Greenfield Investment studies foreign-market entry patterns in the professional
services industry. Chapter 2 titled The Structure of Multinational Sales under Demand
Risk analyzes the effects of demand risk on the location and sales structure of multi-
national firms in the manufacturing sector.
Chapter 1. This chapter contributes to the literature on trade in services and proximity-
concentration tradeoff when distinguishing between M&A and greenfield invest-
ment.
Services sector plays an important role in the international trade: it accounts for
about two thirds of the world foreign direct investment flows and one fifth of the
world export. However, trade in services has not been much investigated yet. In this
chapter, we show that the findings on the entry patterns predicted by the classical
proximity-concentration literature for the manufacturing sector are not empirically
confirmed for service exporters and multinationals. In particular, in the German pro-
fessional services industry, only the largest firms export their services, while middle-
range firms serve foreign markets via FDI. Moreover, the majority of FDI entries oc-
cur via cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&A). In this chapter, we develop a
theoretical framework in order to rationalize the differences in foreign-market entry
xvi
patterns across industries and countries. Understanding the determinants of sort-
ing patterns into foreign activities is then relevant for the analysis of the effects of
service-trade liberalization.
The model features horizontal FDI and exports with firms that are heterogeneous
in terms of revenue productivity. Firms can choose to serve foreign markets via ex-
porting, cross-border mergers, or greenfield investment. The key ingredients of this
model are country- and industry-specific entry costs and returns associated to each
entry alternative, which makes the framework sufficiently flexible to accommodate
different orderings of entry types in terms of firm’s revenue productivity and empir-
ically tractable not only for the services sector, but also for other sectors.
Specifically for the services sector, the mechanism underlying the entry choice is
the following. The heterogeneity in the revenue productivity is mainly explained
by the differences in the service quality and strength of firms’ brands. Greenfield
investment and exporting are subject to the standard proximity-concentration trade-
off and, in addition, associated with uncertainty about foreign quality perception,
while M&A can serve as a device to resolves uncertainty about quality perception in
a foreign market, as it provides an acquirer with access to the network of consumers
and expertise of an already preexisting firm. Reproduction of high quality abroad
potentially requires larger fixed entry costs, inducing high-quality service firms to
export.
We structurally estimate the fundamental market-specific parameters of the model
using firm-level FDI and trade data for a sample of German firms in the professional
services industry. The empirical findings confirm the reversed sorting patterns of
services firms into export and FDI. The relative sorting of M&A vs. greenfield FDI
in terms of firm quality is market-specific and depends on the relative importance of
uncertainty about quality perception, the structure of entry costs, and size of syner-
gies associated with M&A. In the second tier of our empirical analysis, we calibrate
the general equilibrium implied by our model and discuss the simulation of trade
liberalization in the services sector. Given that services FDI have larger intensive and
extensive margins than exports, one would expect the main liberalization effect to
come from an increase in multinational activity. This is crucially different from the
manufacturing, where the change in the trade barriers mainly results in an increase
in exports. The developed model captures the industry-specific entry patterns and
assess how exactly the composition of international services flows change following
liberalization as heterogeneous firms adjust their entry and supply choices.
Chapter 2. This chapter develops an empirical framework to analyze how multina-
tionals design their production and sales structure under demand risk. The multina-
tional activity involves a set of complex location and sales decisions. MNEs (multi-
national enterprises) decide in which countries to locate their production facilities,
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how much to produce and which markets to serve from each foreign plant. More-
over, the multinational activity is subject to the global uncertainty on the realizations
of industry-demands in the prospective destination markets. Since MNEs take into
account the global interdependences of demand risks across prospective destination
markets, this is reflected their investment flows and the multinational production
structure.
In our structural model we consider firms that are heterogeneous in terms of risk
attitudes and productivity. As MNEs are weakly risk averse, the location and sales
decisions hinge both on the expected demand for each market and the correlation
structure of demand shocks across destination markets. As a result, firms are less
prone to concentrate sales in similar markets, and use multinational sales as a mean
of diversification.
We use firm-level FDI data for German multinational companies to structurally
identify firm-specific risk aversion coefficients as well as other model parameters.
We find that multinationals are risk averse on average and heterogeneous in terms
of risk aversion. Moreover, we study the quantitative implications of the model: we
show that the model with risk aversion performs significantly better in terms of pre-
dicting location and sales structure of German multinationals compared to a version
with risk neutral firms. At a more aggregate level, we find that risk aversion varies
also across the different industries included in our analysis. More specifically, risk
aversion correlates with the demand characteristics of the sector rather than with its
technological features, with more risk averse firms operating in industries character-
ized by a relatively more disperse demand.
In a counterfactual analysis, we simulate the trade liberalization in China and an-
alyze how the policy of cutting import tariffs changes the structure of multinational
sales of German firms. We find that German multinationals increase their sales not
only in China but also in the USA and Japan, whereas neighboring countries like
Hong Kong and Singapore are negatively affected. Therefore, the presence of risk
aversion generates the spillover effects of liberalization. We also demonstrate that a
change in the average risk aversion of German multinationals produces a larger vari-
ation in the sales toward those countries which are more correlated with Germany,
whereas more distant and regions are less involved.

1Chapter 1
Serving Abroad: Export,
M&A, and Greenfield
Investment
1.1 Introduction
Going abroad, firms select between opening a foreign branch, which allows them to
be close to their consumers, and exporting, which is associated with variable trade
costs but avoids duplication costs. This so-called proximity-concentration tradeoff is
extensively discussed in the trade literature. In line with the empirical evidence for
the manufacturing sector, a seminal paper by Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple (2004)
finds that only the most productive firms conduct foreign direct investment (FDI),
while less productive firms serve foreign markets via exports.1 However, the en-
try patterns for service exporters and multinationals do not correspond to the ones
predicted by the classical proximity-concentration literature. Specifically, in the Ger-
man professional services industry,2 only the most productive firms export their ser-
vices, while less productive firms opt for FDI.3 In particular, the average exporter
1For the manufacturing sector in Germany, Ottaviano and Mayer (2007) find that relative to ex-
porters, multinationals are substantially larger, more productive, pay higher wages and generate higher
value added. In particular, exporters are 3.0 times larger than domestic producers, while multinational
firms are 13.2 times larger. Same difference holds true for other countries.
2Professional services can be described as a broad consulting industry, including legal and account-
ing activities, management consultancy activities, architectural and engineering activities, technical
testing and analysis, scientific research and development, advertising and market research, veterinary
activities and other professional, scientific and technical activities. In our analysis, we also consider IT
consulting and administrative and support service activities.
3According to the General Agreement in Trade in Services, there are four possible modes to trade
services abroad. A transaction can occur without a physical movement of a consumer or a service
provider to a location of the other (mode 1); a consumer can receive the service in the country of a
service supplier, which would be specified under the mode 2; finally, a service provider can temporarily
move to the location of its foreign buyer (mode 4) or establish a branch there (mode 3). The statistical
data on services trade for German firms further aggregate these modes and classify modes 1, 2 and 4 as
export.
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is 3.0 times larger and sells 2.1 times more domestically than an average multina-
tional firm.4 When breaking down service FDI by entry mode, 73% of FDI occurs via
cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&A), and only 27% via the opening of new
establishments abroad (greenfield investment).5 Moreover, M&A generates larger
affiliate sales than greenfield investment.
In this chapter, we rationalize the differences in foreign-market entry patterns across
industries and analyze their implications for trade-liberalization outcomes. The study
of the last question is particularly relevant for understanding the effects of service-
trade liberalization and potential differences in the outcomes compared to manu-
facturing due to the specific features of this sector.6 This chapter contributes to
the area of the literature concerned with the structural estimation of the proximity-
concentration tradeoff by taking into account the distinction between M&A and green-
field investment, as well as by introducing industry- and country-specific returns
to exporting and FDI. Due to the potential differences in the sorting patterns into
FDI and exporting, the liberalization can have different effect in the services sector
compared to manufacturing, so that the main change in the intensive and extensive
margins would come from FDI rather than exporting.
We build a structural model of horizontal FDI with firms that are heterogeneous in
terms of their service quality. Firms can choose to serve foreign markets via export-
ing, cross-border mergers (M&A), or greenfield investment. Since foreign consumers
can have a different perception of the service quality, entry into a new foreign mar-
ket is associated with uncertainty about demand. Therefore, firms face the tradeoff
between trying to transmit their core quality to a prospective market without ex ante
observing the tastes of foreign consumers (via greenfield investment and exporting),
and “buying demand” of a preexisting foreign firm in order to get access to its net-
work of consumers and its expertise (via M&A).7 Moreover, as replicating a qual-
ity abroad is potentially subject to larger costs for firms with initially higher qual-
ity, these firms may decide to export in order to avoid larger entry costs associated
with high-quality greenfield investment. In our model, the M&A process features
“cherry-picking,” meaning that better targets are more likely to be acquired. Finally,
acquisitions provide a higher return to core quality when the magnitude of synergies
between the acquirer and the targets is larger.
The model generates a completely flexible relationship between quality and entry
4Similar evidence was found by Bhattacharya, Patnaik, and Shah (2012) for the Indian software
industry and by Oldenski (2012) for the US services industry.
5The statistics is reported for the average parameters over the period 2005 – 2014 in Germany. For
comparison, in the manufacturing sector, 62.6% of FDI entries in during this period occur via M&A.
6Analyzing the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), Francois, Manchin, Nor-
berg, Pindyuk, and Tomberger (2013) find that reduction in non-tariff barriers has larger impact for the
manufacturing sector than for the services.
7The Baker & McKenzie (2014) survey names “the acquisition of customers or distribution net-
works” as the main incentive for cross-border mergers and acquisitions. According to their survey, the
chief financial officer of a South African MNE in the professional-services sector say about the M&A in
Mauritius: “The customer base was very attractive and we were confident of extracting the value by
targeting the customer base of the target company.”
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types8 for each market. Entry patterns depend on the industry- and country-specific
parameters, which determine the return to firm’s core quality for each entry type in
a given market. For example, high-quality services are more likely to be provided
via greenfield investment if expected perceived quality is high and FDI entry costs
do not increase much in quality. Alternatively, one will observe high-quality services
to be exported if variable trade costs are low and expected perceived quality is high.
Finally, high-quality services will be provided via M&A if targets are on average
of high quality and synergies between acquirers and targets are substantial. Thus,
depending on the characteristics of the industry, the model is able to deliver different
outcomes regarding entry patterns and foreign sales for each entry type.
We then structurally estimate the fundamental parameters of the model for each
market. We base our empirical analysis on firm-level data for German multination-
als and exporters operating in the professional services sector. In particular, we con-
sider the cross-section of the first entries of German multinationals into the EU, the
US and the rest of the world markets during the period 2005 – 2014. In the struc-
tural estimation, we use information on the affiliate and domestic sales, as well as
the entry types selected by firms in each market. The unique feature of the data is
that it distinguishes between greenfield investment and M&A entries for each new
FDI case. The structural estimation delivers the fundamental parameters which de-
termine returns associated to each activity (change in the perception of quality across
markets, synergies magnitude, trade costs, quality of M&A targets, and the cost of
quality transmission with greenfield investment), as well as institutional entry costs
specific to the foreign market and the entry type.
We find that the resulting equilibrium thresholds reverse the standard outcome for
the manufacturing sector, where high-quality (or high-productivity) firms tend to
engage in FDI. In contrast, firms with lower service quality prefer FDI to exporting.
This result partly comes from the fact that the costs of replicating quality in a new
market increase in core service quality, so that high-quality firms try to avoid these
costs by serving foreign markets from their home location via exporting. Moreover,
we find that the market differences in the distribution of foreign quality perception,
as well as differences in the quality of M&A targets result in market-specific relations
between the average service quality and FDI entry modes. While greenfield investors
in the US exhibit a higher service quality than firms engaging in M&As, this relation
is reversed for the EU and the rest of the world.
In the final part of our analysis, we aim to use the estimated model to examine the
potential impact of a service-trade liberalization episode between the EU and the US,
as planned for TTIP (Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership). We consider
the impact on average service quality for each entry type and the average level of
service quality provided in each market: the EU, the US, and the rest of the world.
8Hereafter entry alternatives are called “entry types” in order to avoid any confusion with the GATS
specification of entry modes in the services sector.
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The model can be used to simulate two main features of TTIP for the services sec-
tor. First, we look at a reduction of institutional entry barriers, including facilitation
of cross-border M&As and easier market access through reductions in costs asso-
ciated to licensing and approvals of businesses. We consider a moderate scenario
with a 10%-reduction in non-tariff barriers, as well as a more ambitious scenario of a
25%-reduction of barriers. Accordingly, this policy mainly impacts on the thresh-
old quality that makes each entry alternative profitable, while the relative ranking
between quality and entry modes remains unchanged. Second, we look at the in-
troduction of quality standards, which reduces the costs of transferring core qual-
ity overseas. The corresponding reallocation effects can result in changes of relative
qualities exported and provided via greenfield investment. Moreover, given the pre-
dictions on the ordering of entry alternatives in our model, we can expect that facil-
itating quality transmission abroad leads to higher quality of M&A targets, so that
mergers become less frequent but of a better quality.
1.1.1 Related Literature
This chapter contributes to the literature on the proximity-concentration tradeoff
with heterogeneous firms. We depart from Helpman et al. (2004), who describe the
selection of firms into exporting and greenfield investment, by (i) allowing firms to
acquire foreign targets in order to resolve uncertainty regarding the quality percep-
tion and to exploit the potential merger synergies; (ii) introducing the flexibility in
the returns each entry activity provides to firm’s revenue productivity. These nov-
elties make our model empirically tractable and allow us to explain differences in
the entry patterns across industries and countries.9 This chapter relates to a small
set of papers that structurally estimate a model of the Helpman et al. (2004) type.
The recent contributions by Irarrazabal, Moxnes, and Opromolla (2013), Ramondo
and Rodríguez-Clare (2013), Ramondo (2014), Tintelnot (2017) propose frameworks
suitable for the empirical analysis of multinational production and trade. In contrast
to the model described in this chapter, these models predetermines the relation be-
tween productivities of firms selecting into exporting and FDI, since the return from
exports is always smaller due to the presence of iceberg trade costs. Moreover, these
papers do not consider M&A, which are conceptually different from the greenfield
investment in terms of the technology transfer and, therefore, are driven by different
incentives and provide different outcomes from greenfield investment.
This chapter also relates to the literature analyzing the determinants of cross-border
mergers, among those the papers by Nocke and Yeaple (2007, 2008) are the closest to
the present chapter. Analogously to Nocke and Yeaple (2007), we regard M&A as
a vehicle for obtaining the network and service quality of an existing firm in the
prospective market. Similar to their model, we regard quality as a non-transferable
9Geishecker, Schröder, and Sørensen (2017) show that the exporter productivity and size premia
vary across countries and industries.
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capacity. For example, a high-quality firm in the services sector may have an excep-
tional consultant, so that the costs of finding a new worker with the same set of skills
are larger than those of sending the worker herself to the foreign country. Unlike
Nocke and Yeaple (2007), we do not restrict the realization of perceived quality in the
foreign market to be lower than at home. Moreover, in our framework, the ordering
of cutoffs for greenfield investment and M&A is not determined by the source of firm
heterogeneity but instead by the country-specific distribution of perceived quality
shocks and the structure of entry costs. Additionally, we find that firms conducting
greenfield FDI in the professional services sector have lower quality than exporters,
so that we have a different ordering of cutoffs for these two entry types. Similarly
to Nocke and Yeaple (2008), the incentives of engaging in cross-border acquisition
and greenfield FDI differ across countries. As the distribution of target quality in
the EU and the US is characterized by larger expectations of the targets’ quality, the
acceptance rate of M&A offers is higher, too.
This chapter extends the trade literature on the services sector. Bhattacharya et al.
(2012) model the choice between FDI and export in IT-oriented services. They find
that firms with high service quality prefer exporting over FDI. Differently from our
work, the choice between entry types is driven by the differences in the overseas
transferability of quality via export and greenfield investment. By contrast, we do
not assume that the physical presence in the country reduces demand uncertainty.
Given that services export involves personal contact between a supplier and a con-
sumer, it seems hard to justify an assumption about the differences in perception
of service quality between export and FDI. Moreover, perception of quality in our
model reflects country-specific tastes, so that consumer preferences are independent
of the supply mode. Oldenski (2012) also emphasizes the importance of personal
presence in the country for providers of commercial services, which can affect the
entry choice. In our model, the choice for M&A and greenfield investment is en-
dogenous and not amplified by any restriction on the need for commercial presence
for the personal contact with a consumer.
One of the key ingredients of our model is the uncertainty about foreign quality
perception. Rob and Vettas (2003), Nguyen (2012), Albornoz, Calvo Pardo, Corcos,
and Ornelas (2012), and Conconi, Sapir, and Zanardi (2016) highlight the importance
of non-observability of demand in new destination markets, and learning about de-
mand which occurs via entry in related foreign locations. For the services sector, we
do not observe sequentiality of entry into foreign markets, and consider the first entry
into a given market in order to avoid confusion between the mechanism of our inter-
est and learning occurring via foreign activities. Aeberhardt, Buono, and Fadinger
(2014) consider firms that can choose to serve a foreign market either directly, facing
the costs of getting to know the foreign market, or indirectly, via a local partner who
can potentially hold them up. Similar to their paper, we find that the characteristics
of foreign markets can be crucial for determining the incentives to select one of the
available alternatives.
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Finally, this chapter also contributes to the literature highlighting the role of prod-
uct quality in international trade. Analogously to Kugler and Verhoogen (2012),
Johnson (2012), and Feenstra and Romalis (2014), we argue that service quality is
one of the key factors explaining firm heterogeneity. Similar to Cagé and Rouzet
(2015), we assume that perceived quality is not observed prior to entry into the for-
eign market, therefore firm’s choice is based on the expected perceived quality. Since
we allow for M&A as a way to avoid informational frictions, we observe relatively
less efficient firms active via acquired affiliates in the foreign markets. Moreover,
since the professional services sector is a long quality ladder industry, we use the re-
sults of Khandelwal (2010) to argue that the sales of a firm are a good proxy for firm’s
service quality.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.3 describes the data used in
the empirical analysis and presents the entry patterns observed in the services sector
for German firms. Section 1.4 estimates the fundamental market-specific parameters
for German multinational firms. Section 1.5 calibrates the industry equilibrium and
describes the way to conduct counterfactual analysis for the services sector liberal-
ization according to the TTIP proposal. Section 1.6 concludes.
1.2 Theoretical Framework
We build a structural model to explain the entry choice of a firm when it decides
to go abroad. There are three entry types distinguished: direct export, cross-border
mergers and acquisitions, and greenfield investment. The main aim of the model is
to rationalize the differences in the entry patterns across industries and countries.
We describe the model for a firm operating in the services sector, and therefore high-
light the importance of quality and brand recognition in generating heterogeneity
across firms. However, the model can be applied to other sectors, when equivalently
describing firm heterogeneity in terms of the revenue productivity.
1.2.1 Demand
The economy consists of a set I = {1, . . . , N} of countries. Each country i ∈ I admits
a representative consumer whose preferences are given by the quasi-linear utility
function in the homogeneous good Ai
Ui = βs,i ln
[∫
ω∈Ωi
(ϕ˜i(ω)qi(ω))
σ−1
σ dω
] σ
σ−1
+ Ai, (1.1)
where βs,i denotes the absorption of services sector in country i, qi(ω) the amount
of service ω, σ elasticity of substitution, Ωi the endogenous set of varieties sold in
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country i, and ϕ˜i(ω) the perceived quality of service ω in country i.10 In order to
reflect potential differences in the perception of the service quality across different
foreign markets, the quality ϕ˜i(ω) of the variety ω can vary across countries. Quality
perception of the service ω reflects the differences in tastes of consumers, value of
quality to them, as well as the awareness of the brand of variety ω. A representative
consumer in country i can evaluate the quality of a given variety with certainty.11
Let Yi and pi(ω) denote the total expenditure per consumer and the price of service
ω in country i, respectively. Then, the representative consumer i’s budget constraint
given the upper-tier of utility maximization reads as∫
ω∈Ωi
pi(ω)qi(ω)dω+ Ai ≤ Yi. (1.2)
By solving the consumer i’s utility maximization problem subject to the budget con-
straint (1.2), we obtain the direct demand function for variety ω in country i which is
given by
qi(ω) =
ϕ˜i(ω)
σ−1 p−σi
P1−σi
βs,i = ϕ˜i(ω)
σ−1 pi(ω)−σΦi, (1.3)
where Pi ≡
(∫
ω∈Ωi ϕ˜i(ω)
σ−1 pi(ω)1−σdω
)1/(1−σ)
is a country i’s quality-adjusted
price index, Φi ≡ Pσ−1i βs,i is a demand shifter. The expression (1.3) implies that
the demand for variety ω increases with its perceived quality ϕ˜i(ω) in country i.
1.2.2 Supply
A firm from country o ∈ I provides the same service variety ω in all markets it
decides to operate. Therefore, we identify the firm by the supplied service variety ω.
Each firm is a monopolist for the service it provides, and makes its entry and provi-
sion choice taken aggregate price and market size as given. Firms are heterogeneous
in the quality of their services. In particular, each firm ω is endowed with a core level
10The homogeneous good is chosen as the numeraire; it is produced with a linear technology requir-
ing a unit input of labor and is freely traded. In equilibrium, all countries produce a positive amount
of a homogeneous good, which results in the equalization of the factor prices across markets. Thus,
for the rest of the analysis, we consider the equilibrium wages in an open economy. In particular, this
means that the level of wages, and therefore all entry costs expressed in labor terms, stay unaffected by
any policy changes, and wages can be set equal to 1.
11Since the aim of this chapter is to analyze the determinants of the entry choice by firms, we disre-
gard the potential uncertainty on the side of consumers. Therefore, in our setting, we model uncertainty
regarding the quality perception at the side of a service provider, while consumers know with certainty
the value each service provides to them. Alternatively, one can think about learning from the side of
consumers about the quality of a given variety (Bagwell and Staiger (1989), Chisik (2003), Cagé and
Rouzet (2015)). We can accommodate this concept in our model by assuming that the perceived quality
reflects the current belief of a representative consumer regarding the quality of the product, so that she
consumes a service basing her consumption choice on this belief.
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of quality ϕ.12
As consumers have different tastes toward quality and are differently aware of
services’ brands, same quality is differently perceived within and across countries.
The country- and variety-specific perceived quality shock ei adjusts the core qual-
ity level of the firm to the perceived level in country i. In particular, the perceived
quality of the service in country i is ϕi = ϕei, which implies that services with ini-
tially higher core quality have on average better realizations of the perceived quality
across markets. Since each firm operates a domestic unit, the perception of quality in
the origin market is known by the firm.13 At the same time, the firm cannot observe
ex ante how its quality is perceived by foreign consumers if it was never present in
the country.14
The problem of the firm can be separated into two stages. At the first stage, for
each foreign market i ∈ I fo ≡ I \ {o} the firm decides whether to enter, and if so,
with which out of three alternatives: direct export or establishment of a cross-border
greenfield investment or acquisition of a foreign target firm. Accordingly, the firm
pays the entry costs associated with the selected foreign activities. Upon entry, the
firm observes how its quality is perceived in each market it selected to operate in. At
the second stage, the firm solves the profit maximization problem and sets the unit
of service provision for each market.
A firm is defined by the variety of service it provides, ω, its country of origin, o,
its core quality, ϕ, a vector of perceived quality shocks e, a vector of quality of M&A
offers, ϕM , a vector of export entry costs, f E, and vector of institutional exntry costs
with greenfield investment, f¯G.
1.2.3 Serving the Foreign Markets
Now we consider the choice of the firm to serve a foreign market i. In order to high-
light the tradeoff among different entry types, we compute the payoffs associated
with each alternative.15
12A core level of quality is an adjusted level of quality by the physical productivity, and is repre-
sented as a product of quality itself and the physical productivity of a firm. Hereafter, we refer to the
quality adjusted by the physical productivity, ϕ, as the main source of heterogeneity across firms. Since
the physical productivity of services firms is difficult to measure, we explain the variation in adjusted
quality (or revenue productivity) by differences in the quality component. In other words, one can
consider all firms in the services sector to exhibit the same level of physical productivity, but different
service quality.
13In the absence of firm-specific origin quality shifter, the model would imply zero likelihood. This
is due to the fact that home sales would solely define firm’s core quality which in turn would result in
deterministic supply choices for foreign markets. In other words, this means that two firms with iden-
tical core quality would opt for the same foreign activity choices while selecting between exporting and
greenfield investment, which is not observed in the data. For more details, we refer to the estimation
section.
14Nguyen (2012) introduces learning about demand in untested destination markets through the
positive correlation of demand in them with markets firm is present in. In our model, we abstract from
the learning aspect, defining markets to be large enough to capture specific tastes of consumers to the
service. Moreover, the learning by operating abroad would imply sequentiality of entry, which is not
observed in the data for the professional services industry.
15For what follows, we maintain that the profit associated with no activity in country i
is normalized to 0.
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Export and Greenfield Investment. Entering via exporting or greenfield investment, the
firm transmits its quality abroad and does it under uncertainty about the perception
of its quality by foreign consumers. This uncertainty can be mapped to the problem
of incomplete transferability of quality (or technologies) overseas.16 Therefore, a firm
evaluates the benefits of entering via export or greenfield investment by considering
the expected perceived quality in the prospective destination market. Accordingly,
the more favorable is the expectation regarding the perceived quality shock in the
foreign country, the higher the return to the core quality the firm expects from con-
ducting greenfield FDI or exporting.
Although exporting and greenfield investment are similar to each other on the de-
mand side, there are differences in the marginal and entry costs associated to these
activities. In order to serve foreign market i via export, the firm pays an additional ad
valorem trade cost τi,o > 1. Therefore, the marginal costs of serving market i are larger
for exporters. Entry costs of exporting, f Ei , reflect non-tariff restrictions firms face by
serving foreign market i via export, e.g. restriction to movement of people, licensing
discrimination, or non-perfect regulatory transparency. In turn, as the replication of
a higher level of quality and the establishment of a better brand can be more costly,
we allow the entry costs of greenfield investment, f Gi (ϕ), to be dependent on the core
quality ϕ of the firm. One can also rationalize this assumption by regarding these en-
try costs as related to advertisement expenses, which are proportional to the number
of consumers a firm intends to reach in the new market.17 In particular, we assume
that the firm pays f Gi (ϕ) = f¯
G
i + α
G
i vi(ϕ) when it establishes a foreign affiliate in
country i, where vi is the firm’s value in market i under the assumption that it can
fully transfer its core quality ϕ to the country i and there are no perceived quality
frictions, i.e. vi ≡ (σ− 1)σ−1σ−σϕσ−1Φi.18 Thus, we associate the variable part of the
entry costs to the firm’s value in country i provided that country i’s consumers at-
tach the evaluation ϕ to the service itself. The parameters of the entry costs function
can be interpreted as follows. The component f¯ Gi of the entry costs for greenfield
investment represents the institutional entry barriers that the firm faces in country i.
In particular, the level of institutional entry costs reflects the development of legal in-
stitutions, ease of getting the license, quality of capital markets, closeness of services
regulations of a host country and the origin, and other regulatory and non-regulatory
restrictions to entry. The quality cost for greenfield investment, αGi , is determined by
the country characteristics which affect the ease of quality transmission, e.g. size of
the labor markets, advertisement costs.
16In particular, imperfect foreign mobility of technologies and loss to productivity associated to
foreign locations are discussed by Nocke and Yeaple (2007), Guadalupe, Kuzmina, and Thomas (2012),
and Tintelnot (2017).
17See Arkolakis (2010) who models explicitly the choice of marketing investment of firms that are
heterogeneous in revenue productivity.
18Similarly to Arkolakis (2010), the aggregate market shifter, Φi, captures the fact that entry costs
can be larger for larger markets. Moreover, since this shifter contains information about the average
perceived quality in the market, one can think about larger replication costs for quality when entering
a market with higher average quality of services.
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The expected profits associated to the two above suitable choices are given by
EpiGi =
[
Eeσ−1i − αGi
]
Φ˜i︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆Gi
ϕσ−1 − f¯ Gi ,
EpiEi = E
(
ei
τi,o
)σ−1
Φ˜i︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆Ei
ϕσ−1 − f Ei ,
(1.4)
where Φ˜i ≡ (σ − 1)σ−1σ−σΦi, ∆Gi denotes the greenfield investor’s return to the
core quality in country i, and ∆Ei denotes the exporter’s return to the core quality
in country i. From the expressions above, we can see that the return to greenfield
investment will be larger the more favorable is the expectation of perceived quality
and the lower are the costs of replicating the brand’s quality abroad. Similarly, the
exporter’s return is larger the higher is expected perceived quality and as lower is
the increase in the marginal costs associated to this activity.
Mergers and Acquisitions. The uncertainty of quality perception can be eliminated via
M&A. By acquiring a foreign firm, a multinational gets access to the target firm’s local
market and, as a consequence, to its already established group of consumers. One can
see the acquisition of a foreign firm as a device to “buy the demand” of a preexisting
local firm.19 Therefore, before accepting the merger, a firm knows with certainty how
its service is perceived by consumers in the foreign location, and, specifically, which
volume of sales it can generate.
We model the M&A market as follows. The firm receives a take-it-or-leave-it offer
from a target firm with perceived quality ϕMi .
20 Since the foreign firm observes the
realization of the perceived quality shock to its service in its origin market i, the
quality level ϕMi is represented by a product of the core quality of the foreign target,
ϕ′, and the perceived quality shock, e′i . The acquisition price serves the role of the
entry costs with M&A, f Mi
(
ϕMi
)
, and consists of the value of the foreign firm, vMi ≡
Φ˜iϕMi , and the institutional entry costs, f¯
M
i . The institutional costs include not only
the legal costs of M&A in a given country but also capture the level of entry barriers
imposed for mergers and acquisitions.
Though the acquirer cannot perfectly transfer its quality abroad, some common
practices or brand name can be used by an acquired affiliate. Therefore, the acquisi-
tion process generates synergies Si(ϕ), the size of which increases in the core quality
19An analogous interpretation of M&A can be found in Nocke and Yeaple (2007).
20To make our model more tractable, we assume that each firm gets offers for M&A in each market.
Alternatively, we can introduce the probability of getting an offer from each market, which will not
change the results of the model, but this variation is not empirically tractable as identifying the corre-
sponding parameters require additional data on M&As. At the same time, we allow the offer to be such
that no firm finds it profitable to accept. Therefore, the resulting distribution of the target offer can be
seen as the combination of the actual distribution and the probability of an offer.
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of an acquirer.21 The perceived quality of the acquired affiliate is ϕi = Si(ϕ)ϕMi ,
so that perceived quality is Si(ϕ) times larger than prior acquisition. It is impor-
tant to note that should the synergies be positive, the net profit from M&A (weakly)
increases with target firm’s quality. Therefore, if the firm faces several merger pro-
posals from one country, it optimally select the one from the highest quality target
firm.
There are several things worth noting. First, the offers for M&A are independently
and identically drawn across firms and countries. This assumption eliminates any
self-selection of acquired firms to more (or less) productive acquiring firms. We ra-
tionalize it by the fact that foreign firms do not observe the quality of the service of
potential acquirers, so that all foreign firms are ex ante identical for them. Moreover,
the acquisition price is solely determined by the quality of the target firm, so that the
benefit of a foreign firm from M&A is independent of the acquirer identity.
Second, we parameterize synergies by a linear function, i.e. Si(ϕ) = siϕ.22
The profits from acquiring the foreign firm are given by
piMi = s
σ−1
i
(
ϕMi
)σ−1
Φ˜i︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆Mi
ϕσ−1 − Φ˜i
(
ϕMi
)σ−1 − f¯ Mi , (1.5)
where ∆Mi denotes the acquirer’s return to the core quality in country i. This return is
higher as better is the target firm, and is higher the magnitude of synergies si. In par-
ticular, one would expect higher synergies in the markets where common practices
are more applicable and the brand name of an acquirer has a better reputation.
Third, we do not model any competition for the target firms from the side of po-
tential acquirers. Since this does not drive our main results regarding the entry type
choice, we avoid any complication for the merger market to keep our model as par-
simonious as possible.
To sum up, the quality of potential targets varies across and within countries and
this, together with country-specific entry barriers, results in the differences of M&A
price and merger profitability across foreign locations.
1.2.4 Entry Decision
Having described the profits associated to each of the three activities, we are ready
to consider the first stage of the firm’s problem: which markets to enter and via
which entry alternatives. Prior to deciding about the entry into foreign markets, the
firm observes (i) its core quality level ϕ, (ii) perceived quality in the origin ϕo, (iii)
country-specific M&A offers ϕM , (iv) entry costs associated to each entry type. The
21Here we note that if the function of synergies is constant, so that the size of synergies is indepen-
dent of the core quality of an acquirer, the M&A will be regard as an outside option, so that the lowest
quality served abroad will be supplied via M&A. Moreover, we assume that the magnitude of synergies
is observed by an acquirer prior making an entry decision. Therefore, we take M&A as a safe option or
normalize all levels of uncertainty with respect to the level of uncertainty of m M&A.
22The linear function is needed to insure the single-crossing of the profits associated to each entry
alternative.
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entry choice, e ≡ {ei}i∈I fo , combines the entry type the firm selects for each foreign
market i ∈ I fo (if any), such that
ei = arg max
ei∈{0,E,G,M}
{
EΠeii
} ∀i ∈ I fo , (1.6)
where EΠeii corresponds to the (expected) profit from not entering (0), exporting (E),
conducting greenfield investment (G), and M&A (M).
In the next paragraphs, we discuss the tradeoffs existing among the three described
entry alternatives when entering market i. First, we describe the traditional proximity-
concentration tradeoff between greenfield investment and exporting. Second, we an-
alyze the choice between two types of foreign direct investment.
Proximity-Concentration Tradeoff. Consider the tradeoff between exporting and green-
field investment. We observe that exporting is preferred to greenfield investment in
market i if and only if
EpiEi ≥ EpiGi ⇔ ϕσ−1
[
αGi − (1− τ1−σi,o )Eeσ−1i
]
≥ f
E
i − f¯ Gi
Φ˜i
. (1.7)
We can separate into two groups the set of parameters affecting the value for the
quality cutoff between exporting and greenfield investment. The first group includes
those parameters that determine the relative quality of services provided via each of
the two entry types. Accordingly, these are the parameters that change the return to
the core quality for exporters and greenfield investors, i.e. quality cost for replicat-
ing brand abroad, αGi , trade costs, τi,o, and the expectation of the perceived quality,
Eeσ−1i . The second group of parameters affects the propensity of each entry type
to be selected and include entry costs of export, f Ei , and institutional entry costs for
greenfield investment, f¯ Gi .
If the replication of high quality abroad is harder, that is αGi  0 and replication
costs outweigh the proximity benefits, then firms with higher quality will export in
order to avoid large entry costs with greenfield FDI. Therefore, the average quality
exported will be higher than the one provided via greenfield investment. Moreover,
the lower the trade costs are and the less favorable the expectation of the perceived
quality is, the more likely that high quality firms export their services to market i. The
special case of this cutoff ordering arises if the institutional entry costs of greenfield
are so large that all firms find it more profitable to export.
An inverse ordering of cutoffs in the core quality arises if greenfield entry costs are
lower for firms with higher quality. This assumption would invert the condition for
exporting and imply that high quality firms self-select into greenfield investment,
while firms with relatively lower quality choose to export.23 Moreover, the larger
23In the empirical analysis, we do not restrict the sign of αGi , thus we are not assuming any ordering
of exporting and greenfield investment cutoffs. In particular, with αGi = 0 we will obtain a standard
proximity-concentration tradeoff, when entry costs for greenfield investment are equal across firms
with different quality.
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trade costs and the expectation of perceived quality are, the more likely it is that
high-quality firms self-select into greenfield FDI, rather than exporting. In particular,
if export entry costs are sufficiently large, all firms will conduct greenfield investment
rather than export.
Two Types of Foreign Direct Investment. Now we turn to the choice between green-
field investment and M&A. The firm prefers greenfield investment over M&A in the
market i if and only if
EpiGi ≥ piMi ⇔ ϕσ−1
[
Eeσ−1i − αGi − sσ−1i
(
ϕMi
)σ−1] ≥ f¯ Gi − f¯ Mi
Φ˜i
+
(
ϕMi
)σ−1
. (1.8)
The selection of firms with higher or lower quality into greenfield investment rather
than M&A depends on the firm-specific target draw and country-specific parame-
ters. Therefore, we can talk about the ordering of cutoffs only subject to the clusters
of firms defined by the quality of M&A offer firms receive in the foreign market i.
Within a cluster, high quality is provided via greenfield investment rather M&A if
(i) expected perceived quality is high, (ii) the increase in greenfield entry costs due
to high core quality is low, (iii) synergies are low. Thus, the order of cutoffs is deter-
mined by the relation between the loss/gain in perceived quality and variable entry
costs for greenfield FDI, as well as by the magnitude of synergies. In countries where
the costs of finding abroad a consultant with an equal level of home skills are pro-
hibitive, or the advertising expenditures are large, relatively more productive firms
self-select into M&A rather than greenfield investment. If the institutional costs of
mergers and acquisitions are too high, acquisition is not profitable for middle-quality
firms, and only greenfield investment can be selected. We note that with the presence
of uncertainty in quality perception, the set of accepted M&A is different from the
case with perfect forecasting of foreign consumer tastes for a service; also there is no
clear ordering of this activity with respect to others in terms of the core quality.24
1.2.5 Equilibrium
Now we aggregate the industry-level parameters, as market sizes and quality ad-
justed price indexes, and derive the general equilibrium for our model. Each country
i ∈ I is populated with mass ni of firms heterogeneous in their service quality. We as-
sume that all firm-specific parameters are independently drawn across countries and
firms from corresponding distributions. The core quality ϕ is drawn from an arbi-
trary distribution G(ϕ). The perceived quality shocks ei are drawn from an arbitrary
country-i- and origin-o-specific distribution Hi,o(ei).25 The M&A offers ϕMi are drawn
from an arbitrary country-i-specific distribution Mi
(
ϕMi
)
. The entry costs of export
24Empirically, if M&A quality is observed, this can be reflected in the higher variance of domestic
sales generated by acquirers relative to exporters and firms conducting greenfield FDI compared to the
case when quality of M&A is unobservable.
25Similar to Schott (2008), this assumption reflects the presence of the origin-specific shifters to the
perception of quality.
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to market i, f Ei , and institutional costs for greenfield investment, f¯
G are drawn from
the distribution FEi,o
(
f Ei
)
and FGi,o
(
f¯ Gi
)
with the positive supports, correspondingly.
Conditional on being active in market j, the share of firms from country j 6= i with
core quality level ϕ that enter market i with entry type e is
ζei,j(ϕ) =
∫
f Ei
∫
f¯ Gi
∫
ϕMi
1
[
ei
(
j, ϕ, f Ei , f¯
G
i , ϕ
M
i
)
= e | ei
(
j, ϕ, f Ei , f¯
G
i , ϕ
M
i
)
6= 0
]
dMi
(
ϕMi
)
dFGi,j
(
f¯ Gi
)
dFEi,j
(
f Ei
)
.
(1.9)
We note that different realizations of firm-specific entry costs of export, greenfield
and quality of M&A targets would result in different profits associated to those entry
types.
The total sales generated by firms from country j 6= i with core quality ϕ in country
i via entry type e are given by
Xei,j(ϕ) = nj
∫
f Ei
∫
f¯ Gi
∫
ϕMi
1
[
ei
(
j, ϕ, f Ei , f¯
G
i , ϕ
M
i
)
= e
]
·
∫
ei
rei
(
j, ϕ, ei, ϕMi
)
dHi,j(ei)dMi
(
ϕMi
)
dFGi,j
(
f¯ Gi
)
dFEi,j
(
f Ei
)
.
(1.10)
Different realizations of perceived quality shocks and quality of targets would re-
sult in different foreign revenues. Integrating over the core quality levels of foreign
firms and summing over all entry types and foreign countries, the aggregate trade
inflow of services to country i is
X f oreigni = ∑
j∈I fi
∑
e={E,G,M}
∫
ϕ
Xei,j(ϕ)dG(ϕ). (1.11)
The home production in country i is given by
Xdomestici = ni
∫
ϕ
∫
ei
ri(i, ϕ, ei)dHi,i(ei)dG(ϕ). (1.12)
Total labor income in country i consists of two components. The first component
is the labor cost of services provision in country i, which includes the sum of wages
paid for domestic services suppliers, exporters from country i, as well as FDI-makers
in country i. The second component combines entry costs paid by FDI- and export-
entrants from foreign markets. The third component constitutes labor income in the
homogeneous good sector.
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Given that wages are equalized in the open economy when each country produces
the homogeneous good, the labor market clearing condition reads as
Li =
σ− 1
σ
Xdomestici + ∑
j∈I fi
ni ∫
ϕ
XEj,i(ϕ)dG(ϕ) + ∑
e={G,M}
nj
∫
ϕ
Xei,j(ϕ)dG(ϕ)

+ ∑
j∈I fi
nj
∫∫∫∫
ϕ, f Ej , f¯
G
j ,ϕ
M
j
(
1
[
ej
(
i, ϕ, f Ej , f¯
G
j , ϕ
M
j
)
= E
]
f Ej
)
(1.13)
+ 1
[
ej
(
i, ϕ, f Ej , f¯
G
j , ϕ
M
j
)
= G
]
f Gj
(
ϕ, f¯ Gj
)
+ 1
[
ej
(
i, ϕ, f Ej , f¯
G
j , ϕ
M
j
)
= M
]
f Mj
(
ϕMj
))
dFEj,i
(
f Ej
)
dFGj,i
(
f¯ Gj
)
dMj(ϕMj )dG(ϕ)
+ LA,i,
where LA,i denotes the labor in the homogeneous sector in country i.
The quality-adjusted price index in country i is formed by the contribution of for-
eign and domestic firms
Pi =
σ− 1
σ
[
∑
j∈I fi
nj
∫
ϕ
∑
e
ζei,j(ϕ)
 ϕ
τ
1[e=E]
i,j
σ−1 dG(ϕ)]
[
+ ni
∫
ϕ
ϕσ−1dG(ϕ)
] 1
1−σ
.
(1.14)
Finally, we assume that a representative consumer in country i owns the domestic
firms, so that the aggregate income is given by the sum of the labor income and the
profits generated by firms with origin in country i
Yi = Li +
1
σ
Xdomestici
+ ni
∫
ϕ
∑∑
j∈I fi
e∈{E,G,M}
∫
f Ej
∫
f¯ Gj
∫
ϕMj
1
[
ej
(
i, ϕ, f Ej , f¯
G, ϕMj
)
= e
]
(1.15)
·
∫
ej
 rej
(
j, ϕ, ej, ϕMj
)
σ
− f ej
(
ϕ, f¯ Gj , ϕ
M
j
) dHj,i(ej)dFEj,i ( f Ej ) (1.16)
· dFGj,i
(
f¯ Gj
)
dMj
(
ϕMj
)
dG(ϕ).
The next definition describes the general equilibrium of the model.
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Definition 1. (General Equilibrium). Given parameters τi,o, αGi , si, σ and distribution func-
tions G(ϕ), Hi,o(ei), Mi
(
ϕMi
)
, FEi,o( f
E
i ), F
G
i,o( f¯
G
i ) for all countries o, i ∈ I, the equilibrium
constitutes a set of levels of service consumption, qi(ω), and homogeneous good, Ai, prices,
pei (o, ϕ, ei, ϕ
M
i ), entry choices, e(o, ϕ, f
E, f¯G,ϕM), price indexes, Pi, and income, Yi, such
that
(i) the optimal level of consumption of service variety ω and homogeneous good Ai is given
by (1.2) and (1.3),
(ii) e(o, ϕ, f E, f¯G,ϕM) solves the firm’s entry problem (1.6),
(iii) pei (o, ϕ, ei, ϕ
M
i ) solves the firm’s profit maximization problem,
(iv) Pi satisfies equation (1.14),
(v) the labor market clears (1.13),
(vi) Yi satisfies equation (1.15).
1.2.6 Discussion
Our model is agnostic about the ordering of cutoffs between different entry types.
Depending on the return parameters Eeσ−1i , τi,o, α
G
i and si, as well as the distribution
of target firms’ quality, different groups of firms in terms of quality self-select into
the corresponding activities.26 Therefore, our model can explain the entry patterns
specific to a given industry or country.
In particular, we expect that M&A is particularly relevant for sectors where quality
is of high importance and its perception can vary a lot across countries. This can be no
longer the case for industries with more homogeneous products or services, as well
as industries where the physical productivity explains most of the firm heterogeneity.
The perception of quality in such industries does not play an important role, which
changes the tradeoff between M&A and other entry types. Moreover, synergies in
the technologies are more relevant for sectors with firms heterogeneous with respect
to the physical productivity. Therefore, by introducing synergies in the model, we
are able to capture the patterns arising in the manufacturing sector and allow for a
reverse ordering of the export-acquisition cutoff.
Regarding the greenfield investment, in manufacturing, more productive firms can
be more efficient in transferring their production technologies abroad and use of
scale economies in building new foreign plants. Thus, greenfield investment entry
costs can be lower for more efficient firms, which reverses the ordering of proximity-
concentration cutoff with respect to the services sector.
26The detailed description of all possible orderings of cutoffs is provided in the Appendix A.3.
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1.3 Data
We rely on three main data sources for the empirical analysis: (i) the Microdatabase
Direct investment (MiDi), (ii) the Statistics on International Trade in Services (SITS)
database, and (iii) the AMADEUS database.
The data on the foreign affiliates of German multinational firms are obtained from
MiDi.27 According to the German Foreign Trade and Payments Regulation, all Ger-
man firms are obliged to report outward FDI activities if (i) the share or voting rights
of the German enterprise in the foreign affiliate constitutes at least 10% directly or
50% indirectly, and (ii) the balance sheet of the foreign affiliate exceeds 3 million Eu-
ros. The database is maintained since 1996 onwards and is available for researchers
from 1999. Therefore, we observe the balance sheets of all German affiliates abroad
that satisfy the above reporting requirements during the time period 1999 – 2014. In
addition, MiDi provides information about the country of the foreign subsidiary and,
since 2005, the type of entry in the foreign market, distinguishing between newly es-
tablished enterprises (greenfield investment) and purchases, mergers or acquisitions
(M&A).
We combine MiDi with SITS, which documents international service transactions
carried out by German residents, where activities correspond to modes 1, 2 and 4
in the GATS classification.28 Differently from MiDi, the reporting requirement for
SITS is more stringent, so that all transactions exceeding 12,500 Euros monthly are
included. In order to make the reports of multinationals and exporters comparable,
we consider only those transactions in SITS that would also be included in MiDi if
carried out via commercial presence. In other words, we restrict our focus on those
firms whose annual service exports exceed one million Euros.29
Finally, we use AMADEUS to obtain data on domestic activities of pure exporters,
i.e. firms which are not present in MiDi, but only in SITS.30
Since we are concerned with the heterogeneity in the quality of the provided ser-
vice, we focus on the professional services sector, among which are consulting, mar-
keting, research and administrative activities.31 This sector accounts for more than a
27Deutsche Bundesbank (2016): Microdatabase Direct Investment 1999-2014. Version: 2.0. Deutsche
Bundesbank. Dataset. http://doi.org/10.12757/Bbk.MiDi.9914.02.03
28Refer to the Section 1.1 for the description of the modes according to the GATS classification.
29Since the domestic sales of excluded exporters are comparable to those we consider in our analysis,
the restriction of the sample does not drive main empirical results. Moreover, we note that requirements
for MiDi are easier to satisfy for manufacturing firms rather than services. Therefore, we expect that
larger proportion of services FDI is excluded from the database compared to manufacturing due to
the features of FDI in these sectors. Specifically, un manufacturing, the settlement of a new plant re-
quires larger capital investment which is more likely to overshoot the reporting threshold relative to the
services FDI, where capital investment can be associated with renting the office for a consulting firm.
30SITS contains information exclusively about foreign transactions, but does not provide any data on
operations in Germany. These data are recovered via matching with MiDi, as well as with AMADEUS.
The matching of the AMADEUS with Bundesbank’s datasets has been performed by the Research Data
and Service Center of the Deutsche Bundesbank. For more details, please, refer to Schild, Schultz, and
Wieser (2017). Accordingly, we consider the subset of firms that is present both in SITS and AMADEUS
datasets.
31According to Francois and Hoekman (2010), professional services is one of the sectors most ex-
posed to uncertainty in quality.
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half of all international transactions occurring in the services sector.32 Together with
financial services, the professional services sector is the one with the fastest growth
of its share in the aggregate trade flow in developed countries. Figure 1.1 shows
the evolution of international trade flows generated by German firms operating in
this sector. We can see that the professional services represent a substantial share of
international services flows from Germany.
FIGURE 1.1: International trade flows in services from Germany
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Source: Research Data and Service Centre (RDSC) of the Deutsche Bundesbank,
Microdatabase Direct investment (MiDi), 1999-2014, and Statistics on International
Trade Services (SITS), 2001-2015, authors’ calculations.
In the final sample, we consider German firms operating in the professional ser-
vices sector in the period 2005 – 2014.33 We exclude firm-market-specific observations
starting before 2005, as this is the first year when the type of FDI entry is reported.
This exclusion ensures that the perceived quality is unobserved in the foreign market
before entering, as firms that operated in the market in previous years could already
have developed their consumer network, so that they did not face uncertainty on the
demand side. Moreover, we consider only the first entries for each market. Further-
more, we disregard those firms which operate exclusively in the foreign markets.34
During the period of the analysis, we observe a sample of 2,589 market-specific en-
tries by 2,049 German firms. Since the choice to operate abroad is endogenous, we
extend our sample with 1,727 domestic firms.35 We consider three foreign markets:
the European Union countries,36 the United States, and the rest of the world. Figure
1.2 presents the distribution of total sales of firms operating in the services sector and
32See the International Trade Statistics Report 2015 (WTO) and the World Investment Report 2015
(UNCTAD).
33See Appendix A.1 for more detail on the combination of entries by multinationals and pure ex-
porters by year.
34We exclude from the sample firms with zero domestic sales.
35We consider firms which are not present in MiDi and SITS databases and that satisfy the reporting
requirement for capital.
36In the EU countries we include only EU-15: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and
the United Kingdom.
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serving foreign markets.37 The sales distribution is skewed and there is a substantial
number of relatively small players in the market.
FIGURE 1.2: Distribution of domestic sales
Source: Research Data and Service Centre (RDSC) of the Deutsche Bundesbank,
Microdatabase Direct investment (MiDi), 1999-2014, and Statistics on International
Trade Services (SITS), 2001-2015, authors’ calculations.
Figure 1.3 displays that the patterns of entry into foreign markets are in line with
the predictions of our theoretical model. Among multinational firms, most firms find
it profitable to enter via M&A, followed by greenfield investment and exporting. As
was noticed before, the requirements for reporting on exporting and FDI differ, so
that the comparison made is based on the restricted sample. Moreover, we compare
the entry patterns in the service industry with those in a less differentiated sector
(wholesale) and find that the frequency of entry types is different from that discussed
for professional services (see Appendix A.2). In particular, in the wholesale sector,
most firms select export to FDI, which is in line with the predictions of the standard
framework for manufacturing (Helpman et al., 2004).
37We note that due to the presence of the missing data for sales, we proxy those missing entries by
regressing sales on capital stock.
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FIGURE 1.3: Frequency distribution of entry types
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Note: The middle line represents the number of exporters that conduct multinational
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Source: Research Data and Service Centre (RDSC) of the Deutsche Bundesbank,
Microdatabase Direct investment (MiDi), 1999-2014, and Statistics on International
Trade Services (SITS), 2001-2015, authors’ calculations.
Services firms operate in different markets and can select different entry types for
each. Table 1.1 presents the statistics for pairs of entry types selected by firms in the
sample, as well as combinations of markets firms select to be present in. The pres-
ence of firms conducting several multinational activities is important for our empir-
ical analysis, since it reflects the differences in the entry-type choices of a given firm
across markets.
TABLE 1.1: Frequency tabulation of entry types and markets
Other activity Other market
Export
Greenfield
FDI
M&A
No other
activity
US RoW
No other
market
Export 346 10 13 436 EU 160 485 737
Greenfield FDI 37 74 349 US 113 197
M&A 278 800 RoW 651
Notes: For combinations of entry types, we consider only those firms which enter one or two markets due to the
confidentiality requirements. There are 246 firms that operate in all markets.
Source: Research Data and Service Centre (RDSC) of the Deutsche Bundesbank, Microdatabase Direct
investment (MiDi), 1999-2014, and Statistics on International Trade Services (SITS), 2001-2015, authors’
calculations.
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FIGURE 1.4: Density of log-domestic sales, by entry type
Source: Research Data and Service Centre (RDSC) of the Deutsche Bundesbank,
Microdatabase Direct investment (MiDi), 1999-2014, and Statistics on International
Trade Services (SITS), 2001-2015, authors’ calculations.
We also conduct tests for the cutoff ordering. Table 1.2 presents the sales premium
associated to each entry type. In all three foreign markets, exporters sell significantly
more at home, which suggest that high-quality firms self-select into exporting.38
At the same time, the ordering of M&A and greenfield FDI differs across foreign
markets. While in the US the sales premium is larger for firms conducting greenfield
investment, it is smaller in other markets.
Table 1.3 presents a similar test for the cutoffs in terms of firm size. Again, ex-
porters have more employees in Germany compared to firms conducting FDI. Here,
the size premium is larger for greenfield investors in all foreign markets compared
to acquires.
Next, we consider the importance of each entry alternative by foreign market. The
frequency of entry types differs across foreign markets (see Figure 1.5). Greenfield
FDI is a relatively more frequent entry type in the rest of the world. At the same
time, M&A activity is more frequent in the EU compared to the US and the rest of the
world. Our model would rationalize those differences with the level of fixed entry
barriers associated to each foreign activity and the quality of foreign acquisition tar-
gets. With particular reference to the EU countries, this pattern could be explained
by the relatively higher and less spread quality of potential targets. For the rest of
the world, instead, the propensity of M&A might be linked to the high uncertainty
of perceived quality related to greenfield FDI and exporting, as well as to the lower
38Given the worldwide evidence on the international flows in services, we believe that the ordering
of cutoffs for export and FDI are not peculiar to German services firms. In particular, we notice that
worldwide (i) most of transactions in the services sector occur via FDI, (ii) value added of exports is
generated in the services sector is larger than in the manufacturing sector. This observation shows that
only a minority of firms self-select into exporting and this minority is highly productive.
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price for M&A. Therefore, we would expect that the role of M&A in resolving de-
mand uncertainty is particularly relevant for these countries.
FIGURE 1.5: Entry type, foreign market level
0 20 40 60 80 100
EU
US
Rest of the world
Time in SecondsGreenfield FDI M&A Export
Source: Research Data and Service Centre (RDSC) of the Deutsche
Bundesbank, Microdatabase Direct investment (MiDi), 1999-2014, and
Statistics on International Trade Services (SITS), 2001-2015, authors’ calcula-
tions.
1.4 Structural Estimation
In this section, we describe the empirical strategy for the estimation of the fundamen-
tal market-specific parameters determining returns and entry costs corresponding to
each entry alternative. We use firm-level data for German multinationals described
in the previous section. In the following paragraphs, we describe the parameteriza-
tion, discuss the identification and estimation strategies, and present the estimation
results.
1.4.1 Parametrization
Since in this section we consider only German firms, the origin country o is Germany
for all firms.39
We make the following parametric assumptions on the distributions. The core qual-
ity ϕ is drawn independently across firms from a Pareto distribution with scale pa-
rameter a and shape parameter γ. The perceived quality shocks ei are drawn in-
dependently across firms and countries from a country-specific log-normal distribu-
tion, logN (µe,i, σe). We normalize µe,GER to zero and regard the quality perception
relative to Germany. The M&A offers ϕMi are drawn independently across firms and
countries from a country-specific Pareto distribution with scale parameter aMi and
shape parameter γ. Export-entry costs f Ei are drawn from a log-normal distribution,
logN ( f Ei , σf E). Institutional entry greenfield costs f¯ Gi are drawn from a log-normal
distribution, logN ( f¯ Gi , σf G).40 Finally, we parameterize the demand shifter Φi using
39In this section, we abstract from the use of the subscript o.
40This parametrization does not exclude the negative realizations of greenfield entry costs if αGi is
negative. Therefore, in the estimation we restrict the realizations of total entry costs for greenfield
investment, f Gi , to be non-negative. Alternatively, one could make the mean of the underlying normal
distribution to be dependent on φ, so that the total entry costs for greenfield investment would come
from logN ( f¯ Gi + αGi vi(ϕ), σf G ).
1.4. Structural Estimation 23
TA
B
L
E
1.
2:
Sa
le
s
pr
em
iu
m
fo
r
ex
po
rt
er
s,
ac
qu
ir
er
s
an
d
gr
ee
nfi
el
d
in
ve
st
or
s
Fo
re
ig
n
m
ar
ke
t
Ex
po
rt
er
s
M
&
A
G
re
en
fie
ld
in
ve
st
m
en
t
Sa
le
s
pr
em
iu
m
95
%
C
on
f.
In
te
rv
al
Sa
le
s
pr
em
iu
m
95
%
C
on
f.
In
te
rv
al
Sa
le
s
pr
em
iu
m
95
%
C
on
f.
In
te
rv
al
EU
11
.0
62
(0
.2
05
)
[1
0.
66
1,
11
.4
64
]
8.
77
6
(0
.1
82
)
[8
.4
20
,
9.
13
3]
8.
65
9
(0
.2
66
)
[8
.1
38
,
9.
18
0]
U
S
10
.9
94
(0
.4
30
)
[1
0.
14
8,
11
.8
40
]
8.
91
3
(0
.4
28
)
[8
.0
72
,
9.
75
4]
9.
17
3
(0
.4
89
)
[8
.2
11
,
10
.1
34
]
R
es
to
ft
he
w
or
ld
10
.4
61
(0
.2
65
)
[9
.9
41
,
10
.9
80
]
8.
55
9
(0
.2
62
)
[8
.0
46
,
9.
07
3]
8.
14
2
(0
.2
90
)
[7
.5
73
,
8.
71
0]
To
ta
l
10
.8
06
(0
.1
58
)
[1
0.
49
6,
11
.1
16
]
8.
67
7
(0
.1
51
)
[8
.3
81
,
8.
97
2]
8.
47
2
(0
.1
87
)
[8
.1
06
,
8.
83
9]
N
ot
es
:W
e
es
ti
m
at
e
en
tr
y
ty
pe
pr
em
ia
as
fo
llo
w
s:
lo
g(
Sa
le
s ω
,t
)
=
β
1
E
X
P ω
,t
+
β
2
M
A
ω
,t
+
β
3
G
I ω
,t
+
I t
+
ξ ω
,t
,w
he
re
ti
s
th
e
ye
ar
in
de
x,
I
ar
e
ti
m
e
du
m
m
ie
s.
A
ll
es
ti
m
at
es
ar
e
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
at
th
e
1
pe
rc
en
tl
ev
el
.N
=
24
59
,R
2
=
0.
94
8.
H
er
e
fo
r
ea
ch
en
tr
y
ty
pe
w
e
co
ns
id
er
on
ly
th
os
e
fir
m
s,
th
at
do
no
tc
on
du
ct
an
y
ot
he
r
ac
ti
vi
ty
.C
or
re
sp
on
di
ng
ly
,t
he
re
ar
e
1,
09
4
ob
se
rv
at
io
ns
(R
2
=
0.
95
1)
co
ns
id
er
ed
in
th
e
re
gr
es
si
on
fo
r
th
e
EU
,3
82
ob
se
rv
at
io
ns
(R
2
=
0.
96
1)
fo
r
th
e
U
S,
an
d
98
3
ob
se
rv
at
io
ns
(R
2
=
0.
94
1)
fo
r
th
e
R
oW
.
So
ur
ce
:
R
es
ea
rc
h
D
at
a
an
d
Se
rv
ic
e
C
en
tr
e
(R
D
SC
)
of
th
e
D
eu
ts
ch
e
Bu
nd
es
ba
nk
,
M
ic
ro
da
ta
ba
se
D
ir
ec
t
in
ve
st
m
en
t
(M
iD
i)
,
19
99
-2
01
4,
an
d
St
at
is
ti
cs
on
In
te
rn
at
io
na
lT
ra
de
Se
rv
ic
es
(S
IT
S)
,2
00
1-
20
15
,a
ut
ho
rs
’c
al
cu
la
ti
on
s.
TA
B
L
E
1.
3:
Si
ze
pr
em
iu
m
fo
r
ex
po
rt
er
s,
ac
qu
ir
er
s
an
d
gr
ee
nfi
el
d
in
ve
st
or
s
Fo
re
ig
n
m
ar
ke
t
Ex
po
rt
er
s
M
&
A
G
re
en
fie
ld
in
ve
st
m
en
t
Si
ze
pr
em
iu
m
95
%
C
on
f.
In
te
rv
al
Si
ze
pr
em
iu
m
95
%
C
on
f.
In
te
rv
al
Si
ze
pr
em
iu
m
95
%
C
on
f.
In
te
rv
al
EU
4.
85
9
(0
.2
67
)
[4
.3
34
,
5.
38
3]
2.
54
2
(0
.2
50
)
[2
.0
50
,
3.
03
4]
2.
74
9
(0
.3
96
)
[1
.9
71
,
3.
52
7]
U
S
5.
03
4
(0
.1
33
)
[4
.7
72
,
5.
29
6]
2.
66
7
(0
.2
26
)
[2
.2
22
,
3.
11
3]
2.
93
6
(0
.5
82
)
[1
.7
89
,
4.
08
4]
R
es
to
ft
he
w
or
ld
4.
81
3
(0
.2
81
)
[4
.2
62
,
5.
36
3]
2.
56
8
(0
.2
70
)
[2
.0
38
,
3.
09
8]
2.
58
6
(0
.3
16
)
[1
.9
64
,
3.
20
7]
To
ta
l
4.
91
9
(0
.1
79
)
[4
.5
69
,
5.
26
9]
2.
59
4
(0
.1
72
)
[2
.2
57
,
2.
93
2]
2.
73
0
(0
.2
29
)
[2
.2
81
,
3.
17
9]
N
ot
es
:
W
e
es
ti
m
at
e
en
tr
y
ty
pe
pr
em
ia
as
fo
llo
w
s:
lo
g(
E
m
pl
oy
m
en
t ω
,t
)
=
β
1
E
X
P ω
,t
+
β
2
M
A
ω
,t
+
β
3
G
I ω
,t
+
I t
+
ξ ω
,t
,w
he
re
t
is
th
e
ye
ar
in
de
x,
I
ar
e
ti
m
e
du
m
m
ie
s.
A
ll
es
ti
m
at
es
ar
e
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
at
th
e
1
pe
rc
en
tl
ev
el
.
N
=
1,
50
8,
R
2
=
0.
83
2.
H
er
e
fo
r
ea
ch
en
tr
y
ty
pe
w
e
co
ns
id
er
on
ly
th
os
e
fir
m
s,
th
at
do
no
t
co
nd
uc
t
an
y
ot
he
r
ac
ti
vi
ty
.
C
or
re
sp
on
di
ng
ly
,t
he
re
ar
e
64
5
ob
se
rv
at
io
ns
(R
2
=
0.
82
0)
co
ns
id
er
ed
in
th
e
re
gr
es
si
on
fo
r
th
e
EU
,2
42
ob
se
rv
at
io
ns
(R
2
=
0.
86
4)
fo
r
th
e
U
S,
an
d
62
1
ob
se
rv
at
io
ns
(R
2
=
0.
92
9)
fo
r
th
e
R
oW
.W
e
co
ns
id
er
le
ss
ob
se
rv
at
io
ns
du
e
to
th
e
la
ck
of
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
on
th
e
nu
m
be
r
of
do
m
es
ti
c
em
pl
oy
m
en
t.
So
ur
ce
:
R
es
ea
rc
h
D
at
a
an
d
Se
rv
ic
e
C
en
tr
e
(R
D
SC
)
of
th
e
D
eu
ts
ch
e
Bu
nd
es
ba
nk
,M
ic
ro
da
ta
ba
se
D
ir
ec
ti
nv
es
tm
en
t(
M
iD
i)
,1
99
9-
20
14
,a
nd
St
at
is
ti
cs
on
In
te
rn
at
io
na
lT
ra
de
Se
rv
ic
es
(S
IT
S)
,2
00
1-
20
15
,a
ut
ho
rs
’c
al
cu
la
ti
on
s.
24 Chapter 1. Serving Abroad: Export, M&A, and Greenfield Investment
country i’ services sector absorption.41 In particular, we take the market size of a
country reported in MiDi or SITS as the recipient of a given transaction, rather than
the average market value in the aggregated markets (the EU and the rest of the
world). Then, we compute the average market size of a country in the aggregated
market in each year, and take the maximum average market size when consider the
outside option.
1.4.2 Identification Strategy
In this section, we briefly discuss the sources of variation we use to identify the pa-
rameters of interest. We separate the parameters into four groups: the domestic mar-
ket parameters (a, γ), the export and greenfield investment parameters(
{µe,i}i∈I f , σe, { f Ei }i∈I f , {τi}i∈I f , σf E , { f¯ Gi }i∈I f , {αGi }i∈I f , σf G
)
, the M&A parameters({si}i∈I f , { f¯ Mi }i∈I f , {aMi }i∈I f ), and the general parameter σ. In the next paragraphs,
we describe the main source of variation used to identify each group of parameters.
Domestic Market Parameters. Given the structure of our model, the intensive margin
of domestic activity is explained by the variation in quality. Therefore, the distri-
bution parameters (a, γ) for the core quality ϕ are mainly determined by the sales
generated by firms in Germany, as well as by the sales generated by firms outside
Germany.
Export and Greenfield Investment Parameters. Everything else equal, the difference in
the foreign sales realized with greenfield investment and exporting with respect to
the domestic sales determines the shocks to perceived quality and the correspond-
ing parameters ({µe,i}i∈I f , σe). Identification of greenfield investment quality costs
{αGi }i∈I f is based on the tradeoff between greenfield FDI and exporting. In partic-
ular, the sign of these parameters determines if higher (or lower) quality firms self-
select into exporting rather than opening new affiliates. The export entry costs and
the institutional greenfield investment entry costs
(
{ f Ei }i∈I f , { f¯ Gi }i∈I f , σf E , σf G
)
are
identified by observing the entry choices of firms conditional on their core quality.
Finally, ad valorem trade costs {τi}i∈I f are evaluated from the difference in revenues
generated by firms via exports and greenfield investment. In particular, the lower the
intensive margin of exporting is, the higher are trade costs associated with services
exports.
M&A Parameters. The parameters related to the M&A activity deserve some dis-
cussion, since the quality of potential acquisition targets, aMi , affects directly both
intensive and extensive margins of M&A. Therefore, one can find different combi-
nations of a triple (aMi , si, f¯
M
i ) that can rationalize the distribution of M&A sales and
entries in the market i. For instance, fixing one triple of M&A parameters, it could
be possible to find another one with a higher magnitude of synergies, lower quality
41The data are taken from the World Bank database.
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of acquisition targets and lower level of institutional M&A entry costs, that would fit
the observed data.
To identify those parameters, we consider two specifications.42 In the first specifi-
cation, we assume that the magnitude of synergies depends on the relative advance
of a firm with respect to the least productive firm in the industry. Accordingly, we
restrict the magnitude of synergies and parametrize it to si = 1/ai. This restriction
implies that a firm with the core quality ϕ can increase the level of quality of acqui-
sition target by ϕ/a, which represents the ratio of firm’s core quality to the lowest
core quality in the market. Moreover, it follows that the least productive firm in the
industry is just indifferent between being engaged in M&A or not should there be no
institutional entry costs. In this specification, the magnitude of synergies a firm can
generate is the same across all markets. Everything else equal, the quality of acquisi-
tion targets would be the main determinant of the differences in M&A sales realized
across locations. In the second specification, we assume that the institutional restric-
tions for M&A and greenfield investment are similar. In particular, we restrict the
level of M&A institutional entry costs to be equal to the median of the distribution
of the institutional entry costs for greenfield investment. Hence, in this specification
we can talk only about overall institutional barriers for entering via FDI.
Independent of the restriction specification, the parameters related to the inten-
sive margin of M&A are recovered from the sales firms generate via acquired affil-
iates. The extensive margin determines the related entry cost parameters. In the
Appendix A.4 we simulate the model and show that all parameters are identified for
both specifications.
General Parameters. Since the assumption of CES preferences implies that markups
are constant, we can use data on sales and variable costs to recover the corresponding
σ parameter.43
1.4.3 Estimation Strategy
There are two sources of heterogeneity in service quality which are observed by
firms, but not observed by the econometrician: the core quality ϕ and the draws
for target firm quality
{
ϕMi
}
i∈I f . When we construct the maximum likelihood func-
tion, we need to integrate over all possible realizations of the quality levels, so that
the combination of the two sources determines the optimal choice of the entry type.
Moreover, we need to account for all possible orderings of cutoffs with respect to the
42Two natural restrictions are on the magnitude of synergies, which restricts the intensive margin,
and the level of institutional entry costs, which puts restrictions on the extensive margin. The third
restriction on the quality of M&A targets is less tractable, as it would imply restrictions not only on the
parameters related to M&A entries, but also on the other entry modes. When conducting the Monte-
Carlo simulations under an assumption that distribution parameters {aMi }i∈I f are all the same and
equal to a, we are able to show that it is not always possible to find the corresponding triple of M&A
parameters in order to rationalize the observed data. The intuition behind this finding is that aMi en-
ters revenues and entry costs simultaneously and it affects the Pareto distribution, which restrict the
possible set of ϕMi realizations.
43At the moment, we set σ = 3.18 to make our results comparable to Francois et al. (2013).
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core quality depending on the distribution parameters of perceived quality shocks
({µe,i}i∈I f , σe), ad valorem trade costs {τi}i∈I f and quality transmission costs {αGi }i∈I f .44
In order to avoid this complication, we exploit the assumptions on the independence
of draws for target firms’ qualities and core quality, which allows us to separate entry
choices across markets conditional on the firm’s core quality.
The construction of the likelihood implies several steps. In particular, we divide
the choice of entry type into two stages. If the firm ω selects the entry type eω,i in the
foreign market i, it should prefer it to (i) entering via M&A, (ii) entering via any other
entry type than M&A, i.e.
eω,i = arg max
e′i
{
EΠe
′
i
i
}
e′i∈{0,E,G,M}
⇔
eω,i = arg max
e′i
{
max
e′′i
{
EΠe
′′
i
i
}
e′′i ∈{0,E,G}
,Πe
′
i=M
}
.
(1.17)
Therefore, in the first stage we determine for each firm the probability of preferring
observed entry types to entering into all markets with M&A. We note that conditional
on the core quality and entry costs, choice of an alternative over M&A in one market
is solely determined by the draw of target firm’s quality. Given that M&A draws are
i.i.d. across markets, we can consider probability of entry type choice over M&A in
each foreign market separately. Then, for the firm ω with core quality level ϕ the
probability of selecting alternative eω,i in the foreign market i over M&A is
Pr1i
(
eω,i  M&A | ϕ, f eω,ii ; θ1i
)
=∫
1
{
EΠeω,ii
(
ϕ, ϕMi , ei, f
eω,i
i , τi, si; µe,i, σe
)
≥ ΠMi
(
ϕ, ϕMi , si, f¯
M
i
)}
dM(ϕMi ; a
M
i ,γ),
(1.18)
where θ1i =
{
µe,i, σe, aMi ,γ, τi, si
}
.
In particular, the draw of target firm’s quality should be below the corresponding
country-specific cutoff, which in turn is represented by a function in the core quality
ϕ and (institutional) entry costs of a selected activity f eω,ii . Let ∆˜
G
i denote firm’s return
to core quality associated to greenfield investment in a foreign market, respectively;
that is,45
∆˜Gi ≡ Eeσ−1i Φ˜i. (1.19)
Then, the corresponding upper bounds for the realization of ϕMi for the choice of
44Three possible orderings of cutoffs in ascending in core quality order are: i) M&A – Greenfield
Investment – Export, ii) Greenfield Investment – M&A – Export, iii) M&A – Export – Greenfield Investment.
45Here we adopt a different notation for returns, as entry costs for greenfield investment should be
considered in total when comparing this entry type to M&A.
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not entering into the market i, ϕM0i , entering via exporting, ϕ
ME
i , and greenfield in-
vestment, ϕMGi , for the firm with core quality ϕ > 1/si are as follows
ϕM0i =
[
f¯ Mi
Φ˜i(ϕsi)σ−1 − Φ˜i
] 1
σ−1
,
ϕMEi =
[
f¯ Mi + ∆
E
i − f Ei
Φ˜i(ϕsi)σ−1 − Φ˜i
] 1
σ−1
,
ϕMGi =
[
f¯ Mi + ∆˜
G
i − f Gi
Φ˜i(ϕsi)σ−1 − Φ˜i
] 1
σ−1
,
(1.20)
while if the firm has the core quality level ϕ < 1/si, it never finds it profitable to
acquire a target firm in the market i, so that such firm selects any alternative over
M&A with deterministic probability in the market i.46
In the second stage, we determine the probability of choosing a given entry type
in each market over all other alternatives, but M&A. The cutoffs (if relevant47) in the
core quality with respect to Export, Greenfield investment, and No entry are
ϕ0Ei =
f Ei
∆Ei
, ϕ0Gi =
f¯ Gi
∆Gi
, ϕGEi =
f Ei − f¯ Gi
∆Ei − ∆Gi
, (1.21)
where ϕjki defines firm’s threshold such that with core quality ϕ satisfying ϕ
σ−1
i = ϕ
jk
i
firm is indifferent between entering with the entry type j or k into the foreign market
and enters with k if the core quality is above the relevant cutoff,
where j, k ∈ {0, E, G} with j 6= k.
The cutoffs for choosing M&A depend both on the core quality and realization of
target firms’ qualities. Thus, the density of the revenues in each location and the
choice of M&A are interdependent. However, using the monotonicity of M&A rev-
enues in the target firm’s quality, we can constrain the possible realizations of target
firms’ draws of quality to rationalize the sales associated to M&A and observed in the
data. In particular, we can express the target firm’s quality as ϕMω,i = r
M
ω,i/Φ˜i(siϕ)
σ−1
and redefine all cutoffs for firm ω for selecting M&A over other alternatives in terms
of the sole core quality.48
Finally, the likelihood for each firm consists of (i) the probability of observing cho-
sen entry types {eω,i}i∈I f , (ii) the density of the country-specific revenues {rω,i}i∈I f ,49
46For simplicity, if ϕ > 1/si we assume that Greenfield Investment is preferred to M&A with probabil-
ity 1 in the market i. In this case, option of not entering dominates both M&A and Greenfield investment.
Therefore, in the second stage the Greenfield investment will be dominated by No entry, so that the like-
lihood of selecting Greenfield investment will be zero independent of the value which we assign to the
probability to select Greenfield investment over M&A in the first stage. The probability of selecting M&A
over M&A is one.
47The relevance of cutoffs is discussed in the Appendix A.3.
48Formal expressions for cutoffs in the core quality for selecting M&A over other alternatives can be
found in the Appendix A.6.
49Here we drop the entry-type superscript for sales to reduce notation complication.
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(iii) the density of the domestic revenues rω,GER conditional on the entry choices and
firm’s core quality. We transform the density of revenues into the density of per-
ceived quality shocks for Export, Greenfield investment, and domestic sales. The den-
sity of M&A sales is transformed into the density of M&A quality draws. Since the
perceived quality shocks are i.i.d. across firms and countries, the final representation
of the contribution of the firm ω to the likelihood is
lω
(
θ; {eω,i, rω,i}i∈I f , rω,GER
)
=∫
Pr
(
eω = e| ϕ; {θ1i }i∈I f
)
· ∣∣Jeω (ϕ; {τi}i∈I f )∣∣ ∏
ei∈{E,G}
y
(
r−1i (rω,i)
∣∣ ϕ; {µe,i}i∈I f , σe)
·
∣∣∣JϕMω (ϕ; {si}i∈I f )∣∣∣ ∏
ei=M
m
(
r−1i (rω,i)
∣∣∣ ϕ;{aMi }i∈I f ,γ)
·
∣∣∣∣drGER(eGER)de (r−1GER (rω,GER))
∣∣∣∣−1 y (r−1GER (rω,GER) | ϕ; σe) dG(ϕ; a,γ),
(1.22)
where θ is the vector of parameters to estimate,
∣∣Jeω (ϕ; {τi}i∈I f )∣∣ is the absolute value
of the determinant of the Jacobian associated to the transformation of the density of
foreign revenues generated via export and greenfield investment into the density of
the perceived quality shocks,
∣∣∣JϕMω (ϕ; {si}i∈I f )∣∣∣ is the absolute value of the Jacobian
associated to the transformation of the density of M&A foreign revenues into the den-
sity of the M&A quality draws, y
(· ∣∣ {µe,i}i∈I f , σe ) is the univariate density of the
perceived quality shocks, m
(
· ∣∣ {aMi }i∈I f ,γ) is the univariate density of the M&A
quality draws, and G(ϕ; a,γ) is the distribution of the core quality.
To estimate the model we solve the constrained optimization problem, which is
specified as follows
max
θ,{ϕi}i∈I f ,ϕGER
log ∏
ω∈ΩGER
lω
(
θ; {eω,i, rω,i}i∈I f , rω,GER
)
subject to: rω,i = ri(ϕi) ∧ rω,GER = rGER(ϕGER) ∀ ω ∈ ΩGER, i ∈ I f .
(1.23)
1.4.4 Estimation Results
Table 1.4 presents the estimates of the structural parameters.50
Institutional entry costs of both types of FDI are below the institutional export-
entry costs. Therefore, only the firms with the highest core quality find it profitable
to export.51 Entry costs of greenfield investment increase with the core quality of the
firm, which confirms the hypothesis that transferring higher quality is more costly.
The cost of quality for greenfield investment is higher in the US relative to the rest
50We note that results are obtained without putting any restriction on M&A parameters. Though this
may result in a bias of absolute parameter values, we can make a relative comparison of parameters
across different markets and entry types.
51The orderings of the returns and fixed part of the entry costs across entry types are the same.
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of the world and the EU. This result can be explained by higher average quality of
services provided in the US market, as well as higher advertisement costs.
TABLE 1.4: Maximum likelihood estimates
Common parameters Estimates
Scale parameter of core quality distribution, a 0.139
Shape parameter of core quality distribution, γ 4.649
S.d. log perceived quality shock, σe 0.887
S.d. log export-entry costs, σf E 2.996
S.d. log greenfield investment entry costs, σf G 9.436
Country-specific parameters EU US RoW
Median entry cost with export, exp( f E) 4.455 1.069 3.803
Iceberg trade costs, τ 1.468 2.259 2.897
Median log perceived quality shocks, exp (µe) 0.858 0.375 0.655
Median institutional entry costs with greenfield FDI, exp
(
f¯ G
)
0.279 0.611 0.764
Quality price for greenfield FDI, αG 0.224 0.575 0.200
Median institutional entry costs of M&A, exp
(
f¯ M
)
0.216 0.048 1.565
M&A synergies, s 6.457 1.729 3.934
Scale parameter of M&A quality distribution, aM 0.115 0.148 0.368
Number of firms 3776
Log-Likelihood −3.245E+4
Source: Research Data and Service Centre (RDSC) of the Deutsche Bundesbank, Microdatabase
Direct investment (MiDi), 1999-2014, and Statistics on International Trade Services (SITS), 2001-2015,
authors’ calculations.
Next, we discuss the parameters which determine the revenues associated with
each activity. The perception of quality in the foreign markets is lower with respect
to the median perceived quality in Germany. When the loss in the perception is
only 14% for the EU, the mode perceived quality in the US and the rest of the world
markets for German services is substantially lower. In particular, this results in the
change of the cutoff ordering between M&A and greenfield for the US market: more
productive firms prefer to acquire firms in the US. Iceberg trade costs in the services
sector are mainly explained by the gravity parameters. Not surprisingly, an increase
in the marginal costs is the lowest for the EU market. Finally, the magnitude of syn-
ergies generated via M&A is larger in the EU compared to the US and the rest of the
world, which reflects larger applicability of German common practices in this market
and better brand-name recognition.
1.5 Counterfactual Analysis
In this section, we address the question of how the liberalization affects the services
sector. Specifically, we examine the potential effect of the Transatlantic Trade and
Investment Partnership (TTIP) related to the services sector on the average quality of
services provided via each entry type and overall quality of services provided in the
EU, the US, and the rest of the world.
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We describe the main steps of conducting a counterfactual analysis with the pro-
posed model. First, we discuss how to calibrate the iceberg trade costs and param-
eters of the origin-specific distributions of the perceived quality shocks to data on
bilateral multinational and trade flows between markets. Second, we explain how
to simulate a trade liberalization with our model and what can be the differences in
liberalization outcomes in the services sector with respect to manufacturing. As pre-
vious steps done, we can analyze the effect of the introduction of quality and safety
standards which result in the reduction of the costs of quality transfer with greenfield
investment.
1.5.1 Calibration
Some additional data are needed to calibrate the general equilibrium of the model.
For the multinational and trade outflows and inflows in the EU and the US, we use
the data provided by the OECD. The multinational outflows type-specific FDI in Ger-
many are taken from MiDi. We set the mass of firms in each market proportional to
the number of listed companies in the region. Accordingly, we use data from the
World Bank to determine the size of the labor force in each market and the share of
labor employed in the services sector.
Taking Germany as a representative EU country, we set all origin-specific structural
parameters for the EU firms equal to the ones estimated for Germany. Specifically,
we assume that EU firms face the same uncertainty in quality perception in the for-
eign markets, draw entry costs from the same distributions and pay same iceberg
trade costs. Moreover, as the magnitude of the iceberg trade costs in the professional
services sector can be explained by gravity parameters, we restrict the trade costs to
be symmetric.
Following the theoretical specification of our model, we account for the possibil-
ity that quality perception and the level of entry costs can depend not just on the
destination country, but also on the origin of trade flows. The perception of qual-
ity can differ due to the presence of “country-brands”, for instance German services
could be perceived differently from those provided by US firms in the RoW market.
The flexibility in parameters corresponding to the perceived quality shocks would
allow us to match closer intensive margin of services trade. At the same time, the
closeness of regulations on services sector between origin and host countries would
make the institutional entry barriers different across various country pairs. When
allowing for origin- and destination-specific entry costs, we are able to match better
extensive margin, and therefore selection patterns into different activities. Moreover,
those two assumptions allow us to regard all countries the same in terms of the core
quality distribution.52
52With non-origin specific institutional entry barriers the model will predict the same cutoffs for a
given country for all entrants independent of their origin. This would largely restrict the set of possible
market shares of foreign suppliers and make the calibration of the model not feasible.
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More specifically, we assume that ki,o = ki + ko, where ki,o =
{
µe,i,o, f Ei,o, f¯
G
i,o, f¯
M
i,o
}
can be represented as a sum of the destination country component ki, and the origin
country component ko. We normalize all parameters related to the EU market to
zero, so that the estimates for entry costs and quality perception shocks obtained for
Germany can be regarded as the corresponding destination country components.
Thus, there are eight parameters, θc, to be calibrated: (i – ii) US – RoW and RoW –
RoW iceberg trade costs, and (iii – viii) origin country components of the perceived
quality shocks’ distribution and entry costs for the US and the rest of the world.
Using the predictions of the model on the export and FDI flows across foreign mar-
kets, we construct the set of moments for our calibration. The first subset of moments
includes the shares of each foreign market in the US and the EU trade and multi-
national flows. The theoretical decomposition of export and import across foreign
markets is given by
κ
1,import
i,j =
∫
ϕ X
E
i,j(ϕ)dG(ϕ)
∑i 6=j
∫
ϕ X
E
i,j(ϕ)dG(ϕ)
, κ1,exporti,j =
∫
ϕ X
E
i,j(ϕ)dG(ϕ)
∑i 6=j
∫
ϕ X
E
i,j(ϕ)dG(ϕ)
, (1.24)
where i ∈ {EU, US}, j ∈ {EU, US, RoW}.53 For each country, we drop a moment
with respect to one foreign country. This results in six moment conditions.54
Next, we take the shares of each foreign market in the FDI inflows and outflows in
the US and the EU markets. The model prediction for these moments is
κ
1,inflow
i,j =
∫
ϕ
[
XGi,j(ϕ) + X
M
i,j (ϕ)
]
dG(ϕ)
∑
i 6=j
∫
ϕ
[
XGi,j(ϕ) + X
M
i,j (ϕ)
]
dG(ϕ)
,
κ
1,outflow
i,j =
∫
ϕ
[
XGj,i(ϕ) + X
M
j,i (ϕ)
]
dG(ϕ)
∑
i 6=j
∫
ϕ
[
XGj,i(ϕ) + X
M
j,i (ϕ)
]
dG(ϕ)
,
(1.25)
where i ∈ {EU, US}, j ∈ {EU, US, RoW}. Accordingly, we consider six additional
moment conditions.
Then, we include the shares of each foreign market in the greenfield investment
and M&A services flows from Germany. Here we assume that the German FDI com-
position is similar to the aggregate EU composition of FDI. The proportion of country
j in the greenfield investment and M&A outflows from Germany is
κ1,GEU,j =
∫
ϕ X
G
j,EU(ϕ)dG(ϕ)
∑
j
∫
ϕ X
G
j,EU(ϕ)dG(ϕ)
, κ1,MEU,j =
∫
ϕ X
M
j,EU(ϕ)dG(ϕ)
∑
j
∫
ϕ X
M
j,EU(ϕ)dG(ϕ)
, (1.26)
where j ∈ {EU, US, RoW}. This condition gives us four additional moments.
53We allow for trade between countries within the same aggregated region (the EU and the rest of
the world). Therefore, only non-feasible pair of i and j combination is US−US.
54Correspondingly, there are two moment conditions for flows associated to the US and four mo-
ment conditions for the EU.
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The second set of moments defines the composition of a trade flow to each foreign
destination by export and FDI. First, the theoretical share of import from country j to
country i in total expenditure of country i to services from country j is given by
κ
2,import
i,j =
∫
ϕ X
E
i,j(ϕ)dG(ϕ)
∑
e∈{E,G,M}
∫
ϕ X
e
i,j(ϕ)dG(ϕ)
, (1.27)
where i ∈ {EU, US}, j ∈ {EU, US, RoW}. Analogously, the theoretical share of ex-
port in total sales flows from country i to country j is given by
κ
2,export
i,j =
∫
ϕ X
E
j,i(ϕ)dG(ϕ)
∑
e∈{E,G,M}
∫
ϕ X
e
j,i(ϕ)dG(ϕ)
, (1.28)
where i ∈ {EU, US}, j ∈ {EU, US, RoW}.
Finally, we include the proportion of destination-specific greenfield investment
flows and M&A flows in outward German activities. The proportion of M&A in
the total FDI flow to the foreign market from the EU is
κ2,MEU,j =
∫
ϕ X
M
j,EU(ϕ)dG(ϕ)∫
ϕ
[
XMj,EU(ϕ) + X
M
j,EU(ϕ)
]
dG(ϕ)
, (1.29)
where j ∈ {EU, US, RoW}. This condition gives us three additional moments.
Therefore, we construct 31 moments, κ. We then minimize the squared difference
between theoretical moments and the data targets conditional on the vector of the
aggregate market parameters satisfying the model equilibrium
max
θc
(κ(θc)− κ)′ (κ(θc)− κ)
subject to: Li(θc) = Li ∧ Pi(θc) = Pi ∧Yi(θc) = Yi ∀i ∈ I,
(1.30)
where Li(θc) is given by (1.13), Pi(θc) is given by (1.14), and Yi(θc) is given by (1.15).
We take all moments with the equal weights.
1.5.2 Counterfactual Analysis
In the counterfactual analysis, we simulate the liberalization in the services sector
as it is described for TTIP agreement. According to the proposals of the European
Commission,55 the services sector liberalization has two important policies which
are the reduction of the non-tariff trade barriers and introduction of services qual-
ity standardization. In terms of the model, an increase in mobility of professional
consultants, fastening of licenses approvals and elimination of legal restrictions of
professional services trade will be reflected in the reduction of the institutional trade
55Detailed information about proposals could be found on the website of the European Commission.
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barriers, that is f E, f¯G and f¯M . Standardization of the quality requirements can de-
crease costs of entering foreign markets with the greenfield investment by facilitating
the transferring of quality overseas; therefore, we would expect that the costs of qual-
ity transfer, αG, will decrease.
The reduction in the institutional entry costs does not change the relative quality
provided by each entry mode, but in turn it affects the absolute value of the aver-
age quality supplied by exporters, FDI-makers and domestic firms as institutional
barriers determine the proportions of firms selecting in one or another entry mode.
Contrarily, the introduction of quality standards results in an increase of a return to
greenfield investment and therefore could have implications on the sorting entry pat-
terns. A sufficiently stringent quality requirements could revert the sorting between
export and greenfield investment and result in the highest quality services to be pro-
vided with FDI. Moreover, an increase in the return to greenfield investment would
have an effect on the acceptance of M&A offers, leading to less M&A but of a higher
quality.
Following Francois and Hoekman (2010), we consider two possible scenarios for
trade liberalization. In the moderate scenario, we simulate a 10%-reduction of the
non-tariff barriers, where we reduce bilateral institutional entry costs for the US and
the EU markets. In the more ambitious scenario, we simulate a 25%-reduction of
institutional entry barriers. For each case we consider a change in the aggregate in-
come, as defined by (1.15); a change in the average quality ϕ˜i of services in the market
i, as defined by (1.31); and a change in the average quality provided by exporters and
FDI-makers, that is by groups gei separated according to different entry types e, as de-
fined by (1.32)
ϕ˜i =
∑
j∈I fi
nj
∫
ϕ
ζei,j(ϕ)ϕ
σ−1dG(ϕ) + niϕσ−1dG(ϕ)
 1σ−1 , (1.31)
ϕ˜i,gei =
∑
j∈gei
nj
∫
ϕ
ζei,j(ϕ)ϕ
σ−1dG(ϕ)
 1σ−1 . (1.32)
Given the structural parameter estimates obtained in Section 1.4, we can expect the
main effect of liberalization to come from the changes in the multinational activity
in the services sector. As non-tariff trade barrier fall, previously domestic firms can
become profitable for starting the FDI activity in the foreign market. While export can
increase, this would be mainly due to selection into exporting over FDIrather than
deriving from entries of previously internationally inactive firms. This is a crucial
difference with the effect of liberalization in manufacturing, which highlights the
importance of a proper consideration of the selection patterns into foreign activities
across industries and countries.
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1.6 Conclusion
This chapter analyzes the entry patterns into foreign markets specific to the profes-
sional services sector. We explain theoretically why the largest service firms in the
industry export, while the smaller companies open new foreign affiliates or acquire
preexisting foreign targets. Since international activities are associated with high un-
certainty in the perception of service quality in the non-tested destination markets,
most firms find it profitable to enter a new market by buying foreign firms with an
already established consumer network in order to avoid demand risks. At the same
time, the most productive firm can generate higher sales by engaging in greenfield
FDI or by exporting the quality of their origin country abroad subject to entry costs.
Our parsimonious model fits the empirical evidence on German firms. We find that
entry patterns are reversed compared to the standard sorting in manufacturing: only
the firms providing the highest service quality export, while lower-quality firms con-
duct FDI. The relative sorting of M&A vs. greenfield FDI in terms of firm quality is
market-specific and depends on the relative importance of uncertainty about quality
perception, the structure of entry costs, and size of synergies associated with M&A.
Finally, we calibrate the model equilibrium to the data on multinational and trade
flows between the EU, the US, and the rest of the world. The theoretical model sug-
gest that the service-trade liberalization, based on the reduction of non-tariff trade
barriers and introduction of quality standards, can reallocate quality across entry
alternatives, increase quality of acquired targets, and make FDI a more prominent
entry type.
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Chapter 2
The Structure of
Multinational Sales under
Demand Risk
2.1 Introduction
The activity of multinational enterprises (MNEs) comprises a set of complex location
and sales decisions. First, MNEs decide in which countries to establish production
facilities through foreign direct investment (FDI); in doing so, they typically weigh
the benefit of proximity to customers against the cost of setting up a foreign plant.
Second, MNEs decide how much to produce in each foreign plant; in particular, the
output of a foreign plant can serve the local and the neighboring markets if MNEs
use their production facilities as export platforms.1
Crucially, MNEs make the investment and production decisions before observing
the realization of demand in each market. In addition, such realizations can be cor-
related across the foreign markets served by the MNEs. In other words, the MNEs’
activity is subject to the risk of unfavorable demand fluctuations which can be corre-
lated across foreign markets. This is what we define as demand risk. If MNEs are risk
averse, then the location and sales decisions hinge both on the expected demand for
each market and the correlation structure of demand realizations across destination
markets.
Demand risk is an important determinant of multinational activity. For example,
the UNCTAD World Investment Report 2010 describes how MNEs adjusted their
investment flows and organization of production in response to the demand fluctua-
tions following the outbreak of the financial crisis. Specifically, FDI flows favored, in
1According to the World Investment Report 2017, foreign affiliates of MNEs exported approxi-
mately 20% of their total output abroad in 2016.
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relative terms, countries less affected by the economic downturn.2
This chapter addresses the question of how demand risk shapes investment and
sales decisions of MNEs. For this purpose, we propose a structural model of hori-
zontal FDI with firms that are heterogeneous in terms of productivity and risk aver-
sion. MNEs decide about the locations of their production facilities, which countries
to serve from each plant and the volume of production to sell in each market. They
make all the above decisions under demand risk, i.e. before observing the realiza-
tions of demand in the destination markets. With risk averse MNEs and correlated
demand realizations, investment and sales decisions are interdependent and similar
to a complex portfolio choice problem. In particular, each market in which the MNE
sells its output yields a risky return which imperfectly correlates with the returns
offered by other foreign markets. Thus, the sales depend on the expected return,
related to the expected demand realization in the market, and the diversification
opportunities, related to how the market demand correlates with that of the other
markets. Ceteris paribus, markets that offer better hedging opportunities to multina-
tionals induce larger sales, and the more risk averse the firm is, the more beneficial
the diversification is.
Foreign plants serve as export platforms since they can originate sales to local and
third markets. Such export platforms reduce the effective distance between the MNE
and a destination market. This results in an expected demand increase in the market
itself. Moreover, establishing the plant eases MNE’s access to markets, which may
be possibly correlated in a favorable fashion to the ones the MNE already sells to.
However, setting up a foreign plant comes at a fixed cost. Thus, MNEs have to trade
off the described increase of the expected demand paired with the reduction in de-
mand risk against the fixed set-up cost. Due to complementarities, the attractiveness
of each foreign plant depends on the set of other plants owned by the MNE. Hence,
the location entry choice of MNEs is a complex combinatorial discrete choice prob-
lem with complementarities. In particular, with N locations and a given host country
of the MNE, there are 2N−1 eligible location sets.
Several theoretical implications related to the MNEs’ activities result
from our model.
First, our model rationalizes why expected sales in a given market are not a suffi-
cient statistic for the entry decisions of multinationals in this market. Standard mod-
els of horizontal FDI (Helpman et al., 2004) have the counterfactual implication that
distance-adjusted market size determines a monotone ranking in terms of entry: all
firms sell to close and large markets as they are associated with large expected sales.
However, only more productive firms afford to sell to smaller and more distant mar-
kets as they command lower expected sales. By contrast, in our model the described
2Though global FDI flows decreased after 2008, the ratio of FDI inflows into developed compared to
developing countries substantially changed. Specifically, FDI flows in developed countries contracted
by 44% in 2009, whereas those in developing and transition economies fell by 27%. Thanks to their
rapidly expanding local demand and resilience to the crisis, the developing regions accounted for the
majority of worldwide FDI inflows for the first time.
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ranking does not necessarily obtain because the attractiveness of establishing a plant
in a foreign country depends also on the diversification opportunities offered by this
location, which depend, in turn, on the characteristics of other MNE’s locations. As
a consequence, if a low productive MNE opens up a foreign production facility, say,
both in France and China, a highly productive one does not necessarily set up a plant
in these two countries too as also demand risk matters. These results hold when core
productivity varies given the level of risk aversion and vice versa. Specifically, a
larger degree of risk aversion does not automatically reduce the number of foreign
locations a firm decides to enter.
Second, heterogeneity in risk aversion leads to country-firm-specific markups even
when the elasticity of demand is constant. In fact, the firm chooses a quantity to
ship in each country which reflects three factors: (i) country’s demand variance
and (ii) diversification potential, and (iii) the degree of risk aversion of the firm. As
a result, the firm scales up or down the optimal quantity it would sell under no risk
by a factor which reflects (i) – (iii), implying a different realized price in each of the
markets.3
Third, demand risk diversification can impact on the outcomes of trade policies. A
tariff reduction in a country which offers a good hedging potential can magnify the
effect of a trade liberalization on trade flows compared to standard models.4 More-
over, trade liberalization can give rise to third-country effects. In other words, sales
flows may change also in countries which are not directly interested by the policy
change, with the direction of the change depending on the sign of the correlation. To
be specific, countries offering a demand hedge with respect to the market for which
trade costs have been reduced experience an increase in imports, whereas markets
whose demand is highly and positively correlated with the liberalized market are
subject to negative spillovers.
The empirical analysis uses firm-level data on German multinationals operating
in the manufacturing sector. The data represent the universe of German multina-
tional firms holding an investment position in a foreign country and contain infor-
mation about the balance sheet and location of the foreign affiliates. By exploiting
the properties of the solution to the MNE’s optimization problem described in the
present chapter, we match the observed sales to the ones predicted by our model to
obtain a measure of firm-specific absolute risk aversion. We find that the German
multinational companies are risk averse. Moreover, the degree of risk aversion is
heterogeneous across firms. The findings are consistent with our theoretical model
which predicts that the level of correlation across foreign markets directly affects the
composition of the sales portfolio of German multinationals. Compared to the risk
neutral benchmark, firms tend to sell relatively more to the countries providing a
better hedge. We estimate the risk aversion elasticity of aggregate sales to be 0.8 (in
3In our framework, the price can be thought of as the residual equalizing the realized demand to
the supply.
4On the contrary, a lower hedging potential or higher demand volatility may dampen the effect of
a trade liberalization.
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absolute value). We find that risk aversion varies across the different manufactur-
ing sectors included in our analysis. Specifically, risk aversion correlates with the
demand characteristics of the sector rather than with technological features. Fur-
thermore, more risk averse firms operate in industries characterized by a relatively
more disperse demand. In a counterfactual analysis, we assess the effect of a tariff
reduction on products exported to China. We find that the policy change increases
the sales of German MNEs not only in China but also in the USA and Japan, whereas
neighboring countries like Hong Kong and Singapore are negatively affected. Other,
less correlated countries are less affected. We also demonstrate how a change in risk
aversion of German companies (e.g. due to the entry of new firms or to the reduction
of financial constraints) produces a larger variation in the sales toward those coun-
tries which are more correlated with Germany, whereas more distant regions are less
influenced.
2.1.1 Related Literature
The present chapter relates to the literature studying firm’s incentives to conduct
horizontal FDI versus export (the so-called proximity-concentration tradeoff) in the
presence of uncertainty. The closest contribution to the chapter is Tintelnot (2017)
who proposes a structural model of firms engaging in multinational activities where
they can use foreign affiliates as export platforms. His analysis assesses the costs
involved in multinational production and the incentives of firms in designing their
global operations under imperfect transferability of technology from the parent com-
pany to its subsidiaries. As Tintelnot (2017), we account for the importance of export
platforms in shaping the multinational organization of production. However, we
rather concentrate our attention on the role played by export platforms in affecting
the sales structure of MNEs when the demand is risky and MNEs are risk averse.
Indeed, the possibility of reaching markets different from the local one makes it pos-
sible for a firm to fully exploit the diversification opportunities offered by the foreign
sales. The impact of technological and demand uncertainty on the choice between
exporting and establishing a foreign production facility has been also addressed by
Ramondo, Rappoport, and Ruhl (2013). In particular, they study the above tradeoff
in the presence of country-specific shocks to the production costs and to the demand.
The firm’s dynamic choice between export and FDI hinges on the heterogeneous cor-
relation existing between production costs across home and foreign countries. In
particular, firms are more likely to select export over FDI in markets characterized by
productivity shocks poorly correlated with those at home. In particular, as demand
and costs are positively correlated, engaging in multinational activity entails high
foreign production cost when the foreign demand is high and this partly offsets the
benefits from FDI compared to exporting, which requires domestic inputs. With ref-
erence to the demand shocks, they find that firms are more likely to serve volatile
locations by exporting activity. Differently from them, we focus on the demand
side and highlight the importance of demand correlations across different markets
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in shaping entry and production choices. Other contributions investigating multina-
tional activity under uncertainty are Rob and Vettas (2003), who discuss uncertain
demand growth in foreign markets, and Chen and Moore (2010), who concentrate
on idiosyncratic shocks to firm demand in the foreign market. With reference to the
last paper, the authors find that more productive firms are more likely than less ef-
ficient ones to enter into tougher markets. Their result does not necessarily obtain
in our framework since allowing for risk averse firms and demand interdependen-
cies across countries break the monotonicity in the firms’ entry choice with respect to
productivity. Campa (1993), Goldberg and Kolstad (1995), and Russ (2007) introduce
risk in the form of exchange rate fluctuations and find that firms take into account
the exchange rate volatility when they solve the proximity-concentration tradeoff.
Aizenman and Marion (2004) analyze the role of uncertainty on the choice between
vertical and horizontal FDI, demonstrating how higher uncertainty should induce
firms to favor horizontal over vertical FDI. This conclusion is in line with the idea
that MNEs diversify their demand risk by using their production and sales struc-
ture. Ramondo and Rappoport (2010) explore the role of FDI flows both as an asset
available to consumers for diversification and as a means for transferring technol-
ogy across countries; the existence of multinational production affects the amount
of goods available in each state of the world and reduces consumption risk as long
as foreign affiliates are located in regions characterized by good hedging properties
with respect to the world consumption risk.
The chapter also closely relates to the growing literature on the role of demand risk
in international trade. Specifically, Di Giovanni and Levchenko (2012) analyze the
risk content of exports and show that cross-country specialization patterns depend
both on the comparative advantage and the riskiness of those sectors in which they
have a comparative advantage. Kramarz, Martin, and Mejean (2016) quantify the
contribution of idiosyncratic demand shocks and the structure of trade to the volatil-
ity of exports, and link the volatility of exporters to the low level of diversification in
the client portfolio held by a firm. Conconi et al. (2016) show that firms learn about
their profitability in a foreign market by entering there as exporters before engaging
in FDI activities. Our model implicitly assumes immediate learning; upon entering
into a foreign market all uncertainty about the demand realization unravels.
We also contribute to the growing literature regarding the relation between firms’
preferences toward risk and international trade. In particular, De Sousa, Disdier,
and Gaigné (2017) and Esposito (2017) analyze risk averse exporters in the presence
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of demand shocks. The present chapter differs from these contributions along sev-
eral dimensions. First, De Sousa et al. (2017) and Esposito (2017) focus on pure ex-
porters.5 MNEs typically face lower marginal costs compared with exporters; as a
consequence, it is more likely that for the latter the benefits of diversification out-
weigh the transportation costs. Second, we distinguish from De Sousa et al. (2017)
since we allow for correlated expenditures across destination markets and abstract
from the possible effects of skewed demand shocks; with regard to Esposito (2017),
we focus on the risk affecting a firm both at the industry and macroeconomic levels,
whereas he focuses on firm-specific demand shocks.6 Riaño (2011) considers the in-
vesting and exporting decisions of risk averse managers in a framework where both
productivity and demand are subject to firm-specific shocks. He proves that export-
ing increases the volatility of the firm’s sales.
The present chapter also contributes to the literature on interdependent foreign
markets. In Nguyen (2012), firms learn the demand realization in potential foreign
destinations by exporting given the positive correlation of demands across countries.
Albornoz et al. (2012) consider a model of experimenting exporters who learn about
their own profitability by entering into foreign markets. Under the assumption that
profits exhibit the same positive correlation across different foreign destinations, risk
regarding profits reduces over time not only in the markets the firm is present in, but
also in the other unexplored markets. With respect to the above contributions, we
relax the assumption that demand correlations are positive. Vannoorenberghe (2012)
shows that foreign and domestic sales are negatively correlated at the firm level,
which supports the hypothesis that firms diversify by selling abroad. Vannooren-
berghe, Wang, and Yu (2016) shows that volatility of exports increase (decrease) with
the level of diversification of destination countries reached by a small (large) firm.
This result is justified with the presence of fixed costs and short-run demand shocks.
Our analysis extends the above contribution by highlighting the role of heterogeneity
in risk aversion and the importance of multinational activity.
Finally, this chapter is connected to the recent contributions on export platforms
and multinational production. In particular, we model export platforms similarly to
Tintelnot (2017) and Head and Mayer (2017).7 Analogously to Ekholm, Forslid, and
5In comparison with pure exporters, multinational enterprises typically have more opportunities
of adjusting their sales across markets since they are present in several foreign countries. In this regard,
the UNCTAD World Investment Report 2008 highlights how multinationals exhibited more stable sales
than pure exporters during the crisis, in line with the idea that multinational firms benefit more exten-
sively from diversification than other firms. Therefore, demand risk diversification plays a greater role
for MNEs than for exporters. In addition, such a role can be assessed only in a framework which allows
for the presence of export platforms. Not taking into account this possibility would lead to consider a
(potentially) misspecified demand.
6In addition, in our framework, the firms are heterogeneous in terms of risk aversion. Cucculelli
and Ermini (2013) provide evidence that managers differ in risk attitudes in a sample of Italian manu-
facturing firms. In particular, they find that about 76% of the managers display a risk averse attitude,
17% a risk neutral attitude and the rest a risk loving attitude. Hence, 93% of managers in their sample
exhibit a (weak) risk aversion. This heterogeneity is also correlated with firm’s characteristics like size,
age, and innovativeness. Moreover, different financial conditions can result in differences in hedging
opportunities by other means than sales.
7In our framework, the choice of serving a foreign market from an affiliate is deterministic.
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Markusen (2007) and Arkolakis, Ramondo, Rodríguez-Clare, and Yeaple (2018), we
find the spillover effects of liberalization arising from the complexity of global value
chains. Differently from their papers, we introduce demand-side spillovers affecting
multinational production. However, to our knowledge, we are the first to highlight
the importance of export platforms in enhancing sales diversification.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2 introduces the
theoretical model and shows how risk aversion enters into firm’s production and FDI
decisions. Section 2.3 discusses the data used in the estimation. Section 2.4 describes
the estimation procedure. Section 2.5 presents the main empirical results. Section 2.6
concludes.
2.2 Model
This section proposes a version of Chaney (2008) with N countries indexed by d ∈
D ≡ {1, . . . , N}, and I + 1 sectors indexed by i = 0, . . . , I.
2.2.1 Demand
In each country d, there is a representative consumer whose total income equals Yd.
Her preferences are represented by the following quasi-linear utility function in the
homogeneous good Q0d
Ud =
I
∑
i=1
αid ln Qid + Q0d, (2.1)
where αid > 0 is the absorption relative to the sector i and destination d, and Qid
denotes a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregate good i in country d, that is,
Qid =
[∫
ω∈Ωid
qid(ω)
σ−1
σ dω
] σ
σ−1
. (2.2)
The elasticity of substitution σ between any two varieties and ω′ is larger than 1.
The set Ωid represents the varieties of Qid sold in country d.
The absorption αid is random. In particular, one can think of it as a shifter to con-
sumer’s preferences with respect to the aggregate good Qid, describing fluctuations
occurring at the industry and aggregate levels. For example, it can represent a change
in the quality of the product produced in the industry i or an exogenous change in
country d’s total income or aggregate demand.
Realizations of absorptions in different countries can be correlated; they tend to
move in the same (opposite) directions in countries either characterized by similar
(opposite) tastes for a certain product or displaying more (less) integrated economies.
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We assume that the vector of absorption αi = (αi1, . . . , αid, . . . , αiN) has a bounded
expected value, denoted by α¯i = (α¯i1, . . . , α¯id, . . . , α¯iN), where α¯id is the expected ab-
sorption for the good Qid. In addition, αi has a full-rank variance-covariance matrix
Σi. The element in position (d, d′) of the matrix Σi represents the long-run covariance
between the absorption in countries d and d′ and is denoted by Σi(d, d′). We assume
that, if d 6= d′, then it holds
−1 < Σi(d, d
′)√
Σi(d, d)Σi(d′, d′)
< 1. (2.3)
The above restriction on Σi excludes the possibility that the cross-correlations be-
tween the demand realizations in two destination countries are perfect.8
The representative consumer observes the realizations of the vector αid for i =
1, . . . , N and makes consumption decision accordingly.
The consumption bundle chosen by the consumer follows from the solution of the
following utility maximization problem
max
I
∑
i=1
αid ln Qid + Q0d
s.t. Q0d +
I
∑
i=1
∫
ω∈Ωid
pid(ω)qid(ω)dω = Yd,
(2.4)
from which we obtain Q0d = Yd − ∑Ii=1 αid and PidQid = αid, where Pid is the price
index associated to Qid.9 In addition, the inverse demand for the variety is given by
pid(ω) = Aidqid(ω)−
1
σ , with Aid ≡ αidQ−
σ−1
σ
id and Υid ≡ Q
− σ−1σ
id , (2.5)
where pid(ω) is variety ’s price in country d.
For the following discussion, we let ΣAi ≡ Υ′iΣiΥi denote the variance of
Ai = (Ai1, . . . , ANi).
2.2.2 Firms
Each firm produces exclusively one variety of the differentiated good Qid. We index
this variety by ω. Since there exists a one-to-one relation between firms and varieties,
we drop any industry-related subscript.
Firms also differ with respect to the level of productivities ϕ, risk aversion r, fixed
entry costs f , and origin country o. Hence, a firm is fully characterized by the vector
of variables (ω,ϕ, r, f , o).
In this section, we consider an arbitrary firm so we suppress also the index referring
to the variety ω it produces.
8As the estimated industry variance-covariance matrix satisfies this requirement, the assumption is
not stringent.
9We assume that Yd is large enough to avoid the possibility of incurring in a corner solution.
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A firm can observe the above variables at no cost before making any choice. Its
profits are determined by three simultaneous decisions. First, a firm makes a location
decision, i.e. it picks the set of locations in which to establish a foreign affiliate.10 We
denote a location set by L with L ∈ L = 2N−1 as we assume that the firm is always
present in its home country. Second, a firm makes a shipment decision, i.e. it chooses
the optimal location as origin for shipping the variety in a given destination mar-
ket. Third, a firm makes a production decision, i.e. it selects the quantity of the variety
to sell in each destination. Crucially, the three decisions are made before observing
the actual realizations of demand in the destination markets. Hence, a firm decides
under demand risk. In particular, the fact that the produced quantity cannot be ad-
justed following the realization of the demand implies that a firm is exposed to price
fluctuations in the destination markets.11
In the following paragraphs, we closely describe firm’s technology and each deci-
sion.
Technology and production costs. The firm has to pay a fixed entry cost fl to set
up a plant in the foreign location l. The fixed entry cost represents the firm-specific
cost of building or acquiring a foreign plant in the country.12
In addition, the firm has a different level of productivity associated to each of its
foreign plants. This assumption reflects two things. On the one hand, the firm can
face productivity losses due to the imperfect transferability of technologies and pro-
duction skills within its boundaries. On the other hand, the firm can possibly take
advantage of the production infrastructure of its foreign affiliate.13
When firm produces in location l, it has to bear a variable production cost which
is inversely proportional to the firm’s location-specific productivity ϕl . The variable
cost of producing ql units in country l is, then, given by
C(ql) =
ql
ϕl
. (2.6)
The firm can use its plant in location l to serve both the local and any other des-
tination market. This means that the firm owns an export platform in country l.
However, if the firm uses the production facility in country l to serve the foreign
destination market d, then it has to pay an iceberg trade cost τld > 1.14
We denote the constant marginal cost of producing the variety in location l and
shipping it to country d by cld ≡ τld/ϕl .
10Note that we assume that a parent company can maintain at most one foreign plant in each desti-
nation market.
11We discuss a relaxation of this assumption in Appendix B.7.
12In other words, we do not distinguish between greenfield and brownfield investments.
13More concretely, existing contracts with foreign counterparts, lower input prices, or the adoption
of advanced techniques can make a foreign affiliate more productive than its parent. Need for learning,
institutional differences between foreign countries and home, or technology adjustment cost can lead
to productivity losses in a foreign market.
14If l = d, then τll = 1.
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As in Tintelnot (2017), we abstract from the presence of any export fixed cost.15
This restriction can be motivated by two considerations. First, MNEs tend to enter
sequentially in foreign markets;16 manufacturing firms generally start their activity
abroad with exporting rather than operating a foreign production facility. When a
firm sets up a foreign affiliate, the firm substitutes the origin of its trade flows for
some of the foreign destination markets. This means that those destination markets,
previously reached by the home production, can be served by the new production
facility. Thus, the firm has already previously paid the fixed cost of exporting to the
market. Second, one can think that part of the fixed export entry cost collapses into
the fixed entry cost associated to the FDI.
Production decision. We assume that the firm does not observe the size of the ag-
gregate demand in the destination markets before making any production decision.
Hence, firm’s profit is a random variable. As firm is risk averse, this implies that it
does not only consider the (expected) profit in a prospective destination market but
also its volatility and how it comoves with the profits in the other markets.
In line with this, sales across different destination markets can be seen as risky as-
sets held as a sales portfolio by the firm, similarly to the standard setting of portfolio
choice.17 As the demand realizations are correlated across foreign markets, the sales
of an affiliate not only depend on the local productivity, the size of the surrounding
markets, and the cost of reaching them but also on the set of other locations where
the firm is present, and the correlation structure in the destination markets. All these
factors together affect the composition of the production portfolio chosen by the firm.
In the production decision, firm chooses how much to ship to each destination.
We assume that firm’s preferences are represented by a mean-variance utility func-
tion of profits in destination markets. This representation of preferences has been
extensively used in the literature, and it can be also considered as a second-order
Taylor approximation of a twice-differentiable increasing and concave utility func-
tion around the expected profits.18
Throughout this section, we drop the location subscript l from the quantity qld un-
der the assumption that the firm makes the optimal shipment choice (see successive
15Estimating export entry costs would require us to observe data on multinational sales disaggre-
gated by destination.
16See Conconi et al. (2016).
17The crucial difference with respect to the standard setting of portfolio choice relates to the presence
of non-linear shares due to the CES preferences. As a consequence, the expected returns of the firm’s
portfolio vary with the size of share chosen by the firm.
18See Eeckhoudt, Gollier, and Schlesinger (2005). In particular, the second-order Taylor approxima-
tion is exact if (i) the Bernoulli utility function is CARA and (ii) the distribution of the random variable
is fully characterized by the first two moments.
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paragraph). Given that, the realized profit of the firm selling to the destination coun-
tries d = 1, . . . , N is given by
Π(q|L,ϕ, r) =∑
d
(pdqd − cdqd) (2.7)
=∑
d
(
q
σ−1
σ
d
(
Ad − cdq
1
σ
d
))
, (2.8)
where q = (q1, . . . , qd, . . . , qN) denotes the amount of the variety shipped to the des-
tination markets given the optimal shipment choice. Hence, the expected profit is
given by
E[Π(q|L,ϕ, r)] =∑
d
(
q
σ−1
σ
d
(
E[Ad]− cdq
1
σ
d
))
, (2.9)
whereas the variance of profits is given by
var (Π (q|L,ϕ, r)) =∑
d
∑
d′
cov(Ad, Ad′)q
σ−1
σ
d q
σ−1
σ
d′ . (2.10)
Note that the variance does not depend directly on production costs, as risk only
relates to the fluctuations of demand in the destination markets.19
Conditional on the choice of the location, the utility function of the firm is then
given by
u(Π(q|L,ϕ), r) = E [Π (q|L,ϕ, r)]− r
2
var(Π(q|L,ϕ, r)) (2.11)
where r is the firm’s risk aversion. To find the optimal vector of quantities to ship
to the foreign destination markets, the firm solves the following utility maximization
problem
V(L) ≡ max
q∈RN+
E [Π(q|L,ϕ, r)]− r
2
var (Π (q|L,ϕ, r)) , (2.12)
where V(L) denotes the indirect utility function associated to the location set L.
For d ∈ D such that qd > 0, the first-order necessary20 and sufficient conditions21
with respect to qd is given by
∂u(Π(q|L,ϕ, r))
∂qd
=
∂E [Π(q|L,ϕ, r)]
∂qd
(2.13)
− r
2
∂var (Π (q|L,ϕ, r))
∂qd
= 0, (2.14)
where
∂E[Π(q|L,ϕ, r)]
∂qd
=
σ− 1
σ
E[Ad]q
− 1σ
d − cd,
19Other sources of risk, like unexpected change to the production costs, are not taken into account
in the present chapter.
20We notice that the utility function is not differentiable when qd = 0. However, as export fixed costs
are set to zero, the firm always sells a positive amount to each destination markets.
21We defer the discussion about the concavity of the objective function to a later stage.
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and
∂var(Π(q|L,ϕ, r))
∂qd
=
2(σ− 1)
σ
(
q−
1
σ
d ∑
d′
cov(Ad, Ad′)q
σ−1
σ
d′
)
.
Hence, for all d such that qd > 0, it holds
q−
1
σ
d
σ− 1
σ
(
E[Ad]− r∑
d′
cov(Ad, Ad′)q
σ−1
σ
d′
)
= cd. (2.15)
Proposition 1. (Existence and Uniqueness). If the matrix Σ has cross-correlations bounded
away from−1 and 1, there exists a unique solution to the firm’s utility maximization problem.
Proof. See Appendix B.1.
Proposition 1 implies that the optimal production portfolio of firm exists and is
unique given the set of locations of foreign affiliates. Since firm’s realized sales are a
random variable due to the presence of aggregate demand fluctuations, the proposi-
tion also implies that their mean and variance are well-defined and unique. As we
will show later, this guarantees that the measure of firm’s risk aversion implied by
our model is well-defined and theoretically identified.
For arbitrary values of σ, the above non-linear system of equations (2.15) does not
have a closed-form solution. However, to provide some intuition on the optimal level
of quantities sold in each destination, we show how the first order condition looks
like for the case in which σ = 2. In particular, the first-order conditions for this case
can be rewritten as
qd =
(
E[Ad]
2cd
)2
·
1− r
∑d′ 6=d cov(Ad,Ad′ )q
1
2
d′
EAd
1+ r var(Ad)2cd

2
. (2.16)
The first factor of the right hand side of equation (2.16) represents the quantity cho-
sen by the firm if there is no risk aversion or uncertainty. If the expected market size
in the market d is large relatively to the marginal cost of production inclusive of the
trade costs, then the firm’s sales to country d are large. The second part, instead, is
the factor by which the firm optimally rescales the level of production shipped to
country d due to the joint effect of risk aversion and demand risk. Specifically, this
factor decreases with the specific risk associated to the destination d (captured by the
variance var(Ad) in the denominator), whereas it increases with the opportunities of
diversification offered by the market d (captured by the covariances cov(Ad, A′d) in
the numerator). Hence, countries characterized by larger variance or lower diversifi-
cation potential attract smaller sales the more risk averse the MNE is.
Additionally, the first-order necessary and sufficient conditions in (2.15) can also
be rearranged to obtain the risk aversion coefficient r implied by the solution to the
firm’s utility maximization problem.
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Proposition 2. (Risk aversion measure). The measure of risk aversion is a function of the
optimal production portfolio, and is equal to
r = ∑d
(Epdqd − p˜dqd)(
q
σ−1
σ
)′
ΣAq
σ−1
σ
,
where Epd is the expected price in country d, p˜d = σσ−1 cd is the price under certainty in
country d, and q
σ−1
σ is a vector whose d component is q
σ−1
σ
d , where qd is the optimal quantity
sold in country d.
Proof. See Appendix B.2.
In the representation of risk aversion offered in Proposition 2, the denominator is
given by the variance of sales in the destination markets, whereas the numerator
measures the risk premium a firm demands in terms of revenues as a compensa-
tion for the risk. Therefore, the risk aversion parameter shows the amount of extra
markup a firm requires for a given level of riskiness of its sales portfolio. Given the
heterogeneity in risk aversion, our model predicts that more risk averse firms charge
higher markups, on average. Moreover, the adjustment of prices after the realiza-
tion of demand shocks result in firm-destination-specific markups implied by the
firm’s choices. As the quantities shipped to each destination are different for simi-
larly productive but differently risk averse firms, we can rationalize heterogeneous
adjustment of prices to demand shocks.
Finally, the following results show the relation between the aggregate sales and the
level of risk aversion.
Proposition 3. (Risk Aversion and Aggregate Sales). The firm’s aggregate sales are decreas-
ing with risk aversion.
Proof. See Appendix B.5.
A more risk averse MNE tries to limit the demand risk it faces in its international
activity by reducing the intensive margin of sales. It is worthwhile to notice that
a change of risk aversion does not proportionately change the contribution of each
destination to the MNE’s sales portfolio. In particular, an increase of risk aversion
induces the firm to substitute out relative risky destinations with safe ones (and vice
versa).
Our framework assumes that a firm selects the optimal quantity rather than the
optimal price to charge in each market. In Appendix B.6, we discuss how the results
would differ when the firm sets the price instead.
As a reference point, it is useful to compare the case of risk aversion when (i) we
remove the presence of export platforms, and (ii) we exclude risk.
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No export platforms. Without export platforms, the system of equations (2.15)
reads as
q−
1
σ
l
σ− 1
σ
(
E[Al ]− r∑
l′
cov(Al , Al′)q
σ−1
σ
l′
)
= cl , (2.17)
where l is a location in which the MNE holds a production facility. From equation
(2.17), we notice that the diversification opportunities that the firm can achieve in
this case are just a subset of those achievable in the model with export platforms,
fixing the location set. In particular, only the covariances associated to the markets
in which the firm has established a foreign affiliate appear in (2.17). As the firm sells
the variety produced in l only to the local market, the marginal cost simply reduces
to 1/ϕl . For the special case of σ = 2, we obtain an expression similar to (2.16). In
particular, we have
ql =
(
E[Al ]
2cl
)2
·
1− r
∑l′ 6=l cov(Al ,Al′ )q
1
2
l′
EAl
1+ r var(Al)2cl

2
. (2.18)
If a firm uses the foreign plant l as an export platform, then the quantity predicted
by the model sold to location l is not correct when we do not consider export plat-
forms. In particular, the factor that scales up or down the quantity the firm wants
to sell under no risk aversion or no uncertainty just considers the sales realized lo-
cally by the different foreign facilities without taking into account the possibility of
demand risk diversification offered by the other markets in which the MNE is not
physically present.
No risk aversion. In this case, the solution to the optimization problem has a
closed form. In particular, it holds
qd =
(
σ− 1
σ
Ad
cd
)σ
. (2.19)
Equation (2.19) shows how the quantity shipped to each destination increases with
the realized size of the market, the productivity of the origin production facility, and
decrease with trade costs. Assume that location l serves the subset of destinations
D˜.22 Using equation (2.19), we obtain that the revenues rl realized in a given location
l are given by
rl = ∑
d∈D˜
pdqd = κϕσ−1l ∑
d∈D˜
αd
P1−σd
τ1−σld , (2.20)
where κ ≡ ( σ−1σ )σ−1. The expression for the revenues realized in a given location is
similar to the one in Tintelnot (2017). In particular, if there is only one industry, then
αd = Yd. In the equation (2.19), it is easy to see that the revenues realized in some
22How the MNE makes this decision is the object of the next paragraph.
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location increase with the productivity of the location whereas decrease with the dis-
tance between the foreign affiliate and the customers in the destination markets.23
Shipment decision. This paragraph describes how the firm selects the optimal lo-
cation for shipping its variety to a given destination market.
The shipment decision hinges on the firm’s productivity vector ϕ given the loca-
tions in which it is present, and on the trade costs associated to the possible location-
destination pairs. As the shipment cost is independent of demand risk, the optimal
decision exclusively relies on firm’s productivity and iceberg trade costs. In particu-
lar, as returns to scale are constant, a standard cost minimization argument implies
that the destination d is served from the location l if the unit cost cld is the lowest
possible one. In other words, qld > 0 only if cld = min
l′
{cl′d : l′ ∈ L}.24 It is worth to
note that the optimal location-destination pair strictly depends on the location set L
chosen by the firm.
Location decision. As stated, firm has to pay a fixed cost fl for entering location
l and setting up a plant there. This cost is observed by the firm before making its
location choice. In our framework, the sum of fixed costs is considered as the price of
holding a portfolio of risky assets associated to the locations from which it is possible
to serve the local and foreign markets. The fixed costs enter as a constant in the utility
of the firm. The observation implies that the sum of fixed costs associated to any
location set can be separately subtracted from the value function obtained from the
production and shipment decisions for that location set. As a consequence, in order
to find the optimal location L∗ for its multinational activity under demand risk, the
firm solves the following discrete maximization problem
max
L∈2N−1
V(L)−F (L), where F (L) = ∑
l∈L
fl . (2.21)
2.2.3 Comparative Statics
In this section, we describe the effect of risk aversion on the MNE’s production and
location choice by means of some illustrative examples. First, fixing firm’s produc-
tivity and chosen location set, we show how different demand correlation structures
affect the firm’s aggregate and relative sales across countries. Second, we conduct
a trade liberalization exercise to show the existence of spillovers on trade flows to
third countries when firms are risk averse. Finally, we consider how the location
choice can be affected by the presence of risk aversion: in particular, to assess the
23If we also drop the assumption that firms can use a foreign location as an export platform, then
equation (2.19) reduces to
rl = κϕl
αl
P1−σl
.
24This analysis abstracts from any possible indeterminacy arising when cld, cl′d ∈ arg min
l′
{cl′d : l′ ∈
L} for l 6= l′. As productivities can be thought as draws from a continuous distribution, such event has
probability equal to 0.
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effect of heterogeneous attitudes towards risk on the location decision, we analyze
how firms with different levels of risk aversion and equal level of home productivity
select different locations for establishing their foreign affiliates; we then conduct a
similar exercise to show how differently productive firms, equally averse to risk, can
select different location sets that do not necessarily nest.
The Role of Demand Correlations. Throughout the subsection, we consider an econ-
omy consisting of three countries, A, B, and C. The variance of demand realizations,
the (expected) market sizes, and the trade costs are equal for the three countries.25 In
addition, the firm holds its unique affiliate in country A. Given the above assump-
tion, we represent the absolute and relative sales of a firm to each country for a given
level of risk aversion.
Equally correlated economies. Assume that the demand correlations between A
and B, B and C, and A and C are equal, positive but not perfect.26 In the left panel
of Figure 2.1, we notice how the absolute sales in country A are comparatively larger
than those in countries B and C for any level of risk aversion. As the firm operates its
affiliate in country A, it benefits from the proximity to the final customers. Hence, it
ships a larger amount of the variety to the local market. Furthermore, given that the
foreign countries B and C are symmetric, the firm sells the same amount to the two
countries. In addition, a larger level of aversion to risk induces the firm to sell less
to each country, as they are risky. The presence of risk aversion affects not only the
absolute value of sales but also the relative shares among countries as it can be seen in
the right panel of Figure 2.1. Indeed, a larger degree of risk aversion reduces the share
of sales associated to country A and increases the shares of country B and C. The
reason for that result is to be linked with the fact that a more risk averse firm exploits
more extensively the diversification opportunities as they are more concerned with
the demand risk.
Differently correlated economies. Next, we consider the case in which the correla-
tion of demand realizations between countries A and B, and A and C is lower than
the correlation between countries B and C.27 In this specification, the gap between
sales in country A and countries B and C widens (see Figure 2.2). Though the struc-
ture of correlations has changed from the previous case, still countries B and C are
25We do not focus on the distinction among safer and riskier markets but rather concentrate our
attention on isolating the pure effect of diverse correlation structures on the sales structure. Notice that
the assumption that the expected size and variance are the same across the markets means the three
countries exhibit the same coefficient of variation. Moreover, because the variances are the same, the
covariances are a sufficient statistic for the degree of integration between the economies of any pair of
countries.
26This can be thought as the case of a German firm (affiliate in country A), producing only domesti-
cally and being able to serve additionally France (country B) and the UK (country C).
27This can be thought as the case of a German firm (affiliate in country A) producing only domesti-
cally and being able to serve additionally Japan (country B) and South Korea (country C).
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FIGURE 2.1: Case 1, Equally correlated economies
Sales in country A
Sales in country B
Sales in country C
Share of sales in country A
Share of sales in country B
Share of sales in country C
symmetric so the firm ships the same amount to both countries. Additionally, we ob-
serve two things. First, country A displays a relatively poor demand correlation with
both B and C; second, the demand correlation between countries B and C is now rel-
atively large. The two observations together imply that, compared with the previous
case, the firm wants to sell more to country A and reduces its exposure in countries B
and C (see the left panel of Figure 2.2). Regarding the relative sales, a similar pattern
to the previous case can be observed in the right panel of Figure 2.2. However, the
adjustment of shares is now less remarkable than before as the countries B and C
have a lower diversification potential.
FIGURE 2.2: Case 2, Poorly correlated economies
Sales in country A
Sales in country B
Sales in country C
Share of sales in country A
Share of sales in country B
Share of sales in country C
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Mixed case. In the last case, we assume that the demand correlation between A and
B is larger than the correlations between countries A and C, and B and C.28 Given
the structure of demand correlation, country C now provides the firm with a better
hedge to negative fluctuations in country A’s demand compared to country B. In the
left panel of Figure 2.3, it is possible to note that, when risk aversion is large enough,
the country with the largest diversification potential, that is country C, attracts the
largest share of sales in absolute terms so that diversification benefits outweigh the
marginal cost benefits of selling in a foreign market. In other words, the benefit of
diversification outweighs the gains of proximity to the customers. The right panel
of Figure 2.3 shows that, when risk aversion increases, the shares of sales in B and C
increase, whereas the share of sales in A decreases.
FIGURE 2.3: Case 3, Mixed case
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Risk aversion and firm sales – Both in highly (B) and poorly (C) correlated economies
In the above examples, the diversification strategies of an MNE distort the sales
distribution compared with the risk neutral model.29 The distortion is particularly
relevant either when risk aversion or diversification opportunities are large. Impor-
tantly, firms with different risk aversion value differently each destination market
as each of them provides different hedging opportunities. The possibility of serv-
ing more conveniently a destination market can result into diverse location choices
and reaction to trade policies as we will discuss later. Moreover, for a given level
of risk aversion, the shares of sales in each location is not going to be affected by a
change productivity. This finding plays an important role in separately identifying
risk aversion and productivity separately.
Finally, it is interesting to see under which correlation structure firms sells more
(Figure 2.4). Comparing aggregate sales across the above scenarios, a multinational
28This can be thought as the case of a German firm (affiliate in country A) producing only domesti-
cally and being able to serve additionally France (country B) and Japan (country C).
29In the risk neutral model, the absolute sales are flat with respect to risk aversion. Moreover, the
sales realized in country B and C represent a downward shift of the sales realized in country A, whose
extent depends on the magnitude of the trade costs.
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firm sells more on average when the dispersion of correlations among the available
countries is the largest, as a consequence of the largest diversification opportunities.
Thus, we expect firms to sell more in industries characterized by a wider spread of
demand correlations. This observation is also in line with the evidence that exporters’
sales decrease more than MNEs’ sales during the crisis; as MNEs can typically reach
a larger number of countries, they access to a more favorable correlation structure
than exporters do. Therefore, this mechanism can explain why the sales of MNEs
were more stable than those of pure exporters during the last crisis.
FIGURE 2.4: Diversification opportunities and aggregate firm sales
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Liberalization Spillovers. Next, we evaluate the effect of a bilateral trade liberalization
when demand realizations are correlated and firms are risk averse. Similarly to the
previous part, we consider a scenario with three countries and look at the effect of
a tariff reduction for the good imported into country B from A. Without risk averse
firms, a tariff reduction in country B does not affect sales in A and C. However, when
we introduce risk averse firms and correlated demand shocks, spillovers can emerge
as a byproduct. In the case of three countries, the effect of the described policy change
depends on the sign of the correlation of demands among the three countries. When
sales in country B increase, the spillover effects in countries A and C depend on the
possibility to hedge the larger exposure to risk due to the sales increase in country
B.30 In particular, if the demand in C, which is a third country, is positively correlated
with the demand in country B, the sales to the destination C drop. On the contrary, a
negative correlation between country B and C determines a sales increase in country
C due to the fact that firms can reduce their exposure to demand risk. Table 2.1 shows
the change in sales in the three countries for each combination of correlation signs.
30For a discussion on the effect of a trade liberalization see Appendix B.8.
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Similar demand-side spillovers emerge for any country-specific change, e.g., an im-
provement of investment climate in one particular country results in the reshuffling
of trade flows in all correlated foreign markets.31
TABLE 2.1: Effects of trade liberalization
Reduction of τAB Sales A Sales B Sales C
corr(A, B) > 0, corr(B, C) > 0 – + –
corr(A, B) > 0, corr(B, C) < 0 – + +
corr(A, B) < 0, corr(B, C) > 0 + + –
corr(A, B) < 0, corr(B, C) < 0 + + +
Risk Aversion and Entry. The above numerical exercises assume a fixed set of foreign
affiliates in which the MNE operates. In what follows, we remove this restriction
and consider the possibility that a firm self-selects into foreign locations. This exer-
cise allows us to evaluate the impact of risk aversion and productivity on the entry
choices.
In the trade literature studying the determinants of firm’s entry in a foreign market
(Helpman et al., 2004), the entry decision is typically described by a destination-
specific productivity threshold. In particular, a firm engages in any foreign activity
if and only if its level of productivity is large enough. Furthermore, a prediction of
these models is that only sufficiently productive firms find it profitable to pay the
fixed entry cost in a foreign location. In a multi-country environment where firms
can establish a foreign plant in many locations, this prediction results in a hierarchical
ordering of entry decisions. As a consequence, the location sets chosen by the firms
constitute a sequence of nesting sets with respect to firm’s productivity. In our model,
since countries are no longer independent, firms decide on the set of foreign locations
also accounting for the hedging opportunities the set provides. Therefore, we can
rationalize the presence of non-hierarchical entry, as observed in the data (e.g. Yeaple
(2009)).
To illustrate this point, we consider a world consisting of six countries. In all sce-
narios, country A is the origin country of the multinational firm.32 First, we fix firm’s
productivity and look at the entry decisions for different values of risk aversion.
In the numerical example, the sets of locations chosen by the firm are not nested
as the upper panel of Table 2.2 shows. Moreover, a higher degree of risk aver-
sion does not necessarily reduce the number of foreign locations the firm decides to
be present in.
For a firm with a medium level of risk aversion, it is profitable to enter two locations
– country B and country E, while a more risk averse firm enters three locations – C,
D and F (see Table 2.2).
31Note that patterns in trade flows change are more complicated when more than three countries
are involved as they depend on the entire structure of the variance correlations matrix.
32Costs of entry in the home country are set to zero.
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TABLE 2.2: Entry decision and risk aversion
Risk aversion Country A Country B Country C Country D Country E Country F
Low risk aversion Yes No No Yes Yes No
Medium risk aversion Yes Yes No No Yes No
High risk aversion Yes No Yes Yes No Yes
Very high risk aversion Yes No No No No Yes
Productivity Country A Country B Country C Country D Country E Country F
Low productivity Yes No No Yes Yes No
Medium productivity Yes No No No Yes No
High productivity Yes No No No Yes Yes
Very high productivity Yes No No No Yes No
Note: “Yes” stands for entry to the market, “No” stands for no entry.
Analogously, given the level of risk aversion, changing the productivity can affect
not only the number of entered locations but also the compositions of the optimal
location set. Specifically, a more productive firm does not need to enter more loca-
tions. Additionally, a more productive firm does not necessarily enter all locations
a less productive firm is present in. The reason behind this outcome hinges on the
different attractiveness as demand-risk hedge offered by each location. More pro-
ductive firms are less concerned about the costs of serving foreign locations due
to their advantage in terms of marginal costs. Hence, they can benefit from the
presence of demand risk diversification even if they enter into fewer locations. In-
stead, firms with low productivity have to bear larger marginal costs; in order to
exploit the diversification potential of sales, they has to select into more foreign lo-
cations in order to reduce the distance from the customers. Therefore, the model
predicts that small (large) firms enter relatively more (less) locations than predicted
by the standard proximity-concentration tradeoff literature. This rationalizes the
finding of Yeaple (2009).
2.3 Data
For the empirical analysis, our main data source is the Microdatabase Direct invest-
ment33 (MiDi), which contains firm-level information about foreign affiliates of Ger-
man multinational companies.34 More specifically, the data include balance sheet
variables of foreign companies in which German MNEs have directly (or indirectly)
at least 10% (50%) of the shares or voting rights. In addition to the standard bal-
ance sheet variables (as capital stock, labor and turnover), we observe the locations
of foreign affiliates and the industries35 they operate in.
33Deutsche Bundesbank (2016): Microdatabase Direct Investment 1999-2014. Version: 2.0. Deutsche
Bundesbank. Dataset. http://doi.org/10.12757/Bbk.MiDi.9914.02.03
34The database is maintained by the Deutsche Bundesbank. For other research using the MiDi see
Tintelnot (2017), who analyzes cost structure of vertical export platforms, Becker and Muendler (2008),
who estimate responses of MNEs employment at the extensive and intensive margins.
35Industries are classified on 2-digit level NACE Rev. 1.1.
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The empirical estimation relies on 952 German multinational firms operating in 19
different industries36 and 45 foreign countries37 with 3,232 affiliates38 in 2007. We
consider only those foreign affiliates in which a German multinational holds the con-
trol rights. Table 2.3 shows the total sales and the number of firms present in each of
the top 10 destinations.39 The United States, Spain and France are the three countries
from which German affiliates sell the most. It is worth noting that the number of
entrants in a country cannot be perfectly mapped to the productivity level (or size)
of the median entrant. In addition, Appendix B.4 shows that the average distance
of the foreign affiliates from Germany does not monotonically increase in the num-
ber of affiliates itself. These observations gives. These observations give us room for
discussing the importance of demand factors in affecting the choice of foreign loca-
tions. Moreover, the relevance of foreign countries with respect to the aggregate sales
differs for small-medium and large multinationals (see Appendix B.3 for descriptive
statistics). We note that the top countries in generating aggregate sales are Brazil and
Japan for large MNEs, whereas they are Poland, Austria, Italy and Switzerland for
small and medium MNEs. With respect to the entry pattern, the top locations are
China and France for large MNEs, the US and Poland for small MNEs.
Since our model describes the contribution of demand components at explaining
the global production structure, we restrict our sample to those MNEs that conduct
horizontal FDI. MiDi does not provide information about the type of FDI chosen by
a firm. To restrict our sample only to the horizontal FDI positions, we use a stan-
dard proxy which considers an investment relation as horizontal if both parent and
affiliate firms operate within the same industry.40
We integrate the information in AMADEUS database to complement the balance
sheet data on the home plants of German multinational firms. In particular, we ob-
serve the level of home sales, the number of employees, and the level of capital of the
36We aggregate the industries 1500 (manufacture of food products and beverages) and 1600 (man-
ufacture of textiles). This consolidation is in line with NACE Rev. 1.1, which aggregates these two
industries at the upper level DA (manufacture of food products, beverages and tobacco). Moreover, in
order to fulfill the confidentiality requirements for the usage of the dataset, we exclude the industry
2300 (manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products).
37The set of countries consists of 26 European countries (Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Repub-
lic, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Nor-
way, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
Ukraine, United Kingdom), 9 Asian countries (China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea,
Malaysia, Singapore, Turkey), 5 South American countries (Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru),
two African countries (South Africa, Tunisia), Canada and the United States in North America, and
Australia in Oceania. These are the countries where at least three different German MNEs operate an
affiliate. Given this set of countries, we account for 96% of the total affiliates of MNEs operating in 2007
and performing horizontal FDI. Furthermore, the share of the affiliates we consider generates 99% of
the total affiliate sales.
38We aggregate the capital, labor and sales for the affiliates of one MNE operating within the same
country. As production fragmentation does not provide us with any information about the effect of
country characteristics on the incentive to diversify, our main results do not change.
39The ranking is built with respect to the total amount of sales.
40This assumption leaves us with 86% of the initial sample. Literature proposed also to proxy for
horizontal FDI using the data on intrafirm trade. Unfortunately, MiDi does not contain this information
explicitly. Nonetheless, intrafirm trade can be proxied by the share of affiliate current assets of which
claims on the affiliated enterprises. This measure is less restrictive and includes our subsample. See
Overesch and Wamser (2009), who use current assets claim to proxy for horizontal FDI in MiDi.
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TABLE 2.3: Descriptive statistics on foreign affiliates and parents
by country
Countries
Total
sales
Sales affiliate Sales MNE Employment MNE Average
productivity
N
Average SD Average SD Average Median
United States 47.5 257 1340 1758 89960 4497 883 3.38 185
Spain 22.2 239 995 4201 15665 11419 1809 3.38 93
France 16.9 105 225 2522 11709 6673 1210 3.53 161
Brazil 16.6 238 1060 4685 809 13290 3255 3.71 70
United Kingdom 15.5 135 442 4151 15042 10772 1434 4.18 115
Czech Republic 13.9 104 694 2279 12622 6621 909 3.58 134
China 10.8 60 178 2002 8733 6290 1453 3.64 181
Poland 9.9 75 301 1705 9417 4495 778 3.91 132
Hungary 9.6 117 646 1838 5760 6324 1252 4.09 82
Mexico 9.2 196 877 7207 21378 18309 2644 3.49 47
Germany 577.2 594 3620 873 5522 2557 676 3.90 971
Note: Total sales are expressed in billion Euro. Sales of affiliate and MNE are expressed in million Euro.
Source: Research Data and Service Centre (RDSC) of the Deutsche Bundesbank, Microdatabase Direct
investment (MiDi), 1999-2014, authors’ calculations.
parent companies.
Figure 2.5 shows the variation in MNE sales and employment. We notice that the
set of firms in our analysis is not solely restricted to the largest German firms; the
variability in the firm sales is particularly evident.
FIGURE 2.5: Distribution of German MNEs’ sales and employment in
2007 in manufacturing
(A) Sales (B) Employment
Note: Firms with employment level to the right of the bold vertical line are
considered to be large firms (more than 1000 employees). Sales are expressed
in the logarithm of million euros. Employment is expressed in the logarithm
of the number of employees.
Source: Research Data and Service Centre (RDSC) of the Deutsche
Bundesbank, Microdatabase Direct investment (MiDi), 1999-2014, authors’
calculations.
Table 2.4 shows some descriptive statistics about foreign affiliates operating in each
industry. First, we can notice that the average and median sales of firms vary across
industries, being particularly high in the manufacturing of auto, electrical machin-
ery and basic metals. Moreover, these three industries are characterized by a large
range of firm sales and sizes. With regard to foreign entry, producers operating in
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the chemical and transport sectors hold more affiliates on average (in the other in-
dustries, the average MNE is present only in one foreign country). Industries are
quite dispersed in terms of share of multinational production. On average foreign
affiliate sales generate 27.6% of the total sales of a German MNE. In some industries,
the sales produced by affiliates are larger (auto, minerals, printing) whereas in other
sectors most of the production is carried out by the parent firm in Germany (wood,
machinery and basic metals). At the same time, foreign market participation cannot
be perfectly mapped to the concentration of sales across affiliates. The largest level
of sales concentration occurs in basic metals and textile, while this measure is lower
in other transport and paper manufacturing. One of the hypothesis that can explain
this result is that industry characteristics can affect the way an MNE spreads its sales
across affiliates.
TABLE 2.4: Descriptive statistics on affiliates by industries
Industry
Sales Employment Number
of affiliates
Concentration
measure
Foreign
share (%)
N
Average SD Average SD
Food and tobacco 185 589 356 469 1.6 0.36 29.7 116
Textile 38 49 240 287 1.5 0.42 28.8 50
Wearing and leather 70 84 440 435 1.5 0.48 26.4 33
Wood 69 115 363 321 1.0 0.40 19.8 14
Paper 120 182 351 395 1.2 0.35 23.2 40
Printing 88 210 342 634 2.4 0.37 32.6 94
Chemicals 271 1118 640 1939 3.7 0.43 29.9 433
Plastic 69 175 312 529 2.1 0.36 30.5 290
Minerals 95 130 488 755 2.2 0.38 33.4 136
Basic metals 376 1112 924 2496 1.3 0.49 22.6 79
Metal products 73 129 380 575 1.8 0.42 25.4 262
Machinery n.e.c. 135 377 516 1321 2.0 0.47 22.2 598
Electrical 377 2227 1644 8026 2.1 0.41 26.8 235
Communication 360 954 957 1437 1.9 0.39 30.4 90
Medical 65 101 308 444 2.0 0.46 27.7 207
Auto 1180 5950 2648 11347 3.3 0.38 34.8 319
Other transport 226 460 826 1670 2.6 0.46 25.4 65
Furniture 46 47 289 274 1.2 0.33 31.3 31
Note: Sales are expressed in million Euro.
Source: Research Data and Service Centre (RDSC) of the Deutsche Bundesbank, Microdatabase Direct
investment (MiDi), 1999-2014, authors’ calculations.
To estimate non-firm-specific parameters, such as trade costs, production indexes,
and the co-variance matrix of country demands, we use data from UN databases and
CEPII.41
2.4 Estimation
In this section, we describe the estimation procedure we follow to obtain estimates
of the risk aversion coefficient of the MNEs. Given the location set L in which the
affiliates of firm operate and the aggregate sales ∑d pdqd of the multinational group,
41Trade flows and home production data are from the COMTRADE, INDSTAT and IDSB. Gravity
dummies and distances are from CEPII. COMTRADE concordance tables provide industry-country
trade flows in NACE Rev. 1.1 classification.
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we determine the firm-specific risk aversion parameter r. Our model yields unique-
ness of the risk aversion measure for a given choice of the location set. The estima-
tion of risk aversion requires additional parametrization and estimation of firm- and
country-industry-specific parameters (ϕ, τ,σ, α¯,Σ,Q).
First, we discuss the estimation of productivities, trade costs, and quantity indexes,
and parametrize the other country-industry-specific parameters. Second, we show
the procedure to derive the risk aversion coefficients.
2.4.1 Productivities and Industry Parameters
Productivities. German companies operating in different countries exhibit different
productivity levels across affiliates. This observation can stem from the non-perfect
cross-border transferability of technologies and different quality of inputs across
countries. Hence, as to disentangle the role of demand from that of technology, we
need to control for the heterogeneity in productivities across affiliates of one firm.
Since the estimates of productivities enter the risk aversion measure, we discuss
the identification of the latter. Productivities and risk aversion affect firms’ sales at a
different levels. In our framework, productivities are affiliate-specific, whereas risk
aversion coefficients are group-specific. In particular, for a risk neutral firm higher
productivity in one affiliate makes it cheaper to serve all destination markets associ-
ated with this location. Therefore, without risk aversion, we expect higher sales to
each destination market from the more productive affiliate. At the same time, risk
aversion shapes sales flows due to the presence of demand correlations. When risk
aversion is positive, an increase in the affiliate productivity results in a reshuffling
of the sales portfolio and changes the sales shares in each destination market served
from the affiliate in a way that is proportional to the hedging opportunities offered
by the location. Moreover, a risk averse firm adjusts the sales realized in all other
affiliates. Since we observe the affiliate sales of firms with different productivities,
we can disentangle the effect of productivity on sales from that of diversification. We
use the variation of sales at the affiliate level to capture the supply-side parameters,
whereas we use the aggregate sales to determine the firm’s risk attitude.
In the estimation of productivity, we control for firm- and market-specific demand
parameters to obtain productivity estimates in the presence of a positive risk aver-
sion. The equation we estimate at the affiliate level by industry reads as
ln(salesjlω) = β1 + βk ln(capitaljlω) + β` ln(laborjlω) + βa ln(agejlω)
+ βcconcentration measureω + βvcoefficient of variationl
+ βppremiuml + ξ jlω,
(2.22)
where j denotes the affiliate, l the location of affiliate j, and ξ jlω
the affiliate-multinational-specific productivity shock. From the previous specifica-
tion, we obtain the productivity estimate ϕˆjlω according to ϕˆjlω = exp(ξˆ jlω + βˆ1).
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We include a measure of sales concentration to capture the diversification incen-
tives of a firm to take into account different degrees of risk aversion across firms.42
Moreover, we include the coefficient of variation of the demand associated to the
location where the affiliate operates in. We find a significant negative relation be-
tween aggregate sales and the volatility of destination market demand. Another
problem can potentially arise from the fact that we estimate productivity using re-
alized sales rather than expected sales (i.e. sales before the realization of the shocks).
Indeed, higher sales to a destination can be just due to a higher realization of the
market demand rather than to the level of productivity of the firm in the given mar-
ket. Therefore, to proxy for the effect of the realized market size, we include the
difference between the realized and expected market size.43 We show in Section 2.5
that the productivity estimates are not correlated with the estimated risk aversion
coefficients when controlling for other firm characteristics. Moreover, we find that
German MNEs are, on average, more productive at home than in the host countries
(see Figure 2.6).
FIGURE 2.6: Distribution of productivities of foreign affiliates
and parents (in logs)
Source: Research Data and Service Centre (RDSC) of the Deutsche
Bundesbank, Microdatabase Direct investment (MiDi), 1999-2014, authors’
calculations.
Industry Parameters. A set of parameters is common to all firms operating within
an industry. For convenience, we distinguish between supply side parameters, i.e.
trade costs, and demand side parameters, i.e. the elasticity of substitution, quantity
indexes, variance-covariance matrix of market sizes, and expected market sizes.
The estimation of trade costs and quantity indexes is based on the methodology
proposed by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) for cross-sectional data. In partic-
ular, a partial equilibrium model for import flows at the industry level delivers the
42The construction of the concentration measure of sales is discussed in the Appendix B.4.
43For the estimation of expected market size, see subsection 2.4.1.
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following equation:
log
(
md′d
Md
)
= (1− σ) log (τd′d) + (σ− 1) log(Pd) for d, d′ ∈ 1, ..., N, (2.23)
where md′d is import from d′ to d, and Md is the sum of total import and consumption
in country d. Therefore, the share of country d′ in total consumption in country d is
described by trade costs between countries, the level of prices in country d, and the
elasticity of substitution.
Similar to Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), we can estimate trade costs and price
indexes only conditional on the elasticity of substitutions σ. As we do not estimate
industry-specific elasticity of substitution, we assume σ = 6.44
We model trade costs as a function of the distance between the two countries, con-
tiguity, and common language. More precisely, we have
log(τd′d) = β1 log(distd′d) + β2contigd′d + β3langd′d for d, d
′ ∈ 1, ..., N. (2.24)
To estimate industry-specific price indexes, we introduce dummies as in Baldwin
and Taglioni (2006). The final equation we are estimating is
log
(
md′d
Md
)
= β˜1 log(distd′d) + β˜2contigd′d + β˜3langd′d + γd + ed′d, (2.25)
where β˜b = (σ− 1)βb for b = 1, 2, 3, γd = (σ− 1) log(Pd), is a country dummy.
We assume that trade costs and price indexes are 2-digit industry-specific, and cor-
respondingly use import flows at the 2-digit disaggregation level. Country-industry-
specific quantity indexes are obtained from the industry i equilibrium condition in
country d: PidQid = αid.
Finally, we proxy the total expenditure parameter αid using data on the industry-
level consumption from the IDSB dataset. This dataset contains information about
the output, export and import in a country at a 2-digit level. We obtain co-variance
matrices from time-series data on total expenditure in 46 countries from 2002 to 2006.
We assume that αid depends on its first lagged value. In particular, we assume that
αid,t = α
β
id,t−1 exp
INDi+COUNTRYd+eid,t , (2.26)
where eid,t is an innovation term45 with mean 1, and β captures the persistence in the
evolution of α. We then estimate the following equation in logs
log αid,t = β log αid,t−1 + INDi + COUNTRYd + eid,t, (2.27)
44This value is in line with Head and Mayer (2004) and Chen and Novy (2011). Note that this value
implies a markup equal to 17% in a risk neutral framework. Importantly, estimates of risk aversion
parameters exhibits a low sensitivity to the choice of the elasticity of substitution. This is linked to the
fact that risk aversion represents a ratio between the sales premium and variance, which are scaled by
the same sigma. See Proposition 2.
45We do not restrict this shock term to be uncorrelated across countries and industries.
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where we include control dummies for industry and country. From this equation we
obtain a prediction for αid,t given the value of αid,t−1. Hence, we compute the entry
(d, d′) of the variance-covariance matrix Σi in the following way
Σi(d, d′) =
T
∑
t=1
(αid,t − α¯id,t) (αid′,t − α¯id′,t)
T − 1 , (2.28)
where α¯id,t and α¯id′,t denote the expectations of αid,t and αid′,t given the level of αid,t−1
and αid′,t−1, respectively, and T is the number of years we are using for our estimation.
2.4.2 Risk Aversion
Uniqueness of the solution of the firm’s problem ensures that aggregate sales across
affiliates are a well-defined function of risk aversion. Therefore, we match theoretical
sales, predicted by our structural model, with aggregate MNE sales, observed in the
data.46 We do not restrict risk aversion to be positive. For each firm, the matching
proceeds as follows:
1. Guess the risk aversion parameter r.
2. Given the location set L observed in the data, solve the firm’s utility maximiza-
tion problem.
3. Obtain q, and compute the implied aggregate theoretical sales ∑
d∈D
pdqd.
4. Update r if the distance between theoretical and empirical sales is larger than
the tolerance level.47
It is important to note that the updating of r is based on the characteristics of the solu-
tion to the utility maximization problem. Everything else equal, the firm’s aggregate
sales are strictly decreasing in risk aversion as shown in the Proposition 3.
2.5 Results
We perform the estimation of risk aversion coefficients for 952 MNEs in the sample
in 2007.
Figure 2.7 shows the distribution of the estimates of the risk aversion coefficients.
We observe that estimated risk aversion coefficients are positive for all firms in the
sample. The majority of MNEs display risk aversion coefficients ranging between 0
and 1. In particular, the average risk aversion coefficient in the sample is 0.34 (s.d.
equal to 1.16).
46Note that we do not observe expected sales in the data. However, sales to each destination are
decreasing with the level of risk aversion. This together with uniqueness of the solution allows us to
match empirical sales.
47We assume convergence when the absolute difference between empirical and theoretical sales is
less than 0.001%.
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FIGURE 2.7: Estimated density of risk aversion
Mean SD p10 p25 p50 p75 p90 N
Risk aversion 0.34 1.16 0.01 0.04 0.11 0.31 0.72 952
Note: Outliers on the right tail are removed.
Source: Research Data and Service Centre (RDSC) of the Deutsche Bundesbank,
Microdatabase Direct investment (MiDi), 1999-2014, authors’ calculations.
Table 2.5 shows that coefficients of risk aversion greatly differ across industries.
The average risk aversion ranges from 0.10 in paper manufacturing sector to 1.39 in
the manufacturing of basic metals sector.
TABLE 2.5: Risk aversion across industries
More risk averse
industries
Risk aversion Less risk averse
industries
Risk aversion
Average SD N Average SD N
Basic metals 1.39 4.98 34 Textile 0.20 0.19 20
Medical 0.79 0.93 68 Printing 0.18 0.30 26
Metal products 0.55 0.66 91 Machinery n.e.c. 0.18 0.92 196
Furniture 0.54 0.71 14 Wearing and leather 0.17 0.16 13
Electrical 0.35 0.49 75 Chemicals 0.14 0.42 90
Food and tobacco 0.34 0.70 44 Other transport 0.14 0.18 18
Plastic 0.31 0.33 93 Wood 0.13 0.14 7
Auto 0.25 0.78 73 Minerals 0.13 0.15 41
Communication 0.24 0.25 31 Paper 0.10 0.09 18
Source: Research Data and Service Centre (RDSC) of the Deutsche Bundesbank,
Microdatabase Direct investment (MiDi), 1999-2014, authors’ calculations.
The heterogeneity in risk aversion can be explained by several factors related to
industry characteristics. In particular, the volatility of demand in the industry seems
to play an important role. Figure 2.8 displays the spread in the coefficient of varia-
tion in each industry given countries in our sample. On average, larger risk aversion
coefficients occur in industries with larger median coefficient of variation (basic met-
als, medical, electrical). In highly volatile industries, firms are indeed more exposed
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to demand shocks. Therefore, for these industries, firms consider the demand risk
as a more relevant factor. In terms of our model, this implies a larger level of risk
aversion. Interestingly, risk aversion is poorly correlated with average industry size
and sales of affiliates. In addition, estimated risk aversions is mainly connected to
industry-specific demand characteristics rather than to technological variables.
FIGURE 2.8: Distribution of coefficient of variation of demand,
product level
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Source: UNIDO INDSTAT2 2016, authors’ calculations.
Next, we evaluate the relation between risk aversion and firm-specific characteris-
tics to assess how the risk attitude correlates with the other sources of firm hetero-
geneity. In Table 2.6, we present the results of the regression of the estimated risk
aversion coefficients on a set of firm’s characteristics. First, we find no significant
correlation between risk aversion and productivity. This observation is important, as
we regard the estimated productivities as an observable. Therefore, the coefficient
of risk aversions obtained from our estimation do not reflect the effect of firm’s pro-
ductivity on sales. Second, we find that risk aversion negatively correlates with firm
size. Third, we find a negative correlation between firm’s age and risk aversion. Our
interpretation is that larger or more experienced firms are better at dealing with mar-
ket risk. Finally, a more risk averse firm tends to display a more diversified structure
of sales. This finding suggests that firms take advantage of possible diversification
opportunities more extensively when they are more concerned about the market tur-
moil. Moreover, the negative correlation between the concentration measure and
risk aversion48 is suggestive that the estimated risk aversion captures firm’s attitude
48Note that this result is still valid when we consider other measure of concentration, like the
Herfindal index.
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toward demand risk.
TABLE 2.6: Risk aversion and firm characteristics
I II III
productivity
−0.0658
(0.0583)
0.0223
(0.1368)
−0.0829
(0.0589)
size
−2.0699∗∗∗
(0.0795)
−1.9597∗∗∗
(0.0801)
−1.9176∗∗∗
(0.0796)
age
−0.0819∗∗
(0.0399)
−0.1330∗∗∗
(0.0206)
productivity*age
−0.0364
(0.0281)
concentration
−0.6905∗∗∗
(0.1429)
constant
−1.3460∗∗∗
(0.1922)
0.9009∗∗∗
(0.2697)
−0.5058∗∗
(0.2181)
industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
N 952 952 952
Note: We consider productivity of parent German firm. Risk aversion and
productivity are taken in logs. Size is equal to 1 for MNEs with more than
1000 employees. Concentration measure is measured by Herfindal Index.
Source: Research Data and Service Centre (RDSC) of the Deutsche
Bundesbank, Microdatabase Direct investment (MiDi), 1999-2014, authors’
calculations.
We test the theoretical prediction that aggregate MNE sales and risk aversion are
negatively related.
In addition, we find a positive correlation between the share of debt in the firm’s
capital and the level of risk aversion.49 The intuition for this finding relates to the
fact that financially constrained firms are more risk averse when they compose their
sales portfolio.
To assess the goodness of fit of our model to the real data, we compare the pre-
dicted trade flows with real data across different regions. Table 2.7 shows that the
model predicts accurately trade flows in most regions. The underprediction of sales
in North America and overprediction of sales in Asia and Oceania can be partly ex-
plained by the fact that trade costs are estimated outside the model. We believe that
an estimation procedure able to match the characteristics (e.g. the interdependence)
of multinational trade flows across countries would provide more accurate results.50
Next, we estimate a proxy for the elasticity of MNE sales to the level of
risk aversion.51
49See Table B.6 in Appendix B.10.
50In particular, estimating jointly productivities and firm’s risk aversion may improve the ability of
the model to match the empirical data.
51Changes of the degree of firm’s risk aversion in the market can take place as a consequence of the
entrance of a different population of firms in the market. Alternatively, changes in the level of financial
constraints can also affect the attitude towards risk of the firms.
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TABLE 2.7: Regional trade flows of German multinationals (percent-
age shares)
Regions Data Model N
Africa 1.1% 1.8% 47
Asia & Oceania 3.4% 10.9% 241
Europe 86.2% 82.2% 896
North America 7.3% 3.1% 205
South America 2.1% 1.9% 69
Source: Research Data and Service
Centre (RDSC) of the Deutsche Bundesbank,
Microdatabase Direct investment (MiDi),
1999-2014, authors’ calculations.
We find that a change of 1% in risk aversion produces a change of sales approxi-
mately equal to −0.8%.
TABLE 2.8: Sales response to exogenous change in risk aversion
Change in risk aversion Mean p25 p50 p75
5% increase −4.13% −4.40% −4.08% −3.79%
1% increase −0.85% −0.92% −0.85% −0.78%
1% decrease 0.85% 0.79% 0.87% 0.93%
5% decrease 4.46% 4.12% 4.51% 4.82%
Source: Research Data and Service Centre (RDSC) of the Deutsche
Bundesbank, Microdatabase Direct investment (MiDi), 1999-2014, authors’
calculations.
We conduct an analogous exercise to measure the sensitivity of countries’ trade
flows to changes in risk aversion. Figure 2.9 depicts the increase in sales of German
multinationals to countries in response to a 1% decrease of risk aversion in the sam-
ple. Trade flows to all countries increase in absolute terms, which is in line with the
result obtained in simplified setting in Section 2.2.3. Moreover, the magnitude of re-
sponse is negatively correlated with the riskiness of the country. Safer markets gain
more from the decrease in risk aversion, while more volatile economies still attract
relatively lower trade flows. At the same time, changes in risk aversion affect to a
larger extent countries whose economies are strongly co-moving with German econ-
omy. We observe that many developing economies are less sensitive to changes in
risk aversion, which is again in line with the intuition provided in the comparative
statics exercise: as risk aversion increases, multinationals are less prone to concen-
trate sales in similar countries and increase relative sales shares in less correlated
countries.
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TABLE 2.9: Response of trade flows to a tariff decrease in China by 10%
Country Change (in %) Country Change (in %)
China 22.94 EU −0.73
USA 11.20 Ukraine −0.95
Japan 6.05 Indonesia −0.96
Australia −0.01 Colombia −1.27
South Africa −0.04 Russia −1.32
South Korea −0.05 Mexico −1.76
India −0.16 Norway −2.04
Brazil −0.21 Singapore −2.45
Turkey −0.36 Peru −2.90
Chile −0.53 Hong Kong −5.93
Source: Research Data and Service Centre (RDSC) of the Deutsche Bundesbank,
Microdatabase Direct investment (MiDi), 1999-2014, authors’ calculations.
FIGURE 2.9: Sales response to exogenous increase in risk aversion,
country level
JPN
FRA
CHL
USA
MEX
PRT
CHE
GBR
AUS
ITA
DEU
CANMLT
GRC
ZAF
AUT
NLDHUN
HKG
MYS
LUX
ESP
IRLSVN
DNK
SWE
FIN
BEL
KOR
PER
SGP
IDN
NORTURCZE
POL
COL
IND
BRA
TUNBGR
CHN
ROU
SVK UKR RUS
0
.
5
1
1.
5
2
R
es
po
ns
e 
of
 c
ou
nt
ry
 s
al
es
.7 .75 .8 .85 .9
Coefficient of variation of demand
Source: Research Data and Service Centre (RDSC) of the Deutsche
Bundesbank, Microdatabase Direct investment (MiDi), 1999-2014, authors’
calculations.
Counterfactual: Trade Liberalization in China. In this section, we consider the
effect of a trade liberalization occurring in China. In particular, we assume that the
trade costs for the goods imported to this country decrease by 10%. The results are
reported in Table 2.9.
Table 2.9 shows how the trade flows to China from German MNEs would increase
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by approximately 23%. A trade cost decrease has a first order effect on the import
to China related to the fact that selling products to this destination market becomes
cheaper. However, not only trade flows to China are affected but also those to other
correlated countries. In particular, imports to the USA and Japan from German
MNEs greatly increase. As the exposure to demand risk in China increased following
the trade liberalization, German MNEs optimally reallocate their production favor-
ing those countries that offer better hedge to the increased risk in China. On the
contrary, countries like Hong Kong and Singapore are negatively affected by the pol-
icy change; though their demand sizes are significantly smaller than the Chinese one,
the change is noticeable. We also evidence that the trade flows to the other EU coun-
tries would slightly decrease. Overall, the direction and magnitude of the change of
imports depend on (i) how good a country is at providing hedging for the increase
in the demand risk, (ii) the correlation structure among the countries in which the
MNEs are present in, as predicted by our model.52 In general, the structure of corre-
lation makes prediction hard. Indeed, the reallocation patterns are rather complex as
spillovers to one country can propagate to other correlated countries. If countries are
relatively highly positively correlated countries, then a liberalization policy taking
place in one of them negatively affects the others. Indeed, firms need to reduce their
exposure to demand risk due to the increase in sales in one the countries.53
2.6 Conclusions
In this chapter, we develop a model of risk averse multinational firms conducting
horizontal FDI and serving foreign markets through export platforms under demand
risk.
Our theoretical model predicts that MNEs exploit the presence of demand corre-
lations across foreign markets to hedge against the risk of unfavorable aggregate
demand fluctuations. The quantity sold in a destination market differs from the one
the firm would sell under no risk and, in particular, depends on the riskiness of the
country, on its diversification potential, and the degree of risk aversion of the firm it-
self besides market size, distance, and production cost. As firms are heterogeneously
risk averse, this implies that they set firm-country-specific markups even within a
standard CES framework. We also find that third-country effects can follow a trade
liberalization episode. In particular, countries that are not directly involved in the
policy change can suffer or gain from a change in tariffs, depending on the structure
of the correlation across demand realizations. Due to the interdependence across
foreign markets and the presence of risk aversion, a nonstandard firm’s entry policy
obtains. Specifically, the size of the location sets in which a firm establishes its foreign
52On May 11 2017, China and US signed a trade agreement to remove some of the existing barriers
in the trade across the two countries. The agreement could be mutually beneficial not only because
firms operating in both countries can take advantage of the lower trade costs but also because of the
favorable correlation structure.
53This might have also implications for Brexit. Countries in the EU might benefits in the case of an
increase in tariffs for the goods imported in the UK.
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production facilities does not necessarily vary monotonically both with risk aversion
and home productivity.
The empirical analysis relies on the data on German multinational enterprises. Our
main findings are consistent with the existence of diversification patterns in the sales
structure of multinational enterprises. In particular, firms display strictly positive
and heterogeneous degrees of risk aversion. This heterogeneity can be related to
firm’s characteristics, like size and age, and to the demand characteristics of the sec-
tor in which the firm operates in. In particular, firms in the relatively more volatile
industries display a larger aversion toward risk. In two counterfactuals, we show
(i) how a tariff reduction for goods imported into China would increase sales in less
correlated economies and harm, instead, those countries whose demand are more
correlated with the Chinese one, and (ii) how a reduction in risk aversion would
result in a larger increase of sales in countries that are either less risky or whose
economies are more correlated with Germany.
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Appendix A
Addendum to Chapter 1
A.1 Entry by Year
Figure A.1 reports the number of entries by year into foreign countries observed in
the sample of firms supplying professional services. The green bars refer only to en-
tries related to multinational enterprises whereas the gray bars include also pure ex-
porters. We note that entry activity is larger at the beginning of the
sample (2005 – 2007). However, starting from 2008, we note that the economic crisis
reduced the entries activity of both groups of firms (especially for
multinationals).
Entries has been slowly reverting to the levels observed before the crisis with re-
spect to pure exporters, whereas they are still below the pre-crisis level with respect
to multinational enterprises.
FIGURE A.1: Foreign market entries
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Source: Research Data and Service Centre (RDSC) of the Deutsche Bundesbank,
Microdatabase Direct investment (MiDi), 1999-2014, and Statistics on International
Trade Services (SITS), 2001-2015, authors’ calculations.
A.2 Wholesale
Figure A.2 displays the patterns of entries into foreign markets. Generally, in the
wholesale sector the quality is not the most important business driver. The patterns
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we observe for this sector are in line with the literature describing entry behavior
for manufacturing (Helpman et al., 2004). In particular, we observe that most firms
enter via export whereas entry by greenfield investment activity is the less frequent,
differently from professional services.
FIGURE A.2: Entry type in wholesale
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Note: The middle line represents the number of exporters that conduct multinational
activity.
Source: Research Data and Service Centre (RDSC) of the Deutsche Bundesbank,
Microdatabase Direct investment (MiDi), 1999-2014, and Statistics on International
Trade Services (SITS), 2001-2015, authors’ calculations.
The results in Table A.1 are also in line with patterns described for manufacturing.
In particular, we find that the sales premium for the exporters is the lowest across
the various entry types, reflecting that exporters are relatively less productive than
foreign direct investors.
TABLE A.1: Sales and size premia in wholesale sector
Premia
95% Conf.
Interval
Exporters
Sales premia 11.667 (0.254) [11.168, 12.165]
Size premia 4.483 (0.221) [4.049, 4.917]
M&A
Sales premia 11.765 (0.271) [11.226, 12.305]
Size premia 4.949 (0.237) [4.478, 5.420]
Greenfield investment
Sales premia 11.759 (0.331) [11.109, 12.408]
Size premia 4.418 (0.288) [3.853, 4.983]
Notes: We estimate entry type premia as follows: Yω,t = β1EXPω,t + β2 MAω,t + β3GIω,t + It +
eω,t, where t is the year index, I are year dummies, and Y is the log of firm characteristic for
which the premia are estimated. All estimates are significant at the 1 percent level. Estimation
of sales premia: N = 901, R2 = 0.9760. Estimation of size premia: N = 894, R2 = 0.8773.
Source: Research Data and Service Centre (RDSC) of the Deutsche Bundesbank,
Microdatabase Direct investment (MiDi), 1999-2014, and Statistics on International Trade
Services (SITS), 2001-2015, authors’ calculations.
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A.3 On the Intuition of Cutoff Ordering
Let ∆E, ∆M, and ∆G denote firm’s return to core quality associated to export, M&A,
and greenfield investment in a foreign market, respectively;1 that is,
∆E ≡ Eeσ−1τ1−σΦ˜,
∆M ≡
(
ϕM
)σ−1
sσ−1Φ˜,
∆G ≡
(
Eeσ−1 − αG
)
Φ˜.
Let ϕjk define firm’s threshold such that with core quality ϕ satisfying ϕσ−1 = ϕjk
firm is indifferent between accessing the foreign market with entry type j or k, where
j, k ∈ {0, Export, Greenfield investment, M&A} with j 6= k.
We distinguish six cases depending on the relation between returns to core quality
and then specify sub-cases according to the relation between fixed part of entry costs.
This case distinction allows us to determine the relevant intervals of core quality
corresponding to the selection into one of three activities (if any). Depending on
the structure of the entry costs, some option can dominate another one in terms of
profits. Firm’s choice between alternatives is determined by the level of core quality.
Therefore, we can describe firm’s optimal choices given the level of its core quality.
Case 1. ∆E > ∆G ≥ ∆M.2
This case corresponds to the situation in which firm’s largest returns to core quality
are associated to Export, whereas lowest returns are associated to M&A.
Case 1.1. f E > f¯ G > f M.3
In this case, the activity with the highest return to core quality is also the most
expensive in terms of entry costs. According to the ordering of zero cutoffs
(that is, ϕE0, ϕG0, and ϕM0), we specify four possible sub-cases.
1Hereafter, we skip country index.
2For illustrative purpose, we provide for all sub-cases of case 1 the corresponding figure with profit
lines. For the next cases, we skip figures as they are analogous to the case 1.
3For the simplicity of notation, in this section we denote f M ≡ f M (ϕM).
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Case 1.1.1. ϕM0 < ϕG0 < ϕE0.
We further separate two sub-cases depending on the relation between the
quality level required to switch from M&A to Greenfield investment or to
Export.
Case 1.1.1.1. ϕEM ≥ ϕGM.
In this case, all alternatives can be optimal for some intervals of core
quality. In particular, the firm chooses to stay out if ϕσ−1 < ϕM0;
firm chooses M&A if ϕM0 ≤ ϕσ−1 < ϕGM; firm chooses Greenfield
investment if ϕGM ≤ ϕσ−1 < ϕEG; firm chooses Export if ϕσ−1 ≥ ϕEG.
Case 1.1.1.2. ϕEM < ϕGM.
In this case, Greenfield investment is not optimal. Indeed, Greenfield in-
vestment becomes more profitable than M&A at a larger level of qual-
ity than that required for Export to become more profitable than M&A.
Hence, firm decides to stay out if ϕσ−1 < ϕM0; firm chooses M&A if
ϕM0 ≤ ϕσ−1 < ϕEM; firm chooses Export if ϕσ−1 ≥ ϕEM.
ϕσ−1
0
− f M
− f¯ G
− f E
piG piM
piE
Case 1.1.1.1. ϕM0 < ϕG0 < ϕE0 ∧ ϕEM ≥ ϕGM .
ϕσ−1
0
− f M
− f¯ G
− f E
piG
piM
piE
Case 1.1.1.2. ϕM0 < ϕG0 < ϕE0 ∧ ϕEM < ϕGM .
Zero cutoff for M&A with x-coordinate ϕM0
Zero cutoff for Greenfield investment with x-coordinate ϕG0
Zero cutoff for Export with x-coordinate ϕE0
Cutoff between M&A and Greenfield investment with x-coordinate ϕGM
Cutoff between Greenfield investment and Export with x-coordinate ϕEG
Cutoff between M&A and Export with x-coordinate ϕEM
Maximum profits for a given level of core quality
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Case 1.1.2. ϕM0 < ϕE0 ≤ ϕG0.
In this case, Export provides a higher return than Greenfield investment,
while it becomes profitable at the lower level of quality. Thus, Greenfield
investment is not optimal. If ϕσ−1 < ϕM0, then firm chooses to stay out.
If ϕM0 ≤ ϕσ−1 < ϕEM, firm chooses M&A. If ϕσ−1 ≥ ϕEM, firm chooses
Export.
ϕσ−1
0
− f M
− f¯ G
− f E
piG
piM
piE
Case 1.1.2. ϕM0 < ϕE0 ≤ ϕG0.
Zero cutoff for M&A with x-coordinate ϕM0
Zero cutoff for Greenfield investment with x-coordinate ϕG0
Zero cutoff for Export with x-coordinate ϕE0
Cutoff between M&A and Greenfield investment with x-coordinate ϕGM
Cutoff between Greenfield investment and Export with x-coordinate ϕEG
Cutoff between M&A and Export with x-coordinate ϕEM
Maximum profits for a given level of core quality
Case 1.1.3. ϕG0 ≤ ϕM0 ∧ ϕG0 < ϕE0.
In this case, Greenfield investment provides a higher return than M&A, while
is becomes profitable at the lower level of core quality than M&A. Thus, no
firm finds it optimal to serve foreign markets via M&A. In this case, firm
stays out if it is not productive enough to conduct greenfield investment,
i.e. ϕσ−1 < ϕG0; firm chooses Greenfield investment if ϕG0 ≤ ϕσ−1 < ϕEG;
finally, firm chooses Export if ϕσ−1 ≥ ϕEG.
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ϕσ−1
0
− f M
− f¯ G
− f E
piG piM
piE
(a) ϕM0 < ϕE0.
ϕσ−1
0
− f M
− f¯ G
− f E
piG
piM
piE
(b) ϕM0 ≥ ϕE0.
Case 1.1.3. ϕG0 ≤ ϕM0 ∧ ϕG0 < ϕE0.
Zero cutoff for M&A with x-coordinate ϕM0
Zero cutoff for Greenfield investment with x-coordinate ϕG0
Zero cutoff for Export with x-coordinate ϕE0
Cutoff between M&A and Greenfield investment with x-coordinate ϕGM
Cutoff between Greenfield investment and Export with x-coordinate ϕEG
Cutoff between M&A and Export with x-coordinate ϕEM
Maximum profits for a given level of core quality
Case 1.1.4. ϕE0 ≤ min{ϕM0, ϕG0}.
In this case, only Export can be optimal since this alternative provides the
highest return to core quality and is the first alternative to become prof-
itable among the available ones. In particular, firm chooses Export if it is
efficient enough to export, i.e. ϕσ−1 ≥ ϕE0, and stays out otherwise.
ϕσ−1
0
− f M
− f¯ G
− f E
piG
piM
piE
(a) ϕG0 < ϕM0.
ϕσ−1
0
− f M
− f¯ G
− f E
piG pi
MpiE
(b) ϕG0 ≥ ϕM0.
Case 1.1.4. ϕE0 ≤ min{ϕM0, ϕG0}.
Zero cutoff for M&A with x-coordinate ϕM0
Zero cutoff for Greenfield investment with x-coordinate ϕG0
Zero cutoff for Export with x-coordinate ϕE0
Cutoff between M&A and Greenfield investment with x-coordinate ϕGM
Cutoff between Greenfield investment and Export with x-coordinate ϕEG
Cutoff between M&A and Export with x-coordinate ϕEM
Maximum profits for a given level of core quality
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Case 1.2. f M ≥ f¯ G ∧ f E > f¯ G.
In this case, M&A cannot be optimal since it provides lower return than Green-
field investment but requires larger entry costs. We distinguish two additional
sub-cases depending on the relation between zero cutoffs associated to Green-
field investment and Export.
Case 1.2.1. ϕE0 > ϕG0.
In this case, both Export and Greenfield investment can be profitable at some
levels of core quality. Firm chooses to stay out if ϕσ−1 < ϕG0; it chooses
Greenfield investment if ϕG0 ≤ ϕσ−1 < ϕEG; finally, it selects Export if
ϕσ−1 ≥ ϕEG.
ϕσ−1
0
− f M
− f¯ G
− f E
piG
piM
piE
(a) f M < f E.
ϕσ−1
0
− f M
− f¯ G
− f E
piG
piM
piE
(b) f M ≥ f E.
Case 1.2.1. ϕE0 > ϕG0.
Zero cutoff for M&A with x-coordinate ϕM0
Zero cutoff for Greenfield investment with x-coordinate ϕG0
Zero cutoff for Export with x-coordinate ϕE0
Cutoff between Greenfield investment and Export with x-coordinate ϕEG
Cutoff between M&A and Export with x-coordinate ϕEM
Maximum profits for a given level of core quality
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Case 1.2.2. ϕE0 ≤ ϕG0.
In this case, the activity yielding the largest returns, Export, becomes prof-
itable at a lower level of core quality compared with Greenfield investment.
Thus, only Export can be optimal. In particular, if ϕσ−1 ≥ ϕE0, firm chooses
Export and stays out otherwise.
ϕσ−1
0
− f M
− f¯ G
− f E
piG
piM
piE
(a) f M < f E.
ϕσ−1
0
− f M
− f¯ G
− f E
piG
piM
piE
(b) f M ≥ f E.
Case 1.2.2. ϕE0 ≤ ϕG0.
Zero cutoff for M&A with x-coordinate ϕM0
Zero cutoff for Greenfield investment with x-coordinate ϕG0
Zero cutoff for Export with x-coordinate ϕE0
Cutoff between Greenfield investment and Export with x-coordinate ϕEG
Cutoff between M&A and Export with x-coordinate ϕEM
Maximum profits for a given level of core quality
Case 1.3. f¯ G ≥ f E > f M.
In this case, Greenfield investment is more costly than Export but has lower re-
turn. Thus, no firm finds it optimal to conduct Greenfield investment. We further
separate two sub-cases depending on the relative positioning of the zero cutoffs
for M&A and Export.
Case 1.3.1. ϕM0 < ϕE0.
In this case, firm chooses to stay out if ϕσ−1 < ϕM0; it chooses M&A if
ϕM0 ≤ ϕσ−1 < ϕEM; it chooses Export if ϕσ−1 ≥ ϕEM.
Case 1.3.2. ϕM0 ≥ ϕE0.
In this case, only Export can be optimal. This occurs since M&A requires
higher core quality than Export to be profitable although it gives a lower
return. Thus, firm chooses Export if ϕσ−1 ≥ ϕE0 and stays out otherwise.
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ϕσ−1
0
− f M
− f¯ G
− f E
piG
piM
piE
Case 1.3.1. ϕM0 < ϕE0.
ϕσ−1
0
− f M
− f¯ G
− f E
piG
piM
piE
Case 1.3.2. ϕM0 ≥ ϕE0.
Zero cutoff for M&A with x-coordinate ϕM0
Zero cutoff for Greenfield investment with x-coordinate ϕG0
Zero cutoff for Export with x-coordinate ϕE0
Cutoff between M&A and Greenfield investment with x-coordinate ϕGM
Cutoff between M&A and Export with x-coordinate ϕEM
Maximum profits for a given level of core quality
Case 1.4. f E ≤ min{ f M, f¯ G}.
In this case, only Export can be optimal since this option yields the highest re-
turn to core quality and, at the same time, is the cheapest, in terms of entry
costs. Thus, firm chooses Export if ϕσ−1 ≥ ϕE0 and stays out otherwise.
ϕσ−1
0
− f M
− f¯ G
− f E
piG
piM
piE
(a) f M < f¯ G .
ϕσ− 1
0
− f M
− f¯ G
− f E
piG
piM
piE
(b) f M ≥ f¯ G .
Case 1.4. f Ei ≤ min{ f Mi , f¯ Gi }.
Zero cutoff for M&A with x-coordinate ϕM0
Zero cutoff for Greenfield investment with x-coordinate ϕG0
Zero cutoff for Export with x-coordinate ϕE0
Maximum profits for a given level of core quality
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Case 2. ∆E ≥ ∆M > ∆G.
In this case, Export is still providing the largest return to core quality, followed by
M&A and Greenfield investment. Similarly to the first case, we distinguish all relevant
cases depending on the structure of the entry costs for three activities.
Case 2.1. f E > f M > f¯ G.
In this case, more expensive in terms of entry costs alternative is also providing
higher return to core quality, so that all activities can be potentially optimal for
some levels of core quality.
Case 2.1.1. ϕG0 < ϕM0 < ϕE0.
Next two sub-cases are specified according to the position of cutoffs be-
tween Greenfield investment and two other choice options.
Case 2.1.1.1. ϕEG ≥ ϕGM.
In this case, Greenfield investment becomes more profitable than M&A
at the lower level of quality than Export. This means that medium-
productive firms will find it profitable to acquire foreign firms. In
particular, firm chooses to stay out if ϕσ−1 < ϕG0; it chooses Greenfield
investment if ϕG0 ≤ ϕσ−1 < ϕGM; it chooses M&A if ϕGM ≤ ϕσ−1 <
ϕEM; it chooses Export if ϕσ−1 ≥ ϕEM.
Case 2.1.1.2. ϕEG < ϕGM.
In this case, M&A is never optimal. Thus, firm chooses to stay out if
ϕσ−1 < ϕG0; firm chooses Greenfield investment if ϕG0 ≤ ϕσ−1 < ϕEG;
finally, firm chooses Export if ϕσ−1 > ϕEG.
Case 2.1.2. ϕG0 < ϕE0 ≤ ϕM0.
Since the quality required for M&A to be profitable is higher than the one
for Export, firm will not go for M&A. Hence, firm chooses to stay out if
ϕσ−1 < ϕG0; it chooses Greenfield investment if ϕG0 ≤ ϕσ−1 < ϕEG; it
chooses Export if ϕσ−1 ≥ ϕEG.
Case 2.1.3. ϕM0 ≤ ϕG0 ∧ ϕM0 < ϕE0.
In this case, Greenfield investment cannot be optimal, as it becomes prof-
itable at the higher level of core quality than M&A, which provides higher
return. Therefore, firm chooses to stay out if ϕσ−1 < ϕM0; firm chooses
M&A if ϕM0 ≤ ϕσ−1 < ϕEM; firm chooses Export if ϕσ−1 ≥ ϕEM.
Case 2.1.4. ϕE0 ≤ min{ϕG0, ϕM0}.
In this case, only Export can be optimal. This happens since this alterna-
tive is of the highest return and becomes profitable at the lowest level of
core quality. In this case, firm chooses Export if it is efficient enough, i.e.
ϕσ−1 ≥ ϕE0, and stays out otherwise.
Case 2.2. f¯ G ≥ f M ∧ f E > f M.
In this case, Greenfield investment cannot be optimal, as it is dominated by M&A
which provides higher return for lower price. Depending on the ordering of
zero cutoffs for Export and M&A we can distinguish two sub-cases.
A.3. On the Intuition of Cutoff Ordering 85
Case 2.2.1. ϕE0 > ϕM0.
In this case medium-productive firms find it profitable to acquire foreign
targets. In particular, firm chooses to stay out if ϕσ−1 < ϕM0; it chooses
M&A if ϕM0 ≤ ϕσ−1 < ϕEM; finally, it chooses Export if ϕσ−1 ≥ ϕEM.
Case 2.2.2. ϕE0 ≤ ϕM0.
In this case, Export is the only alternative that can be optimal. This is
due to the fact that Export provides a higher return to core quality and
requires lower quality to become profitable. In particular, if ϕσ−1 ≥ ϕE0,
firm chooses Export and stays out otherwise.
Case 2.3. f M ≥ f E > f¯ G.
In this case, M&A is dominated by Export which provides higher profit at all
quality levels.
Case 2.3.1. ϕE0 > ϕG0.
In this case, firm chooses to stay out if ϕσ−1 < ϕG0; it chooses Greenfield
investment if ϕG0 ≤ ϕσ−1 < ϕEG; it chooses Export if ϕσ−1 ≥ ϕEG.
Case 2.3.2. ϕE0 ≤ ϕG0.
If Greenfield investment becomes profitable at the higher level of core qual-
ity than Export, then only Export can be optimal. In particular, firm chooses
Export if ϕσ−1 ≥ ϕE0 and stays out otherwise.
Case 2.4. f E ≤ min{ f¯ G, f M}.
In this case, only Export can be optimal as the alternative with the highest return
to core quality and the lowest entry costs. In particular, firm chooses Export if
ϕσ−1 ≥ ϕE0 and stays out otherwise.
Case 3. ∆G ≥ ∆E > ∆M.
We switch to the case when Greenfield investment provides the largest return to core
quality; the middle-level return is provided by Export and the lowest return corre-
sponds to M&A.
Case 3.1. f¯ G > f E > f M.
First we consider the subcase, when the entry costs increase with the return to
core quality that entry type provides.
Case 3.1.1. ϕM0 < ϕE0 < ϕG0.
In this case case, an activity with higher return becomes profitable at the
higher level of core quality.
Case 3.1.1.1. ϕGM ≥ ϕEM.
In this case, all activities can be optimal for some levels of core quality.
In particular, firm chooses to stay out if ϕσ−1 < ϕM0; it chooses M&A
if ϕM0 ≤ ϕσ−1 < ϕEM; it chooses Export if ϕEM ≤ ϕσ−1 < ϕEG; it
chooses Greenfield investment if ϕσ−1 ≥ ϕEG.
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Case 3.1.1.2. ϕGM < ϕEM.
In this case, Greenfield investment becomes more profitable than M&A
at the lower level of quality than Export. Thus, Export cannot be op-
timal. Firm chooses to stay out if ϕσ−1 < ϕM0; it chooses M&A if
ϕM0 ≤ ϕσ−1 < ϕGM; it chooses Greenfield investment if ϕσ−1 ≥ ϕGM.
Case 3.1.2. ϕM0 < ϕG0 ≤ ϕE0.
In this case, Export cannot be optimal, since it becomes profitable at the
higher level of quality than Greenfield investment. Firm chooses to stay out
if ϕσ−1 < ϕM0; it chooses M&A if ϕM0 ≤ ϕσ−1 < ϕGM; it chooses Greenfield
investment otherwise.
Case 3.1.3. ϕE0 ≤ ϕM0 ∧ ϕE0 < ϕG0.
M&A cannot be optimal, as it requires higher level of core quality to be
profitable than Export. Thus, firm chooses to stay out if ϕσ−1 < ϕE0; firm
chooses Export if ϕE0 ≤ ϕσ−1 < ϕEG; firm chooses Greenfield investment if
ϕσ−1 ≥ ϕEG.
Case 3.1.4. ϕG0 ≤ min{ϕM0, ϕE0}.
Greenfield investment becomes profitable at the lowest level of core quality
among three options being of the highest return. Thus, only Greenfield
investment can be optimal in this case. In particular, firm chooses Greenfield
investment if ϕσ−1 ≥ ϕG0 and stays out otherwise.
Case 3.2. f M ≥ f E ∧ f¯ G > f E.
In this case, M&A is dominated by Export which has higher profit at all levels
of core quality.
Case 3.2.1. ϕG0 > ϕE0.
Firm chooses to stay out if ϕσ−1 < ϕE0; it chooses Export if ϕE0 ≤ ϕσ−1 <
ϕEG; it chooses Greenfield investment if ϕσ−1 ≥ ϕEG.
Case 3.2.2. ϕG0 ≤ ϕE0.
In this case, Export is not optimal for firms in the middle range of quality.
Therefore, only Greenfield investment can be optimal. In particular, firm
chooses Greenfield investment if ϕσ−1 ≥ ϕG0 and stays out otherwise.
Case 3.3. f¯ E ≥ f G > f M.
In this case, Export provides lower profit than Greenfield investment at all levels
of core quality. Thus, this option cannot be optimal.
Case 3.3.1. ϕG0 > ϕM0.
In this case, firm chooses to stay out if ϕσ−1 < ϕM0; firm goes for M&A if
ϕM0 ≤ ϕσ−1 < ϕGM; finally, it chooses Greenfield investment if ϕσ−1 ≥ ϕGM.
Case 3.3.2. ϕG0 ≤ ϕM0.
In this case, only Greenfield investment can be optimal, as it becomes prof-
itable at the lower level of core quality than M&A, but provides higher
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return. Therefore, firm chooses Greenfield investment if ϕσ−1 ≥ ϕG0 and
stays out otherwise.
Case 3.4. f¯ G ≤ min{ f M, f E}.
In this case, Greenfield investment dominate both Export and M&A. Thus, firm
chooses Greenfield investment if ϕσ−1 ≥ ϕG0 and stays out otherwise.
Case 4. ∆G > ∆M ≥ ∆E.
In this case, we keep Greenfield investment as the activity which provides the firm with
the highest return to core quality. On the contrary, the lowest returns are associated
with Export, followed by M&A.
Case 4.1. f¯ G > f M > f E.
Under the above assumption, none of the alternatives is a priori dominated by
another one, as higher entry costs correspond to higher returns from a given
action. Depending on the position of the zero cutoffs, we distinguish four sub-
cases.
Case 4.1.1. ϕE0 < ϕM0 < ϕG0.
In this case, relevant cutoffs of quality are determined by the position of
Export cutoff with respect to the other two entry types.
Case 4.1.1.1. ϕEG ≥ ϕEM.
If M&A becomes more profitable than Export at a lower level of core
quality than Greenfield investment, firms in the middle range of quality
find it optimal to acquire foreign targets. In particular, firm chooses
to stay out if ϕσ−1 < ϕE0; it chooses Export if ϕE0 ≤ ϕσ−1 < ϕEM; it
chooses M&A if ϕEM ≤ ϕσ−1 < ϕGM; it chooses Greenfield investment
if ϕσ−1 ≥ ϕGM.
Case 4.1.1.2. ϕEG < ϕEM.
If M&A becomes more profitable than Export at a higher level of core
quality than Greenfield investment, M&A cannot be optimal. Thus, firm
chooses to stay out if ϕσ−1 < ϕE0; it chooses Export if ϕE0 ≤ ϕσ−1 <
ϕEG; it chooses Greenfield investment if ϕσ−1 ≥ ϕEG.
Case 4.1.2. ϕE0 < ϕG0 ≤ ϕM0.
M&A cannot be optimal as this activity provides lower returns than Green-
field investment but becomes profitable at a higher level of core quality. In
this case, firm chooses to stay out if ϕσ−1 < ϕE0; it chooses Export if ϕE0 ≤
ϕσ−1 < ϕEG; finally, firm chooses Greenfield investment if ϕσ−1 ≥ ϕG0.
Case 4.1.3. ϕM0 ≤ ϕE0 ∧ ϕM0 < ϕG0.
In this case, Export cannot be optimal. This is due to the fact that Export
provides lower returns than M&A but requires a larger level of core qual-
ity to become profitable. Therefore, firm chooses to stay out if ϕσ−1 < ϕM0;
firm chooses M&A if ϕM0 ≤ ϕσ−1 < ϕGM; finally, firm goes for Greenfield
investment if ϕσ−1 ≥ ϕGM.
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Case 4.1.4. ϕG0 ≤ min{ϕE0, ϕM0}.
Only Greenfield investment can be optimal since it provides higher returns
to core quality than other alternatives and, at the same time, becomes prof-
itable at a lower level of quality. In particular, firm chooses Greenfield in-
vestment if ϕσ−1 ≥ ϕG0 and stays out otherwise.
Case 4.2. f E ≥ f M ∧ f¯ G > f M.
In this case, Export cannot be optimal as it provides lower profits than M&A for
any level of core quality.
Case 4.2.1. ϕG0 > ϕM0.
In this case, firm chooses to stay out if ϕσ−1 < ϕM0; it chooses M&A if
ϕM0 ≤ ϕσ−1 < ϕGM; it chooses Greenfield investment if ϕσ−1 ≥ ϕGM.
Case 4.2.2. ϕG0 ≤ ϕM0.
In this scenario, only Greenfield investment can be optimal. Therefore, firm
chooses Greenfield investment if ϕσ−1 ≥ ϕG0 and stays out otherwise.
Case 4.3. f M ≥ f¯ G > f E.
In this case, M&A cannot be optimal as it is dominated by Greenfield investment.
Indeed, Greenfield investment yields higher returns to core quality than M&A
does at a lower fixed cost.
Case 4.3.1. ϕG0 > ϕE0.
In this case, firm chooses to stay out if ϕσ−1 < ϕE0; it chooses Export if
ϕE0 ≤ ϕσ−1 < ϕEG; it chooses Greenfield investment if ϕσ−1 ≥ ϕEG.
Case 4.3.2. ϕG0 ≤ ϕE0.
In this case, only Greenfield investment can be optimal. This happens be-
cause this action provides higher returns than Export and becomes prof-
itable at the lower level of core quality. In particular, firm chooses Green-
field investment if ϕσ−1 ≥ ϕG0 and stays out otherwise.
Case 4.4. f¯ G ≤ min{ f E, f M}.
In this case, Greenfield investment dominates Export and M&A. In particular, firm
chooses Greenfield investment if ϕσ−1 ≥ ϕG0 and stays out otherwise.
Case 5. ∆M > ∆E > ∆G.
In this case, we assume that M&A provides the largest return to core quality; middle-
range return is provided by Export; finally, the lowest return to core quality corre-
sponds to Greenfield investment.
Case 5.1. f M > f E > f¯ G.
For the given structure of entry costs, all three alternatives can be optimal for
some level of core quality.
Case 5.1.1. ϕG0 < ϕE0 < ϕM0.
Firm’s choice as a function of core quality is driven by the ordering of the
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cutoffs for switching between from Greenfield investment to either M&A or
Export.
Case 5.1.1.1. ϕGM ≥ ϕEG.
In this case, all entry types can be optimal for some level of core
quality. In particular, the firm chooses to stay out if ϕσ−1 < ϕG0; it
chooses Greenfield investment if ϕG0 ≤ ϕσ−1 < ϕEG; firm selects Export
if ϕEG ≤ ϕσ−1 < ϕEM; finally, firm chooses M&A if ϕσ−1 ≥ ϕEM.
Case 5.1.1.2. ϕGM < ϕEG.
In this case, M&A becomes more profitable than Greenfield investment
at a lower level of core quality than Export. Since M&A provides the
firm with a higher return to core quality than Export, the later cannot
be optimal. Hence, firm chooses to stay out if ϕσ−1 < ϕG0; it chooses
Greenfield investment if ϕG0 ≤ ϕσ−1 < ϕGM; finally, firm goes for M&A
if ϕσ−1 ≥ ϕGM.
Case 5.1.2. ϕG0 < ϕM0 ≤ ϕE0.
In this case, Export cannot be optimal since it becomes profitable at a higher
level of quality than M&A which yields higher returns to core quality.
Therefore, firm chooses to stay out if ϕσ−1 < ϕG0; it chooses Greenfield
investment if ϕG0 ≤ ϕσ−1 < ϕGM; finally, it chooses M&A if ϕσ−1 ≥ ϕGM.
Case 5.1.3. ϕE0 ≤ ϕG0 ∧ ϕE0 < ϕM0.
In this case, Greenfield investment cannot be optimal. This is due to the
fact that Greenfield investment provides the firm with a lower return than
Export, but becomes profitable at a higher level of core quality. Therefore,
firm chooses to stay out if ϕσ−1 < ϕE0; firm selects Export if ϕE0 ≤ ϕσ−1 <
ϕEM; firm chooses M&A if ϕσ−1 ≥ ϕEM.
Case 5.1.4. ϕM0 ≤ min{ϕG0, ϕE0}.
In this case, M&A provides the firm with the highest return and becomes
profitable at a lower level of core quality than the other two alternatives
do. Therefore, only M&A can be optimal. In particular, firm chooses M&A
if ϕσ−1 ≥ ϕM0 and stays out otherwise.
Case 5.2. f¯ G ≥ f E ∧ f M > f E.
In this case, Greenfield investment cannot be optimal as this option is dominated
by Export.
Case 5.2.1. ϕM0 > ϕE0.
In this case, firm chooses to stay out if ϕσ−1 < ϕM0; it chooses Export if
ϕM0 ≤ ϕσ−1 < ϕEM; it chooses M&A if ϕσ−1 ≥ ϕEM.
Case 5.2.2. ϕM0 ≤ ϕE0.
Since M&A gives a higher return to core quality than Export and, at the
same time, becomes profitable at a lower level of quality, Export cannot be
optimal. In particular, firm chooses M&A if ϕσ−1 ≥ ϕM0 and stays out
otherwise.
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Case 5.3. f E ≥ f M > f¯ G.
In this case, Export cannot be optimal as it provides the firm with a lower profit
than M&A for any level of core quality.
Case 5.3.1. ϕM0 > ϕG0.
In this case, firm chooses to stay out if ϕσ−1 < ϕG0; firm picks Greenfield
investment if ϕG0 ≤ ϕσ−1 < ϕGM; it chooses M&A if ϕσ−1 ≥ ϕGM.
Case 5.3.2. ϕM0 ≤ ϕG0.
In this case, only M&A can be optimal since this option yields the largest
return and becomes profitable at a lowest level of core quality than Green-
field investment and Export do. In particular, firm chooses M&A if ϕσ−1 ≥
ϕM0 and stays out otherwise.
Case 5.4. f M ≤ min{ f¯ G, f E}.
In this case, M&A provides the firm with higher profit than other alternatives
for any level of quality. Therefore, firm chooses M&A if ϕσ−1 ≥ ϕM0 and stays
out otherwise.
Case 6. ∆M ≥ ∆G ≥ ∆E.
In the last case, we assume that M&A gives the largest return to core quality, followed
by Greenfield investment and Export.
Case 6.1. f M > f¯ G > f E.
In this scenario, all three alternatives can be optimal as higher returns to core
quality is associated to higher entry costs.
Case 6.1.1. ϕE0 < ϕG0 < ϕM0.
In this scenario, Export becomes profitable before Greenfield investment and
M&A. Hence, the possibility of engaging in each of the alternatives cru-
cially depends on the relative position of the cutoffs for switching from
Export to either Greenfield investment or M&A.
Case 6.1.1.1. ϕEM ≥ ϕEG.
In this case, middle-range quality firms find it profitable to conduct
greenfield investment. Thus, firm chooses to stay out if ϕσ−1 < ϕE0; it
chooses Export if ϕE0 ≤ ϕσ−1 < ϕEG; it selects Greenfield investment if
ϕEG ≤ ϕσ−1 < ϕGM, finally, firm chooses M&A if ϕσ−1 ≥ ϕGM.
Case 6.1.1.2. ϕEM < ϕEG.
Since the level of quality that makes M&A more productive than Ex-
port is lower than the level of quality required for Greenfield investment
to be more productive than Export, Greenfield investment is not optimal.
Therefore, firm chooses to stay out if ϕσ−1 < ϕE0; it chooses Export if
ϕE0 ≤ ϕσ−1 < ϕEM; finally, it goes for M&A if ϕσ−1 ≥ ϕEM.
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Case 6.1.2. ϕE0 < ϕM0 ≤ ϕG0.
In this case, Greenfield investment cannot be optimal as this activity be-
comes profitable at a larger level of quality than the one at which M&A
does. In particular, firm decides to stay out if ϕσ−1 < ϕE0; firm chooses
Export if ϕG0 ≤ ϕσ−1 < ϕEM; firm goes for M&A if ϕσ−1 ≥ ϕEM.
Case 6.1.3. ϕG0 ≤ ϕE0 ∧ ϕG0 < ϕM0.
In this scenario, Export cannot be optimal due to the fact that it provides
lower returns than Greenfield investment but requires a higher level of qual-
ity to be profitable. Therefore, firm decides to stay out if ϕσ−1 < ϕG0; it
chooses Greenfield investment if ϕG0 ≤ ϕσ−1 < ϕGM; finally, firm chooses
M&A if ϕσ−1 ≥ ϕGM.
Case 6.1.4. ϕM0 ≤ min{ϕE0, ϕG0}.
In this case, only M&A can be optimal since this is the alternative yielding
the highest return and becomes profitable at a lower level of quality than
the other two options. Thus, firm chooses M&A if ϕσ−1 ≥ ϕM0 and stays
out otherwise.
Case 6.2. f E ≥ f¯ G ∧ f M > f¯ G.
In this case, Export gives lower profits than Greenfield investment for any level of
core quality and, thus, it cannot be optimal.
Case 6.2.1. ϕM0 > ϕG0.
Firm chooses to stay out if ϕσ−1 < ϕM0; it chooses Greenfield investment if
ϕM0 ≤ ϕσ−1 < ϕGM; it chooses M&A if ϕσ−1 ≥ ϕGM.
Case 6.2.2. ϕM0 ≤ ϕG0.
In this case, only M&A can be optimal as it becomes profitable at a lower
level of core quality than Greenfield investment but also gives higher re-
turns. Hence, firm chooses M&A if ϕσ−1 ≥ ϕM0 and stays out otherwise.
Case 6.3. f¯ G ≥ f M > f E.
In this case, M&A dominates Greenfield investment.
Case 6.3.1. ϕM0 > ϕE0.
In this case, firm decides to stay out if ϕσ−1 < ϕE0; it chooses Export if
ϕE0 ≤ ϕσ−1 < ϕEM; finally, it goes for M&A if ϕσ−1 ≥ ϕEM.
Case 6.3.2. ϕM0 ≤ ϕE0.
In this case, only M&A can be optimal. This happens as M&A provides the
firm with a higher return to core quality than Export does, and it requires
lower quality to become profitable. Hence, firm chooses M&A if ϕσ−1 ≥
ϕM0 and stays out otherwise.
Case 6.4. f M ≤ min{ f E, f¯ G}.
In this case, only M&A can be optimal as it dominates profits associated to the
other two alternatives. Therefore, firm chooses M&A if ϕσ−1 ≥ ϕM0 and stays
out otherwise.
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A.4 Sensitivity Analysis for Two Specifications for M&A
Parameters
In order to identify the parameters of the model, we need to put restrictions on those
parameters affecting M&A profitability. We specify two possible restrictions: (i) the
magnitude of synergies is determined by the relative productivity of a firm with re-
spect to the least productive firm in the market, (ii) the medians of the institutional
entry costs for the two types of FDI are the same. For each specification, we simu-
late 10 datasets with 10,000 firms. Each dataset keeps the same parameters, except
those related to M&A, across the two specifications. We take the elasticity of sub-
stitution σ = 6 and set demand shifters to ΦGER = 100, ΦEU = 90, ΦUS = 100,
ΦRoW = 80. Then, we estimate the model using each simulated dataset. The aver-
ages of estimated parameters are reported in Table A.2 for the first specification and
in Table A.3 for the second one.
TABLE A.2: Specification of M&A with s = 1/a
Common parameters True parameters s = 1/a
Scale parameter of core quality distribution, a 0.4 0.400
Shape parameter of core quality distribution, γ 8.0 7.899
S.d. log perceived quality shock, σe 0.05 0.051
S.d. log export-entry costs, σf E 0.1 0.082
S.d. log greenfield investment entry costs, σf G 0.1 0.049
Country-specific parameters EU US RoW EU US RoW
Median entry cost with export, exp( f E) 0.091 0.067 0.050 0.087 0.066 0.051
Iceberg trade costs, τ 1.020 1.050 1.070 1.027 1.052 1.072
Median log perceived quality shocks, exp (µe) 0.970 0.905 0.932 0.974 0.907 0.934
Median institutional entry costs with greenfield FDI, exp
(
f¯ G
)
0.082 0.050 0.030 0.080 0.050 0.030
Quality price for greenfield FDI, αG 0.100 0.200 0.300 0.126 0.201 0.311
Median institutional entry costs of M&A, exp
(
f¯ M
)
0.100 0.050 0.010 0.098 0.050 0.011
Scale parameter of M&A quality distribution, aM 0.350 0.300 0.310 0.349 0.299 0.311
TABLE A.3: Specification of M&A with f¯ M = exp
(
f¯ G
)
Common parameters True parameters f¯ M = exp
(
f¯ G
)
Scale parameter of core quality distribution, a 0.4 0.401
Shape parameter of core quality distribution, γ 8.0 8.183
S.d. log perceived quality shock, σe 0.05 0.051
S.d. log export-entry costs, σf E 0.1 0.072
S.d. log greenfield investment entry costs, σf G 0.1 0.054
Country-specific parameters EU US RoW EU US RoW
Median entry cost with export, exp( f E) 0.091 0.067 0.050 0.086 0.066 0.050
Iceberg trade costs, τ 1.020 1.050 1.070 1.046 1.057 1.071
Median log perceived quality shocks, exp (µe) 0.970 0.905 0.932 0.979 0.908 0.935
Median institutional entry costs with greenfield FDI, exp
(
f¯ G
)
0.082 0.050 0.030 0.079 0.051 0.031
Quality price for greenfield FDI, αG 0.100 0.200 0.300 0.164 0.201 0.306
M&A synergies, s 2.300 2.500 3.700 2.292 2.509 3.747
Scale parameter of M&A quality distribution, aM 0.400 0.300 0.200 0.403 0.300 0.203
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A.5 Technical Notes on the Constrained Maximum
Likelihood Estimation
In the estimation, we simulate and numerically integrate the likelihood function.
We discuss in detail the integration procedure for each dimension of heterogeneity.
Core Quality ϕ. The core quality ϕ is drawn independently across firms from a Pareto
distribution. We simulate a grid of 50 points in order to integrate the likelihood
function with respect to ϕ. First, we generate 50 random points that come from the
different quartiles of the Pareto distribution.
If firm does not acquire a foreign firm in any market, we follow the procedure
applied in Tintelnot (2017). In particular, we construct 10 intervals using the fol-
lowing set of points [0, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, 0.9, 0.95, 0.98, 0.99, 0.999, 1] and draw 5 points
assuming they constitute the support of a uniformly distributed random variable.
This allows us to obtain the corresponding nodes of a Pareto cumulative distribution
function. Each node has a weight proportional to the length of the interval. For ex-
ample, a node from the interval [0, 0.2] enters the estimation with a weight 0.04. Since
the underlying distribution of the core quality is Pareto, we attribute more weight to
the nodes in the first percentiles of the distribution.
If firm acquires a foreign firm abroad, this implies restrictions on the possible real-
izations of ϕ. Recall that in order to estimate the constrained maximum likelihood,
we use (i) a transformation of the density of M&A foreign sales into the density of
the M&A quality draws, (ii) the restrictions implied by realized M&A sales in or-
der to rewrite the whole problem in terms of ϕ. In particular, the density of M&A
draws reads as m(ϕi/(sϕM)|ϕ; aMi ,γ). Since M&A quality draws come from a Pareto
distribution, this implies a technical restriction, which makes the likelihood equal to
zero when integrating in the regions ϕ > ϕi/(siaMi ). In this case, we account for
the presence of the technical restrictions of ϕ realizations that can result in non-zero
likelihood and construct the grid for nodes of ϕ distribution accordingly. In order
to do so, we first take the technical upper bound implied by M&A choices for each
firm. If M&A is selected as an entry type for several foreign markets, we take the
minimum of upper bounds, that is ϕ¯techω = min{ϕi/(siaMi ) | eω,i = M&A}. Then, we
compute the value of the Pareto cumulative distribution function for the obtained
upper bound and check in which of the previously discussed 10 intervals the value
falls. We set the upper bound of this interval to the cdf ϕ¯techω and take all lower quar-
tile intervals as given. To select the number of points to sample from each interval,
we weights the importance of the interval as a length of the interval relative to its ini-
tial length. For example, if ϕ¯techω felt into the second interval, [0.2, 0.4], we will assign
weight (ϕ¯techω − 0.2)/(0.4− 0.2) and weight 1 to the first interval, [0, 0.2]. Here we
draw nodes using the quasi-random Hatlon number generator to grant more repre-
sentation of the integration region and to avoid any random component in the re-
alization of the likelihood function. Similarly to the benchmark case without M&A
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choice, the weights are taken proportionately to the length of the interval. Therefore,
for each firm conducting M&A in any of the regions we obtain a firm-specific grid for
the numerical integration needed to compute the likelihood function. It is important
to note that without this correction we would underestimate likelihood for firms en-
gaged in M&A, as we would sample integration points for ϕ from the interval where
the likelihood is equal to zero.
Export Entry Costs f E and Institutional Entry Costs for Greenfield Investment f¯ G. En-
try costs are drawn from a destination-specific log-normal distribution. We simulate
1,000 draws for each entry costs using the quasi-random Hatlon number generator.
Recall that we divide the entry choice into two stages. In the first stage, we com-
pute the probability of selecting the observed entry types over entering in all foreign
markets with M&A. In the second stage, we condition on the observed choice by us-
ing an indicator function of choosing the observed entry type in each region over No
entry, Greenfield investment, and Export. Following Train (2009), we approximate the
indicator choice function with a smooth, strictly positive function. This is done in
order to avoid jumps in the likelihood value across different simulations and make
the likelihood function differentiable.
We normalize all profits with respect to the most profitable alternative and use the
logit transformation function with a scale factor λ, that is
EΠ˜eii = EΠ
ei
i −max
{
EΠe
′
i
i
}
e′i∈{0,E,G}
and Sei =
exp
(
EΠ˜eii /λ
)
∑ exp
(
EΠ˜eii /λ
) , (A.1)
where Sei approximates the identity function for choice ei. We note that the limit of
the approximated identity function as λ goes to zero is the identity function. Nor-
malization allows us to make λ smaller and therefore increase the precision of the
approximation.
To make the estimation procedure consistent for M&A, we use an approach simi-
lar to that implemented for the other entry types by adding a noise to f¯ M, such that
˜¯f Mi = f¯
M
i + e
M
i , where e
M
i is drawn from N (0, 1E–6).
Perceived quality shocks e. The perceived quality shocks follow a destination-specific
log-normal distribution. We use the closed form of the log-normal expected value.
Quality of M&A Targets ϕM . The quality of M&A targets is drawn independently
across markets and firms from a destination-specific Pareto distribution. The integra-
tion with respect to M&A quality draws is done at the first stage of the entry choice,
when a firm decides whether to enter a market via M&A or via any other entry type.
We derive a closed form for the probability of this choice. Here we eliminate the sim-
plification assumed in the footnote 46 that Greenfield investment is preferred to M&A
in the first stage if M&A is dominated by No entry (when firm has low core quality
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and it not able to generate positive synergies). This simplification was valid under
the fact that Greenfield investment is never selected in the second stage being domi-
nated by No Entry. However, this is not necessarily true with an introduction of the
approximation of the identity function for the second stage entry choice, which can
be larger than zero even if Greenfield investment yields lower returns than No Entry.
Accordingly, we take the probability of the first stage as given and revert the cutoff
condition, meaning that we compute the probability that the M&A quality draw is
large enough to make costs of acquiring a foreign firm large enough for M&A to be
less profitable that non-profitable Greenfield investment.
The constrained maximum likelihood function estimation follows the procedure
described by Su and Judd (2012). First, for a given guess of parameters, we invert the
sales function in order to obtain the level of the perceived quality which rationalizes
the observed in the data foreign sales. Second, we compute the likelihood func-
tion and iterate till it is maximized. According to Su and Judd (2012), the proposed
approach is asymptotically equivalent to a nested fixed-point approach in terms of
results. Similarly to Tintelnot (2017), who implements the proposed algorithm in his
estimation, we face the problem that the estimates are bias as the model is estimated
on the finite sample of firms. In Appendix A.4 we show that the estimates obtained
with a proposed algorithm are close to the true parameters of the data generation
process.
We maximize the likelihood with the simulated annealing together with the hy-
brid global maximizing algorithm patternsearch. Same algorithms are used in the
calibration of the general equilibrium.
A.6 Cutoffs for Selecting M&A
To select M&A over No entry the core quality ϕ of the firm ω should satisfy the fol-
lowing inequality (
ϕ0Mi
)σ−1 ≥ rω,i
sσ−1i
[
rω,i − f¯ Mi
] . (A.2)
However, if the sales realized via M&A, rω,i, do not exceed the level of the insti-
tutional entry costs for M&A f¯ Mi in country i, firm will not be involved in M&A
independently on its level of core quality.
To select M&A over Export the core quality ϕ of the firm ω should be in the interval
(
ϕEMi
)σ−1 ∈
 f Ei − f¯ Mi + rω,i −
√
DEi
2∆Ei
,
f Ei − f¯ Mi + rω,i +
√
DEi
2∆Ei
 , (A.3)
where DEi =
[
f Ei − f¯ Mi + rω,i
]2 − 4rω,i∆Ei s1−σi . If DEi < 0, then firm will not be in-
volved in M&A independently on its level of core quality.
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To select M&A over Greenfield investment the core quality ϕ of the firm ω should be
in the interval
(
ϕGMi
)σ−1 ∈
 f Gi − f¯ Mi + rω,i −
√
DGi
2∆˜Gi
,
f Gi − f¯ Mi + rω,i +
√
DGi
2∆˜Gi
 , (A.4)
where DGi =
[
f Gi − f¯ Mi + rω,i
]2 − 4rω,i∆˜Gi s1−σi . If DGi < 0, then firm will not be in-
volved in M&A independently on its level of core quality.
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Addendum to Chapter 2
B.1 Existence and Uniqueness
Proposition 1. (Existence and Uniqueness). If the matrix Σ has cross-correlations bounded
away from−1 and 1, there exists a unique solution to the firm’s utility maximization problem.
Proof. Before delving into the proof of Proposition 1, we show an auxiliary lemma
which turns out to be useful for the following discussion.
Lemma 1. Let (P1) denote the following problem
max
q∈RN+
u(Π(q|L,ϕ, r)) =∑
d
(
q
σ−1
σ
d
(
E[Ad]− cdq
1
σ
d
))
− r
2∑d
∑
d′
cov(Ad, A′d)q
σ−1
σ
d q
σ′−1
σ′
d′
Define sd = f (qd; σ) ≡ q
σ−1
σ
d . Then, the problem (P2) defined as
max
s∈RN+
u(Π(s|L,ϕ, r)) =∑
d
(
sd
(
E[Ad]− cds
1
σ−1
d
))
− r
2∑d
∑
d′
cov(Ad, A′d)sdsd′ .
is equivalent to (P1), i.e. q∗ is a solution to (P1) if and only if s∗ is a solution to (P2).
Proof. First, note that for qd ≥ 0 the function f (·) is a bijection. Consider the problems
(P1) and (P2). If sd = qd = 0 for all d, then the statement follows. Assume that
qd, sd > 0 for some d. Then, for such d, the first order conditions for (P1) and (P2)
are respectively given by
∂u(·)
∂qd
=
σ− 1
σ
E[Ad]q
− 1σ
d
− r
(
σ− 1
σ
q−
1
σ
d ∑
d′
cov(Ad, A′d)q
σ−1
σ
d′
)
− cd = 0,
(B.1)
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and
∂u(·)
∂sd
= E[Ad]− r∑
d′
cov(Ad, A′d)sd′ −
σ
σ− 1cds
1
σ−1
d = 0 (B.2)
respectively.
Then, using the definition of sd, we can write (B.2) as
∂u(·)
∂sd
= E[Ad]− r∑
d′
cov(Ad, A′d)sd′ −
σ
σ− 1 cds
1
σ−1
d = 0 (B.3)
⇔ ∂u(·)
∂sd
= E[Ad]− r∑
d′
cov(Ad, A′d)q
σ−1
σ
d′ −
σ
σ− 1 cdq
1
σ
d = 0 (B.4)
⇔ ∂u(·)
∂sd
= E[Ad]q
− 1σ
d − r
(
q−
1
σ
d ∑
d′
cov(Ad, A′d)q
σ−1
σ
d′
)
− σ
σ− 1 cd = 0, (B.5)
where the last equivalence follows from the fact that qd > 0. So, if qd solves (B.1),
then sd solves (B.2), and vice versa. This shows that problems (P1) and (P2) are
equivalent given the definition of sd, and admit the same solution, provided this
solution exists.
Next, we consider the problem (P2). We show that the solution exists and is
unique. Then, using Lemma 1, we can extend this result to the original
problem (P1).
Existence. To show the existence of a solution, we use the notion of coercive func-
tion. Recall that a continuous function f is coercive if and only if
lim
‖s‖→∞
f (s) = +∞.
Note that u(·) can be written as the sum of the expected profits and the variance of
profits multiplied by a scalar r. These functions, taken with negative sign, are both
coercive.1 Moreover, the sum of coercive functions is coercive. We can then apply
Proposition 2.1.1 in Bertsekas, Ozdaglar, and Nedic´ (2003) to conclude the existence
of a solution to the utility maximization problem.2
Uniqueness. To show the uniqueness of a solution, it is enough to show that the
utility function u is strictly concave in s.
Let Hu denote the Hessian matrix associated to the firm’s utility.
Note that any element of the main diagonal is given by
Hu(d, d) =
∂2u(Π(s|L, ϕ, r))
∂s2d
= − σ
(σ− 1)2 cds
2−σ
σ−1
d − rvar(Ad) < 0. (B.6)
1Note that the expected profit function is the sum of the profit realized in each destination d, which
is a continuous and concave function of sd admitting a unique global maximizer, i.e. the solution under
no risk aversion or uncertainty. Hence, the expected profit function is coercive when taken with the
negative sign. Recall that cross-correlations are bounded away from 1. Hence, the variance of profits is
coercive, being a continuous and convex function of (sd)d∈D with a minimum.
2Indeed, maximizing a function is equivalent to minimizing its opposite.
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Moreover, the element outside the main diagonal can be written as
Hu(d, d′) =
∂2u(Π(s|L, ϕ, r))
∂s2d
= −rcov(Ad, Ad′). (B.7)
Let
Du ≡ diag
({
σ
(σ− 1)2 cds
2−σ
σ−1
d
}
d
)
. (B.8)
Thus, the Hessian Hu can be written as
Hu = −(Du + rΣA). (B.9)
Then, we note that matrix Du is positive definite being a diagonal matrix with all
diagonal elements positive. Moreover, rΣA is positive definite being the product of
a positive scalar with a positive definite matrix. Hence, D + rΣA is positive definite
being the sum of two positive definite matrices3 implying that Hu is negative definite.
B.2 Risk Aversion Measure
Proposition 2. (Risk aversion measure). The measure of risk aversion is a function of the
optimal production portfolio, and is equal to
r = ∑d
(Epdqd − p˜dqd)(
q
σ−1
σ
)′
ΣAq
σ−1
σ
,
where Epd is the expected price in country d, p˜d = σσ−1 cd is the price under certainty in
country d, and q
σ−1
σ is a vector whose d component is q
σ−1
σ
d , where qd is the optimal quantity
sold in country d.
Proof. Let sd = q
σ−1
σ
d .
The first order optimality condition with respect to sd is given by
∂u(Π(s|L, ϕ))
∂sd
=
∂E(Π(s|L, ϕ))
∂sd
− r
2
∂var(Π(s|L, ϕ))
∂sd
= EAd − σσ− 1cds
1
σ−1
d − rvar(Ad)sd
− r ∑
d′∈D
cov(Ad, Ad′)sd′ = 0
= EAd − σσ− 1cds
1
σ−1
d − r∑
d
cov(Ad, Ad′)sd = 0.
(B.10)
3See Horn and Johnson (2012).
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Hence, multiplying both sides of equation (B.10) by sd, and summing over d the
risk aversion coefficient r can be expressed as follows
r =
∑
d
[
EAdsd − σσ−1 cds
σ
σ−1
d
]
∑
d
∑
d′
cov(Ad, Ad′)sdsd′
=
(Epdqd − p˜dqd)(
q
σ−1
σ
)′
Σq
σ−1
σ
≡ SP
SV
, (B.11)
where p˜d = σσ−1 cd is the price firm would set under certainty, SP is the sales premium,
and SV is the sales variance.
B.3 Small-Medium and Large Multinationals
TABLE B.1: Descriptive statistics on foreign affiliates and parents of
small-medium MNEs by country
Countries
Total
sales
Sales affiliate Sales MNE Employment
N
Average Median Average Median Average Median
United States 2.4 24 14 121 86 428 388 100
France 1.6 23 17 116 86 410 372 69
Poland 1.3 18 14 111 81 468 474 76
Austria 1.3 30 16 124 103 462 411 43
Belgium 1.3 84 32 371 148 563 559 15
Czech Republic 1.1 16 13 107 83 523 491 70
China 1.0 15 9 118 85 538 527 71
United Kingdom 1.0 20 13 151 115 501 460 49
Italy 0.9 34 20 179 116 420 447 27
Switzerland 0.7 19 13 103 84 366 352 37
Germany 55.0 90 60 118 83 445 417 612
Note: Total sales are expressed in billion Euro. Sales of affiliate and MNE are expressed in million
Euro. In this table we consider subsample of multinationals with less then 1000 employees.
Source: Research Data and Service Centre (RDSC) of the Deutsche Bundesbank, Microdatabase Direct
investment (MiDi), 1999-2014, authors’ calculations.
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TABLE B.2: Descriptive statistics on foreign affiliates and parents of
large MNEs by country
Countries
Total
sales
Sales affiliate Sales MNE Employment
N
Average Median Average Median Average Median
United States 45.1 531 73 3683 716 9286 2905 85
Spain 21.7 362 43 6438 848 17396 3117 60
Brazil 16.5 275 41 5443 982 15390 4010 60
France 15.3 167 63 4328 822 11370 2954 92
United Kingdom 14.5 219 48 7120 1310 18397 3840 66
Chezh Republic 12.8 199 40 4654 508 13290 2670 64
China 9.7 89 23 3218 685 10002 2809 110
Hungary 9.0 196 46 3204 718 10861 2755 46
Mexico 8.9 255 30 9602 912 24363 4081 35
Japan 8.6 346 109 7653 824 17767 3891 25
Germany 522.1 1454 344 2161 474 6158 2152 359
Note: Total sales are expressed in billion Euro. Sales of affiliate and MNE are expressed in million
Euro. In this table we consider subsample of multinationals with more then 1000 employees.
Source: Research Data and Service Centre (RDSC) of the Deutsche Bundesbank, Microdatabase Direct
investment (MiDi), 1999-2014, authors’ calculations.
B.4 Firm Risk Aversion
This section discusses some evidence in the data and other contributions in the liter-
ature related to the assumption that firms might exhibit risk averse behavior.
Firms Diversification Strategies. In this paragraph, we discuss some patterns in
the data which are in line with the idea that firms adopt diversification strategies on
both the intensive and extensive margins of sales when carrying out their multina-
tional activity.
The diversification of sales by firms operating in international markets has been
widely discussed in the literature. Hirsch and Lev (1971) show that firms holding a
more diversified foreign sales portfolio display also more stable sales. Vannooren-
berghe (2012) provides evidence that foreign and domestic sales are negatively cor-
related at the firm level, which supports the hypothesis that firms hedge against de-
mand risk in the home country by selling abroad. This finding contradicts the theo-
retical prediction provided by models considering only productivity, which imply a
positive correlation of sales across destination markets. Fillat, Garetto, and Oldenski
(2015) show that multinational profits benefits from geographical diversification of
sales.
Using data on German multinationals, we find evidence in favor of sales diversifi-
cation. In particular, for a firm present in at least two locations (home included), we
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compute the following measure of sales concentration as
C =
∑Jj=1
(
sharej − 1J
)2
J−1
J
, (B.12)
where J is the number of firm’s locations and sharej represents the ratio of firm sales
in location j to total firm sales. Note that C equals 0 if sales evenly distribute across
different locations (minimum level of concentration), and equals 1, if sales concen-
trate in one and only one location (maximum level of concentration). Moreover,
the proposed measure takes into account the number of foreign locations a MNE
is present in, as J differs across firms.
Figure B.1 shows that firms tend to spread their sales across locations rather than
concentrate their activities. We can notice that the mode of the concentration measure
in the data is slightly above 0.2.
FIGURE B.1: Distribution of concentration measure of sales, firm level
Source: Research Data and Service Centre (RDSC) of the Deutsche
Bundesbank, Microdatabase Direct investment (MiDi), 1999-2014, authors’
calculations.
Moreover, as Figure B.2 shows, the degree of sales concentration is directly related
to firm size; smaller firms are typically more financially constrained so that holding
a portfolio of well diversified financial assets is harder for this class of enterprises.4
As a response to this, they diversify their sales across locations to reduce the degree
of riskiness related to their activity.
4In our data, the median liquidity ratio for a small (large) firm equals 1.33 (1.47). The median
solvency ratio for a small (large) firm equals 35.85 (39.15). The median current ratio for a small (large)
firm equals 1.19 (2.16). This shows that the small median firm is more financially constrained than the
(large) median firm.
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FIGURE B.2: Distribution of concentration measure of sales by size of
MNEs, firm level
Source: Research Data and Service Centre (RDSC) of the Deutsche
Bundesbank, Microdatabase Direct investment (MiDi), 1999-2014,
authors’ calculations.
FIGURE B.3: Average distance of foreign affiliates from Germany
Berlin
Number of Affiliates
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Source: Research Data and Service Centre (RDSC) of the Deutsche Bundes-
bank, Microdatabase Direct investment (MiDi), 1999-2014, authors’ calcula-
tions.
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We also relate the total sales to the average correlation of the given location with
all other markets present in our sample.5 Table B.3 shows that the sales are lower in
those locations characterized by a larger average correlation, as expected.
TABLE B.3: Location sales and average correlation
Dependent variable: log(sales) Coefficient SE
average correlation −0.3865∗∗∗ 0.1076
constant 17.8212∗∗∗ 0.0348
N 1611
R2 0.0080
Source: Research Data and Service Centre (RDSC) of the Deutsche
Bundesbank, Microdatabase Direct investment (MiDi), 1999-2014,
authors’ calculations.
In addition, diversification patterns cannot be explained by heterogeneity in firm
efficiency as we find no correlation between the proposed measure of sales portfolio
diversification and firm efficiency.6
On the extensive margin, figure B.3 shows that the average distance from Germany
of the affiliates does not monotonically increase with the number of countries the firm
operates in. Hence, firms that can afford to pay several times the fixed costs of entry
are not establishing themselves necessarily in more distant markets as predicted by
the standard theory of proximity-concentration tradeoff.
TABLE B.4: Average distance from Germany per number of affiliates
hold by an MNE
Number of affiliates Sample mean SD N
1 2795.74 3272.13 593
2 3271.36 2693.60 173
3 3676.50 2361.76 69
4 3843.34 2077.86 38
5 4223.96 2577.52 24
6 3593.86 2310.64 15
7 3455.94 1445.43 15
8 5006.77 1998.38 6
9 4177.81 1899.63 11
10 4569.92 1076.58 9
11+ 4486.80 1186.02 18
Average Distance 3119.01 2994.77 971
Source: Research Data and Service Centre (RDSC) of the
Deutsche Bundesbank, Microdatabase Direct investment
(MiDi), 1999-2014, authors’ calculations.
5For country d, the average correlation in the sector i is given by ∑d′∈D corr(αid, αid′ )/|D|.
6Firm’s productivity estimation is described in Section 2.4.1.
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Managers of Multinational Firms are Risk Averse. There are several papers show-
ing that firms are run by risk averse agents. Cucculelli and Ermini (2013) elicit CEOs’
risk attitude in a sample of 178 manufacturing firms of different sizes. They find that
most respondents exhibit an averse attitude toward risk.7 Moreover, their measure of
risk aversion varies with different firm characteristics like size and age.8 In particular,
managers of larger or older firms tend to be less risk averse. Other empirical papers
like Esposito (2017), De Sousa et al. (2017), Herranz, Krasa, and Villamil (2015) an-
alyze risk aversion in managerial behavior. In particular, the first two contributions
provide empirical evidence of risk averse attitude of exporters.
In addition, several recent surveys show that managers are concerned about the
volatility of demand in international markets and have a negative attitude toward
risk. In particular, according to the Capgemini Survey 2011, demand volatility is
the most relevant business challenge (40% of responses) in the agenda of managers
of global companies.9 These results are in line with the Capgemini Survey 2012, in
which the fraction of responses indicating demand volatility as the most relevant
concern topped 52%.10 An analogous study conducted by McKinsey in 2010 shows
that increasing volatility of customer demand is the most frequently mentioned chal-
lenge for companies operating in a global environment (37% of responses).11 These
surveys also point out that firms react to demand risk by adjusting their production
and sales plans.
The outcomes of these surveys are also relatable to the consideration that man-
agers can hardly perfectly diversify their endowment of human and physical capital
across different firms.12 Indeed, in most cases, the relation between a multinational
company and a CEO tends to be exclusive. Moreover, the theoretical contribution of
Nocke and Thanassoulis (2014) finds that risk aversion can be the outcome of credit
constraints and diminishing marginal returns to scale of an investment in a pledge-
able asset.
Managers’ risk aversion can be also due to the fact that a part of managerial com-
pensation schemes is linked to company performance. In particular, the value of
bonuses and company’s shares depends crucially on the market performance real-
ized by the firm. In this regard, Perrino, Poteshman, and S. (2002) highlight that
risk-reducing projects attract managers as they become more risk averse. Relatedly,
Abdel-Khalik (2007) shows that managers want to reduce the volatility of firms they
manage to avoid the reduction of company’s market value, as this would reflect in a
decrease of the value of their assets.
776.4% (93.2%) of respondents are (weakly) risk averse.
8The average sales, number of employees, and range of supplied products are significantly larger
for those firms run by risk loving managers than for those run by (weakly) risk averse managers.
9Based on responses from 300 leading companies managers in Europe, North and Latin America,
Asia. Demand risk result more important than other factors, like increasing material costs, meeting
changing customer requirements, sustainability, etc.
10Based on responses from 350 leading companies managers in Europe, North and
Latin America, Asia.
11Survey based on responses from 639 leading companies managers worldwide.
12This form of idiosyncratic risk cannot be diversified since markets are incomplete.
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Demands are Imperfectly Correlated across Destination Markets. Both the World
Trade Report 2008 and the World Investment Report 2008 highlight the importance
of imperfectly correlated demands across countries during the 2007 crisis. While the
Trade Report claims that exporters did not hedge during the crisis, the Investment
Report states the opposite for multinational firms. In particular, at the aggregate
level multinational firms moved their export and production toward those markets
considered as more resilient to demand shocks. During the crisis, transition and de-
veloping economies worked as a good hedge for the declining demand in developed
regions. In line with this observation, we find that German multinationals operat-
ing both in the OECD and non-OECD countries hold more diversified portfolios (in
terms of sales) than those with production plants only in one type of the country.
In particular, the median concentration for firms operating only in the non-OECD
countries is 0.65, whereas the median concentration of firms operating only in the
OECD countries is 0.38. Firms operating in both types of countries display a median
sales concentration equal to 0.32. Moreover, the extent of sales diversification may be
explained not only by the characteristics of the firms but also by the features of the
countries, with particular emphasis on market volatility.
Additionally, we compute the variance-covariance matrix at the 2-digit industry-
level of the consumption expenditure,13 using production and trade data of the top
45 German export-destination countries for the period 2002 – 2006. Figure B.4 shows
the distribution of bilateral correlations at the industry level. As it can be noticed,
the correlation of demands across countries is imperfect for all industries, with the
median correlation of demand being below 0.5.
FIGURE B.4: Distribution of demand correlations, product level
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Bilateral demand correlation
Source: UNIDO INDSTAT2 2016, authors’ calculations.
Therefore, the structure of demand correlations suggests that markets offer hedging
opportunities to multinational firms.
13For a given industry, the consumption expenditure is given by the difference between total pro-
duction and net exports.
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B.5 Risk Aversion and Aggregate Sales
Proposition 3. (Risk Aversion and Aggregate Sales). The firm’s aggregate sales are de-
creasing with risk aversion.
Proof. The system of first-order necessary and sufficient conditions reads as
EAd − σσ− 1cds
1
σ−1
d − r∑
d′
cov(Ad, Ad′)sd′ = 0, ∀d ∈ D. (B.13)
Differentiating both sides with respect to r we obtain
− σ
(σ− 1)2 cds
1
σ−1−1
d s˙d −∑
d′
cov(Ad, Ad′)sd′
−r∑
d′
cov(Ad, Ad′)s˙d′ = 0, ∀d ∈ D,
(B.14)
where s˙d ≡ ∂sd∂r for all d ∈ D. Hence, ∀d ∈ D
σ
σ− 1cds
1
σ−1−1
d s˙d = −(σ− 1)
(
∑
d′
cov(Ad, Ad′)sd′ + r∑
d′
cov(Ad, Ad′)s˙d′
)
. (B.15)
Again, using FOC we observe that
σ
σ− 1 cds
1
σ−1
d = EAd − r∑
d′
cov(Ad, Ad′)sd′ , ∀d ∈ D. (B.16)
Combining equations (B.15) and (B.16) we obtain(
EAd − r∑
d′
cov(Ad, Ad′)sd′
)
s˙d
= −(σ− 1)
(
∑
d′
cov(Ad, Ad′)sd′ + r∑
d′
cov(Ad, Ad′)s˙d′
) (B.17)
for all d, which implies
EAd s˙d = −(σ− 1)
(
∑
d′
cov(Ad, Ad′)sd′ + r∑
d′
cov(Ad, Ad′)s˙d′
)
+ r∑
d′
cov(Ad, Ad′)sd′ s˙d.
(B.18)
Summing both sides over d we obtain
∑
d
EAd s˙d =− (σ− 1)
(
∑
d
∑
d′
cov(Ad, Ad′)sd′ + r∑
d
∑
d′
cov(Ad, Ad′)s˙d′
)
+ r∑
d
∑
d′
cov(Ad, Ad′)sd′ s˙d.
(B.19)
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where the left hand side is the derivative of the aggregate sales with respect to r. We
want to show that this derivative is negative.
Let’s consider the term in brackets of equation (B.19). Recall that
− σ
σ− 1 cds
1
σ−1−1
d s˙d =∑
d′
cov(Ad, Ad′)sd′ + r∑
d′
cov(Ad, Ad′)s˙d′ . (B.20)
Multiplying both sides of equation (B.20) by s˙d, we obtain
− σ
σ− 1 cds
1
σ−1−1
d (s˙d)
2 =∑
d′
cov(Ad, Ad′)sd′ s˙d + r∑
d′
cov(Ad, Ad′)s˙d′ s˙d. (B.21)
Summing over d and re-arranging, we obtain
∑
d
∑
d′
cov(Ad, Ad′)sd′ s˙d =− r∑
d
∑
d′
cov(Ad, Ad′)s˙d′ s˙d
−∑
d
σ
σ− 1 cds
1
σ−1−1
d (s˙d)
2.
(B.22)
We note that the left hand side of the above expression has to be negative since the
right hand side is the sum of two negative terms, i.e.
∑
d
∑
d′
cov(Ad, Ad′)sd′ s˙d < 0. (B.23)
Incidentally we also notice that
r∑
d
∑
d′
cov(Ad, Ad′)s˙d s˙d′ +∑
d
∑
d′
cov(Ad, Ad′)sd′ s˙d < 0. (B.24)
Finally, note that var(A′s+ rA′ s˙) can be written as
∑
d
∑
d′
cov(Ad, Ad′)sdsd′ + 2r∑
d
∑
d′
cov(Ad, Ad′)sd′ s˙d
+r2∑
d
∑
d′
cov(Ad, Ad′)s˙d′ s˙d =
∑
d
∑
d′
cov(Ad, Ad′)sdsd′ + r∑
d
∑
d′
cov(Ad, Ad′)sd′ s˙d
+r
(
r∑
d
∑
d′
cov(Ad, Ad′)s˙d′ s˙d +∑
d
∑
d′
cov(Ad, Ad′)sd′ s˙d
)
> 0.
(B.25)
From equation (B.24) we notice that the term in the brackets is negative. Hence, the
sum outside the brackets has to be positive since the variance is a positive number,
i.e.
∑
d
∑
d′
cov(Ad, Ad′)sdsd′ + r∑
d
∑
d′
cov(Ad, Ad′)sd′ s˙d > 0. (B.26)
Hence, considering equations (B.19), (B.22) and (B.25), we conclude that aggregate
sales are decreasing in r.
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B.6 Price Setting
In this section, we assume that the firm maximizes its expected-utility function of
profits realized in the destination market with respect to the price rather than
quantity.
Recall that consumer utility is
Ud =
I
∑
i=1
αid ln Qid + Q0d, (B.27)
with
Qid =
[∫
ω∈Ωid
qid(ω)
σ−1
σ dω
] σ
σ−1
. (B.28)
Utility maximization implies the following direct demand function for the variety
qid(ω) = αid pid(ω)−σPσ−1id , (B.29)
where
Pid =
[∫
ω∈Ωid
pid(ω)1−σdω
] 1
1−σ
. (B.30)
Firm’s profits as a function of the price p = (p1, p2, . . . , pd, . . . , pN) are given by
Π(p|L,ϕ, r) =∑
d
pdqd − cdqd
=∑
d
αd p1−σd P
σ−1
id − cdαd p−σd Pσ−1d
=∑
d
αdPσ−1d p
−σ
d (pd − cd) .
(B.31)
From equation (B.31), expected profits E[Π(p|L,ϕ, r)] are given by
EΠ[(Π(p|L,ϕ, r))] =∑
d
α¯dPσ−1d p
−σ
d (pd − cd) , (B.32)
whereas the variance var(Π(p|L,ϕ, r)) is given by
var(Π(p|L,ϕ, r)) =∑
d
∑
d′
cov(αd, αd′)Pσ−1d P
σ−1
d′ p
−σ
d p
−σ
d′ (pd − cd) (pd′ − cd′) . (B.33)
Recall that the objective function of the firm is given by
u(Π(p|L,ϕ, r)) = E[(Π(p|L,ϕ, r))]− r
2
var((Π(p|L,ϕ, r)). (B.34)
The first order derivative of E[(Π(p|L,ϕ, r))] with respect to pd is given by
∂E[(Π(p|L,ϕ, r))]
∂pd
= α¯dPσ−1d p
−σ
d (1− σ) + cdα¯dσp−σ−1d Pσ−1d
= α¯dPσ−1d
(
p−σd (1− σ) + cdσp−σ−1d
)
.
(B.35)
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The expected profits have one critical point which corresponds to the standard con-
stant markup over cost pricing. In particular, a firm maximizes the expected profits
if pd = σσ−1 cd for all destination markets. This corresponds to the problem when a
firm is not risk averse or there is no risk.
The first order derivative of var(Π(p|L,ϕ, r)) with respect to pd is given by
∂var(Π(p|L,ϕ, r))
∂pd
= 2
(
p−σd (1− σ) + cdσp−σ−1d
)
·∑
d′
cov(αd, αd′)Pσ−1d P
σ−1
d′ p
−σ
d′ (pd′ − cd).
(B.36)
Hence, the variance has two salient critical points: (i) pd = cd for all destination
markets, and (ii) pd = σσ−1 cd for all destination markets. The second critical point
is irrelevant as it is a local maximum of the variance. Instead, the first critical point
is a global minimum of the variance function. In particular, the firm can make the
variance of profits equal to 0 if pd = cd for all destination markets.
From the above analysis, we can draw the following conclusion. On the one hand a
firm wants to maximize its expected profits by setting the standard constant markup
over marginal cost implied by the CES preferences. On the other hand, the firm wants
to minimize the variance by pricing at the marginal cost in each destination market.
Let ζ(pd) ≡
(
p−σd (1− σ) + cdσp−σ−1d
)
. Then, the optimality condition
∂u(Π(p|L,ϕ, r))/∂pd can be written as
∂u(Π(p|L,ϕ, r))
∂pd
= α¯dPσ−1d ζ(pd)
− rζ(pd)∑
d′
cov(αd, αd′)Pσ−1d P
σ−1
d′ p
−σ
d′ (pd′ − cd′) = 0.
(B.37)
Equation (B.37) can be also arranged in the following way
pd =
σ
σ− 1cd + r
(
pd − σσ−1 cd
)
α¯d
∑
d′
cov(αd, αd′)Pσ−1d′
pd′ − cd′
pσd′
, (B.38)
which shows that the optimal price can be shifted upward or downward depending
on the diversification potential of market d.
We focus on two cases: (i) the case in which pd = σσ−1 cd for all markets d, and (ii)
the case in which pd 6= σσ−1 for some market d.
Consider the case (i). The element (d, d′) in the Hessian matrix associated to the
utility function in (B.34) is given by
Hu(d, d′) =
(
∂2u(Π(p|L,ϕ, r))
∂pd∂pd′
)
. (B.39)
Then, if d 6= d′, the element of
Hu(d, d′) = 0, (B.40)
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when evaluated at pd = σσ−1 cd for all d.
Instead, if d = d′, the element of Hu(d, d), evaluated at pd = σσ−1 cd for all d, is given
by
∂2u(Π(p|L,ϕ, r))
∂p2d
= ζ ′
(
cd
1
σ− 1
)
Pσ−1d
·
(
α¯d − rσ−σ(σ− 1)σ−1∑
d′
cov(αd, α′d)P
σ−1
d′ c
1−σ
d′
)
,
(B.41)
as ζ
(
σ
σ−1 cd
)
= 0. Moreover, ζ ′ (pd) < 0 for pd = σσ−1 cd.
Hence, the a constant-markup over marginal cost is a local maximum if and only if
Hu(d, d) < 0 or, equivalently, if and only if
r < min
d∈{1,...,N}
α¯d
σ−σ(σ− 1)σ−1 ∑d′ cov(αd, αd′)Pσ−1d′ c1−σd′
(B.42)
for all d ∈ D.
Consider now case (ii). For some destination d, the firm charges a price differ-
ent from the constant markup over marginal cost. Then, we can rearrange equation
(B.37) in the following way.
pd − cd
pσd
=
α¯d
rvar(αd)Pσ−1d
− ∑
d′ 6=d
Pσ−1d′
cov(αd, αd′)
var(αd)
pd′ − cd′
pσd
=
α¯d
rvar(αd)Pσ−1d
− ∑
d′ 6=d
Pσ−1d′ βd,d′
pd′ − cd′
pσd′
(B.43)
where βd,d′ ≡ cov(αd,αd′ )var(αd) . The left hand side of the above expression measures firm’s
market power.
A closed form solution for pd cannot be obtained in this case. However, to get some
intuition, let cov(αd, α′d) = 0 for all d, d
′ with d 6= d′. Then, the above expression
reads as
pd − cd
pσd
=
α¯d
rvar(αd)Pσ−1d
. (B.44)
Hence, larger and stabler markets allow the firm to increase the price for
that market. A more risk averse firm tends to charge a lower price.
Assume also that σ = 2 similarly to De Sousa et al. (2017). Then, the solution14
implied by equation (B.44) when σ = 2 is given by
pd =
rPdvar(αd) + α¯d
√
rPdvar(αd)(Pdrvar(αd)−4α¯dcd)
α¯2
2αd
≥ 2cd. (B.45)
14When σ = 2 and all covariances are zero, the Hessian of the utility function is a diagonal matrix
whose d element on the main diagonal is given by
Hd,d = −
64α¯6dc
2
dP
2
d rvar(αd)(
Pdrvar(αd) + α¯d
√
Pdrvar(αd)(−4α¯dcd+Pdrvar(αd))
α¯2
)6 < 0.
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As the Hessian is negative definite, the first order conditions expressed by (B.37) are
sufficient. From (B.45), We can observe that the firm charges a price which exceeds
the standard constant markup over marginal cost price.
Moreover, when σ = 2 and all covariances are equal to 0, we are able to compare
the price implied by the solution to the utility maximization problem under price
choice with the price selected by the firm in equation (B.45). To see this, consider
(2.16). In this case, we obtain
qd =
(
E[Ad]
2cd
)2
·
 1
1+ r var(Ad)2cd
2 . (B.46)
Recall that EAd = α¯dQ
− σ−1σ
d . Hence, rearranging we obtain
qd =
α¯2dQd
(2cdQd + rvar(αd))
2 . (B.47)
Plugging into the equation (B.29), we obtain an expression for the expected
price Epd
Epd = 2cd + r
Pdvar(αd)
α¯d
(B.48)
which does not solve the first order conditions (B.37) with respect to price. Hence, the
expected price implied under quantity choice differs from that chosen by the profit
maximizing firm under price choice. Moreover, the expected price under quantity
choice exceeds the risk-neutral price by an amount which represents the per-unit
risk-premium the firm asks for selling the product in the destination market d.
Comparing the price expression from equation (B.48) with that of equation (B.45),
we obtain
Epd ≥ pd ⇔ var(αd) ≥ 4α¯dcdPdr (B.49)
provided α¯d ≥ 1.
Hence, when uncertainty is a relatively large concern for the firm (either high risk
aversion or high variance), the risk-premium in terms of extra markup required by
the firm is larger in the quantity setting case. This hints at the fact that with large
variance the firm is shipping a smaller amount of the good to the destination market
than those expected under price choice. Under quantity choice the firm needs to plan
in advance and pay the production costs upfront. Hence, the firm would be prefer
to produce a relatively small quantity to reduce its exposure to adversarial demand
fluctuations in the foreign markets.
B.7 Different Timing
Recall that firm’s problem consists of three decisions, as discussed in Section 2.2.
Specifically, one of the assumptions of the model is that the firm decides on how
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much to sell in each destination market before observing the actual realizations of
the demand. In this section, we relax this assumption in the following way.15 We
assume that the firm decides the level of production in each of its foreign affiliate
before observing the demand shocks. However, the firm can optimally readjust its
sales according to the demand realizations in the different markets in which it is
operating, given the chosen level of production. As a preliminary, we notice that this
different specification of the timing does not affect location and shipment decisions
as presented in Section 2.2.
Assume that the firm has chosen a level of production ql for l ∈ L. As discussed,
the level of production in each plant reflects the plant productivity, the benefits (in
terms of trade cost savings and market sizes of the destination markets) associated
to the export platform, and the degree of firm’s risk aversion.
SSuppose that the firm has to decide on how much to sell in each destination mar-
ket after having observed the demand realizations Ad in each market d. Then, the
firm needs to solve
max
q∈RL+N+
∑
d
∑
l
(pd − τld)qld
s.t. ∑
d
qld ≤ ql ∀l ∈ L,
∑
l
qld = qd ∀d.
(B.50)
The first set of constraints expresses the fact that the output sold in the different
markets from the plant in country l cannot exceed the output therein produced. The
second set of constraints states that the quantity sold in d equals the sum of outputs
produced in the different locations and meant to be sold in the destination market d
itself. 624
625 After the shocks have realized, the production costs are sunk. Hence, the firm
only wants to maximize the difference between the price in each destination mar-
ket and the trade costs associated to that market, given the capacity constraints set
in the previous stage. As the firm considers the realized demand, we observe that
pd = Adq
− 1σ
d . Notice that this specification of the problem complicates the analysis.
When the firm makes the production and shipment decisions at the same time, then
each destination market is served by one and only one location, as trade costs and
marginal production costs are constant. However, when these decisions are sepa-
rated, the amount of production carried out in one plant, which operates as a ca-
pacity constraint, can be insufficient to accommodate the total demand in a given
destination market. In other words, the firm serves a destination market from the
optimal origin as long as the built-up capacity suffices. Then, it has to resort to some
stored capacity available in other plants. Moreover, the original location-destination
15Notice that also other specifications are possible. For example, demand realizations might be
observed by the firms after the entry has taken place. However, this would imply that risk aversion
only affects entry choices, which is inconsistent with what we observe in the data.
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paths that firm accounts for when selecting the optimal level of production can be no
longer relevant, as the production costs are sunk. In particular, when maximizing its
profits, the firm only considers the trade costs associated to each plant together with
its capacity, and this fact potentially determines different location-destination paths
from the original one.
Using pd = Adq
− 1σ
d and the constraint ∑l qld = qd, firm’s problem (B.50) can be
written as
max
q∈RL+N+
∑
d
Ad
(
∑
l
qld
) σ−1
σ
−∑
d
∑
l
τldqld
s. t. ∑
d
qld ≤ ql ∀l ∈ L.
(B.51)
Then, the optimality conditions for the problem (B.51) are given by
(i)
σ− 1
σ
Ad
(
∑
l
qld
)− 1σ
− τld − λl + µld = 0 ∀l, d (B.52)
(ii) λl
(
−ql +∑
d
qld
)
= 0 ∀l (B.53)
(iii) ∑
d
qld ≤ ql and λl ≥ 0 ∀l (B.54)
(iv) µldqld = 0 ∀l, d (B.55)
(v) µld ≥ 0 ∧ qld ≥ 0, (B.56)
where µld is the multiplier associated to the non-negativity constraint for qld and
λl is the multiplier associated to the capacity constraint in location l. Notice that the
existence of a solution derives from Weierstrass theorem whereas uniqueness follows
from concavity of the objective function and linearity of the constraint functions.
This timing does not affect qualitatively our major findings concerning the struc-
ture of multinational sales. The realized price in each market for the optimal
(qld)l∈L,d∈D differs from the standard markup over marginal cost and that they are
heterogeneous with respect to firm and destination. To note this point, we write the
set of conditions (B.52) in terms of qd as a function of the parameters
qd =
(
σ− 1
σ
Ad
τld − µld + λl
)σ
∀l, d. (B.57)
Then, it follows from the conditions in (B.57) that
τl′d − τld = (λl − λl′) + (µl′d − µld) ∀l, l′, d. (B.58)
Hence, if the difference between the trade costs of serving market d from locations
l and l′ is large, then the value of relaxing the capacity constraint associated to the
plant l compared with that associated to plant l′ has to be large as well. In addition,
B.8. Liberalization 115
notice that if τld = minl′ τl′d, then for any l′ 6= l, then
λl − λl′ + µl′d − µld ≥ 0. (B.59)
This means that when a firm sells its product to a country in which it has a production
facility, either it does from the location itself, in which case µld = 0, or it needs to be
the case that the difference between λl and λl′ has to be relatively large. This might
be the consequence of the fact that the firm has built a low level of capacity in the
plant l itself in the previous stage.
In addition, we note that the quantity qd depends negatively on the level of trade
costs to serve the market d, positively on the market size and the capacity built-up in
the previous period. Moreover, the quantity sold in a market under demand risk is
not larger than the quantity sold under no risk if firm’s capacity in l associated to the
first scenario is lower than the one in the second one.
Finally, from equation (B.57), we can obtain an expression for the realized price. In
particular,
pd =
σ
σ− 1 (τld − µld + λl) ∀d. (B.60)
From the expression (B.60), though high marginal costs of production induce large
prices, we observe that the price in this setting is potentially different from that
emerging in the parallel model where we set the demand risk equal to zero.
B.8 Liberalization
Proposition 4. Suppose a firm sells its variety in the destination market d˜ from its foreign
affiliate located in l. Then, a reduction in the trade cost τld˜ increases firm’s sales to the
destination market d˜.
Proof. As discussed in the chapter, for each firm there is a unique location-destination
path which is optimal. For this reason, we suppress the subscript of the origin loca-
tion l, assuming that the firm serves the foreign market d˜ in the optimal way.
Consider the first order condition (B.2) given by
E[Ad]− r∑
d′
cov(Ad, A′d)sd′ −
σ
σ− 1cds
1
σ−1
d = 0. (B.61)
Then, for any d, we can differentiate both sides of the above equation with respect
to τd˜. We distinguish two cases. If d = d˜, then
− σ
(σ− 1)2 cd˜s
2−σ
σ−1
d˜
s˙d˜ − r∑
d′
cov(Ad˜, Ad′)s˙d′ =
σ
σ− 1 s
1
σ−1
d˜
c˙d˜. (B.62)
If d 6= d˜, then
− σ
(σ− 1)2 cds
2−σ
σ−1
d s˙d − r∑
d′
cov(Ad˜, Ad′)s˙d′ = 0. (B.63)
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By multiplying both sides of the above equations by s˙d and adding them up side
by side over destinations, we obtain
∑˜
d
σ
(σ− 1)2 cd′s
2−σ
σ−1
d s˙
2
d + r ∑˜
d
∑
d′
cov(Ad˜, Ad′)s˙d s˙d˜ = −
σ
σ− 1 s
1
σ−1
d˜
s˙d˜. (B.64)
Note that ∑
d˜
∑
d′
cov(Ad˜, Ad′)s˙d s˙d˜ > 0 which is a positive quadratic form, being ΣA
positive definite. Hence, the left-hand side of equation (B.64) is positive, as it is the
sum of positive numbers. Therefore, s˙d < 0.
B.9 Fixed Cost Estimation
Estimation of fixed costs can be carried out adapting the approach discussed in Tin-
telnot (2017). Consider the problem of a firm with risk aversion equal to r, core
productivity ϕ, and fixed entry costs f . Firm productivity in each foreign country
l is γlϕ where γl is a country-specific shifter common to all firms. Hence, if a firm
establishes a foreign affiliate in country l, its marginal cost equals 1/(γlϕ). The firm
selects the set L ∈ 2N−1 if for all L′ ∈ 2N−1
V(L)−F (L) ≥ V(L′)−F (L′), (B.65)
where V(L) is the indirect utility function associated to the set L and F (L) = ∑l∈L fl .
Hence, the probability that the firm selects the set L over all other location sets is
given by
Pr(L|ϕ, r, τ,γ,EA,ΣA, θ f ) =∫
f
1
(
V(L)−F (L) ≥ V(L′)−F (L′) ∀L ∈ 2N−1
)
dG f ( f ; θ f ), (B.66)
where G f is the (differentiable) cdf of the fixed costs parametrized by the parameter
vector θ f .
Once firm enters in the chosen location set, productivity, risk aversion and the mar-
ket characteristics (expected and realized sizes and variance of demand realizations,
trade costs and shifters) determine the level of sales associated to each location. The
theoretical revenues realized by the firm depend on r and all the above variables.
We assume that risk aversion and core productivities are distributed according to
continuous parametric cdfs Gr(r; θr) and Gϕ(ϕ; θϕ), respectively, where θr includes
the parameters associated to the distribution of risk aversion, whereas θϕ includes
those associated to the distribution of core productivities.
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Hence, the contribution to the likelihood of firm i is given by the product of ob-
serving the chosen location sets multiplied by the densities of firm’s revenues si in
the different plants, i.e.
li(θ|Li, si) =∫
ϕ
∫
r
Pr(Li|ϕ, r, τ,γ,EA,ΣA, θ f )dGs(si|Li, ϕ, r)dGr(r; θr)dGϕ(ϕ; θϕ), (B.67)
where θ = (θ f , θr, θϕ) and Gs is the cdf of the revenues. As our model does not
yield a closed-form solution for the revenues, the density of sales needs to be non-
parametrically estimated.
The likelihood function implied by our model is then given by
l (θ|{Li}i=1,...,I , {si}i=1,...,I) =
I
∏
i=1
li(θ|Li, si), (B.68)
where I equals to total number of firms in our sample. In order to obtain estimates
of θ, we can maximize function in (B.68) subject to the constraint that the theoretical
sales for each firm implied by our model match those observed in the data.
B.10 Firm Characteristics and Risk Aversion
TABLE B.5: Aggregate sales and risk aversion
Dependent variable: total group sales Coefficient SE
risk aversion −0.5835∗∗∗ 0.0133
productivity 0.6740∗∗∗ 0.0283
number of affiliates 0.1478∗∗∗ 0.0083
constant 2.7747∗∗∗ 0.0954
industry fixed effects Yes Yes
N 952
Source: Research Data and Service Centre (RDSC) of the
Deutsche Bundesbank, Microdatabase Direct investment (MiDi),
1999-2014, authors’ calculations.
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TABLE B.6: Gearing and risk aversion
Dependent variable: gearing Coefficient SE
risk aversion 17.5022∗∗ 8.5526
size −21.2136 31.0504
size*risk aversion −13.0365 10.4800
age −4.4616 3.8717
constant 248.1135 37.3606
industry fixed effects Yes Yes
N 393
Source: Research Data and Service Centre (RDSC) of the Deutsche
Bundesbank, Microdatabase Direct investment (MiDi), 1999-2014,
authors’ calculations.
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